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This dissertation examines the efforts of the South Vietnamese government along with 
their American military and civilian advisors to devise and implement programs to combat the 
Viet Cong Infrastructure in South Vietnam prior to the assassination of President Ngo Dinh 
Diem in 1963. This dissertation will focus on both the Agroville and Strategic Hamlet Programs 
examining their organization, construction, and goals and the Viet Cong response to counter their 
implementation. It examines how the South Vietnamese with assistance from the United States 
military and Central Intelligence Agency under Presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. 
Kennedy conducted armed nation-building from 1955‒63 on an unprecedented scale. This 
dissertation argues that the Viet Cong Infrastructure was so pervasive, and their control of the 
peasants using terror so systematic, that the price in time, treasure, and especially blood was 
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It is not given to human beings, happily for them, for otherwise, life would be intolerable, 
to foresee or to predict to any large extent the unfolding course of events. In one phase 
men seem to have been right; in another, they seem to have been wrong. Then again, a 
few years later, when the perspective of time has lengthened, all stand in a different 
setting. There is a new proportion. There is another scale of values. 
 
       Winston Churchill   
Should I become President . . .  I will not risk American lives . . . by permitting any other 
nation to drag us into the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time through an 
unwise commitment that is unwise militarily, unnecessary to our security and 
unsupported by our allies. 
 
       John F. Kennedy 
Everything depends on the Americans. If they want to make war for 20 years then we 
shall make war for 20 years. If they want to make peace, we shall make peace and invite 
them to tea afterwards. 
        
Ho Chi Minh 
 We . . . didn’t know about the redoubtable nature of the North Vietnamese regime. We 
didn’t know what steadfast, stubborn, dedicated people they were. Their willingness to 
absorb losses compared with ours wasn’t even in the same ballpark.  
 
Gen. William DePuy    
 A democracy cannot fight a Seven Year’s War.  






I start with what this dissertation is not—neither a definitive history of the Vietnam War 
nor a description of how the war was fought; both have been done by several famous scholars 
and authors who have devoted decades of research and study to the subject. Nor have I written an 
apologia or indictment, neither a celebration of “ignominious defeat” nor a lament about it. 
Whatever I have written, thought, or felt in the past about America's problems with war 
and peace has converged on the theme of the nature and meaning of our military failure(s) in 
Vietnam, or in Iraq and Afghanistan. No American service member who participated in any of 
those three wars can pretend to view the consequences of those failures with complete emotional 
detachment. Looking back, I believe the best you can do to achieve perspective is to strive for a 
certain emotional distance from your subject. When the subject is your own nation and its 
institutions, it is hard to keep the distance. Your hopes and fears for America manage to show 
through and color the analysis. 
My studies have confirmed to me that those wars of choice provided abundant evidence 
of good men, with good intentions, who struggled and lived with the decisions they made, men 
groping for answers in the quiet of the night. But I have also found that the decisions of all too 
many of our political and military leaders were based on ignorance.  Others believed all means, 
no matter how brutal, are justified in the pursuit of American political goals.  A lack of political, 
and more importantly, moral courage prevented not a few from revising mistaken decisions even 
after they had recognized them as such. Worst of all, there were also those who did not hesitate 
consciously to deceive the American people about those three wars in order not to lose political 




Obviously, any work about America's reaction to the fact of our military failure in 
Vietnam (or Iraq and Afghanistan) at a time when it was still a matter of public debate is bound 
to be interpreted within the frame of concern, and the question will be asked what is this 
dissertation “for” or “against”?  
I love my country, but it is no service to it, or to its people, to gloss over the rough facts 
of the consequences of our mistakes. If there are some consequences I have not confronted, it has 
not been through lack of diligence or realism, but because I have tried to focus on the most 
important ones and their related aspects. In dealing with something as provocative and 
demoralizing as failure, it is easy to get thrown off track by the transient and miss the enduring 
and significant.  
I will state for the record that I do not believe for a second that our ultimate failure in 
Vietnam (nor Iraq or Afghanistan) was due to either avarice or malignant intent. The men who 
made the tough decisions after 1945 inherited a set of assumptions rising out of the tragedies of 
Hitler, World War II, Stalin, Mao, and the other twentieth-century totalitarians.  
Over the last forty years, prominent scholars have challenged what came to be called the 
“Munich Analogy” so widely offered by a long line of United States presidents and others who 
defended their post-World War II foreign policy. They have noted significant differences 
between Munich and the later events, which Washington officials used to justify their 
interventionist practices. But they largely missed the most important point, which our post-war 
presidents and their supporters could not ignore. Perhaps had the free world developed the 
strength, unity, and will to defend freedom in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere; it could have 
stopped Hitler long before he became a menace to world peace and, therefore, saved more than 




free men let down their guard, lack the intelligence to see danger ahead, or fail to accept the hard 
duties that that knowledge imposed. Instead, they should pay the price of eternal vigilance and 
build the strength to defend their liberties. The critical mistake was made when free men failed to 
establish through the League of Nations, or some other way, an effective collective security 
against all alterations of the Treaty of Versailles (except by negotiation) and all violations of 
world peace. That failure, aided by a divisive, ignorant, and stubborn nationalism, released 
violence and destruction upon the world and denied to any agency the necessary role of 
policeman of the peace, so bitterly and tragically won in 1918. Nor frankly, did it matter that 
Czechoslovakia was more homogeneous, technically advanced, or better governed than Vietnam 
or Korea. The latter two peoples had as much right to seek freedom as did Czechoslovakia. 
To be fair, there may have indeed been many differences between Munich and the later 
events in Vietnam. The opponents of the Munich analogy loved to cite them, but there was one 
important identical factor in both: the dangerous force of aggressive authoritarianism, which 
sought to expand against its neighbors and subvert systems counter to its will. Vast Soviet 
seizures along their bloodstained western rim lands; the Communist takeovers in Cuba, China, 
North Vietnam, North Korea, and elsewhere; the incursions into North Africa, South America, 
and the Near East aroused little or no fears in them. While Communist totalitarianism marched 
on, they expressed little concern; termed efforts to contain it as reactionary capitalist meddling; 
and gave the impression that resistance against it was worse than the conquest.  In 1938, it was 
able to do so for lack of sufficient strength and will to resist. Since 1945, aggression has been 
halted in a few spots without the need for a great world war, but only because the United States 





In the years following the Vietnam War, those who rejected the Munich analogy offered 
no adequate solutions to aggression or for internal subversive grabs backed by the Communists. 
They expressed little fear of the ideological challenge. They suggested no concern that it be 
defeated. They offered no viable option but coexistence or acquiescence. They equated 
America’s resistance to such aggression as imperialism. They seemed unable to see a powerful 
force on the march against freedom over the globe.  
Our fears may have been exaggerated. Even dictatorships and all socialist states at that 
time had their own problems and suffered setbacks. In the space of my lifetime, events revealed 
that nationalism had more appeal than socialism for the world proletariat. Tito, Mao, Castro, and 
others were first nationalists and only secondarily Communists and hardly Communists at all if 
that meant accepting guidance from Moscow or any outside leadership. As of the writing of this 
dissertation, nationalism is still a more powerful force than Communism or internationalism.  
At the risk of torturing Søren Kierkegaard’s metaphor, life truly can only be understood 
backwards; but it must be lived forwards. Mankind stumbles forward as best it can from crisis to 
crisis, and the historian faces the burden of describing and explaining what was, not what ought 








Hindsight is corrupting and distorting and pays no respect to the way life is really 
lived—forwards, generally blindly, full of accidents, fortunes, and misfortunes, 
patternless, and often adrift. Easy in hindsight to say we would beat Napoleon at 
Waterloo: only by a whisker, according to the honest general who did it. Easy to say 
we would win the Second World War: ask those who watched the dogfights of the 
Battle of Britain in Kent in 1940.  Easy to say the Berlin Wall was bound to fall. 
Which influential commentator or body of opinion said so in the 1980s? Hindsight 
is the easy way to mop up the mess which we call history; it is too often the refuge 
of the tidy-minded, making neat patterns when the dust has settled. As often as not, 
when the dust was flying, no one at the time knew what the outcome might be.1 
 Melvyn Bragg 
 British Broadcaster 
It is often said that war, virtually any war, raises a number of questions that often remain 
unanswered long after the fighting has ended. The Vietnam War was no exception. Despite the 
efforts of some revisionist historians to reinterpret the meaning of the Vietnam War as but one 
piece of a larger Third World War against the Communist powers (1917‒91), we did lose that 
war.2  Our repeatedly stated objective from the very beginning of our involvement was to preserve 
South Vietnam as an “independent, non-communist state,” which we were unable to achieve.3 
 
 
                                                 
1. Melvyn Bragg, The Adventure of English: The Biography of a Language (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2003). 
2. Michael Lind, The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous Military Conflict (Simon 
and Schuster, 2002). The Cold War, according to Lind, was actually the Third World War of the 20th century, and the 
proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan were its major campaigns. America fought the war in Vietnam because 
of geopolitics and forfeited the war because of domestic politics. To Lind, the ultimate responsibility lay with neither 
the new civilian policy elite nor the American press, but with the US military establishment, which failed to adapt to 
the demands of what before 1968 had been largely a guerrilla war. In Lind’s interpretation of the conduct of the war, 
the high costs of the military command’s misguided approach in American and Vietnamese lives sapped the support of 
the American people for the nation’s commitment to Indochina. The ill will engendered by the war undermined US 
public support for the Cold War on all fronts. 




This dissertation is specifically concerned with the efforts of American service personnel 
assigned by the US government to act as advisors to the South Vietnamese government and 
military to establish effective control in South Vietnam’s rural areas, how successful they were in 
accomplishing those objectives, and how their actions influenced the enemy. A review of US Army 
advisory programs in the Vietnam War provides a framework for analysis and will help to illustrate 
the human factors, events, and considerations, which fundamentally changed American objectives 
from a historical culture of mass armies and the use of attrition to one of decentralized, small-scale 
interactions with the population.  
United States military involvement in Vietnam began on July 26, 1950, when President 
Harry Truman authorized $15 million in military aid to the French. It is from this point that 
American military advisors began to accompany the flow of US tanks, planes, artillery, and other 
supplies to Vietnam. Over the next four years, the US spent three billion dollars on the French war 
and by 1954 provided eighty percent of all war supplies used by the French. Later that same year, 
the US established a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Saigon to coordinate both 
material and financial aid to the French.  
While this dissertation focuses on a specific military effort to advise and support an Allied 
nation in time of war, the goal of this thesis is to examine the dynamics of these individual 
programs that shared common goals throughout the Vietnam War. Analysis of each of these 
programs and the various factors affecting them will lead to greater insight into their success or 
failure. Of related and critical significance are the political-social problems which develop between 
the US government and the Government of Vietnam (South). Accurate information and reporting is 
needed not only on the enemy, but also on the host government because corruption, resource 
3 
 
allocation, and diminished popular support are usually the factors which force the host country to 
request the aid of the United States in the first place.  
In order to trace the origins of the US Army’s long, and frequently unhappy, involvement in 
Vietnam from 1955 to the end of the Kennedy administration in context, this dissertation describes 
at some length the evolution of the US advisory effort toward Vietnam as well. Beginning in 1950, 
the US was drawn haphazardly into a confusing and ill-defined mission to assist first the French in 
their effort to retain their position in Vietnam and then, in fits and starts, the South Vietnamese in 
their struggle to establish a free, independent, non-Communist country able to defend itself. 
Seemingly making it up as they went, multiple US governmental agencies conducted poorly 
coordinated efforts to help the South Vietnamese. Untethered to any in-country command structure, 
these agencies reported on their efforts directly to their parent organizations in Washington, DC. 
Agencies in many cases were competing against each other for influence and wasting precious 
resources.4 The focus of this dissertation is an examination of those American military and civilian 
personnel tasked by the US government to act as advisors to their South Vietnamese counterparts. 
Those seeking a comprehensive history of US-Vietnam relations, the political development of 
North and South Vietnam, or the international and legal ramifications of the wars in Vietnam may 
refer to the many excellent works on those subjects cited in the footnotes and the bibliographical 
pages of this work. While this dissertation does not cover all aspects of American policy toward 
Vietnam, the reader will find that this examination of the activities of those Americans tasked to 
work with their South Vietnamese counterparts will shed considerable light on that policy. The 
Vietnam War has left a legacy of controversy concerning most major American actions and 
decisions as well as those of our enemies and allies. There is no expectation that the conclusions 
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reached in this account will meet with universal agreement on the part of former participants in, 
and students of, the conflict. The author believes that the efforts of those tasked to advise the South 
Vietnamese are described fairly, accurately, and without bias toward any particular organization or 
individual. 
 




The United States’ lack of understanding of Vietnam was a core problem.  It led to the 
collection of a vast amount of war data collected on seemingly every facet of life.  The American 
industrial method in making war dictated that constructed ratios, such as kill ratios, rice production 
ratios, or personnel force ratios vies-a-vie the enemy, would result in victory or would at least 
provide Americans an answer to the question “Are we winning?”  American leaders assumed that it 
could achieve its political goal, pacification of the Vietnamese population, through military mean, 
and its progress could be measured in concrete figures.   
In a broad sense, a critical flaw existed in evaluating the success or failure of pacification 
programs during the war, pacification was defined as:   
The military, political, economic and social process of establishing or re-establishing 
local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It 
includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of 
the enemy's underground government, the assertion or re-assertion of political 
control and involvement of the people in government, and the initiation of economic 
and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion. The economic element 
of pacification includes the opening of roads and waterways and the maintenance of 
lines of communication important to economic and military activity.5 
The problem with this definition is obvious: Success in war occurs when the nation’s 
political goals are achieved, not by the number of enemy units destroyed, roads opened, schools 
built, or food delivered. America’s purpose for involvement in South Vietnam was to ensure the 
viability of a stable, democratic South Vietnam able to withstand external and internal coercion. 
Operational success in support of a population, while humane, does not necessarily ensure the 
                                                 
5. “1968 Pacification Planning: Definition of Terms,” Memorandum to Corps DEPCORDS, Austin, TX, Lyndon 
Baines Johnson Library, Komer-Leonhart Files, Box 17, 1967. 
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achievement of strategic or political objectives. Defining the objective improperly creates 
handicaps before the war has even begun. The historical record shows that insurgencies can be just 
as brutal as conventional military engagements between opposing conventional armies. 
Due to the fluid nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare, American advisors 
involved in both main force combat and pacification missions were forced to modify their efforts 
numerous times during the war. First, the expectation of the wildly optimistic idea of “nation-
building,” whose goal was the eventual transformation of South Vietnam into a model of 
democracy for Southeast Asia, was constantly reevaluated—usually downward. After nation 
building proved too difficult, next came the “hearts and minds” phase of winning over the 
population, which then led to the simpler concepts of “population control” and “village security.” 
These last two efforts were essentially military concepts, declared to be absolute “musts” in a 
counterinsurgency war. Needless to say, all efforts had corresponding metrics, carefully collected 
and implemented with an Americanized viewpoint held by the era’s prominent think tanks, which 
subsequently showed the successes and failures of US and South Vietnamese efforts. Leaders in 
Washington chose freely which studies to believe based on their own personal feelings or political 
outlook. 
The rationale for American involvement was not South Vietnam in and of itself as it had no 
strategic value to the US. The central issue, as it had been in Korea and later in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, was armed aggression and the demonstration of American credibility. To abandon 
South Vietnam to an army trained and supplied by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of 




Many in Washington, having lived through the appeasement of the Fascists in Germany and 
Italy and the militarists in Japan believed strongly that abandoning South Vietnam would only 
encourage Communist adventurism. Additionally, it would have sent a shock wave through a still 
recovering Japan and other countries in Southeast Asia that had strong left-wing and even avowed 
Communist movements within their populations. Malaysia and the Philippines had only recently 
successfully suppressed internal Communist insurgents and if America abandoned South Vietnam, 
those it Washington believed it would only have encouraged those movements to regroup and try 
again. By contesting Communist moves in South Vietnam, the US reinforced the notion that it 
would counter Communist aggression or subversion in those countries allied to the US and thus 
providing a protective umbrella that gave a breathing space for economic recovery. Frances 
FitzGerald in Fire in the Lake the Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam, identifies three 
distinct grounds for misunderstanding and miscommunication between Vietnamese and Americans: 
the incongruity of their aims; American ignorance of Vietnamese problems; and the disparity of 
Vietnamese and American frames of reference for giving meaning to general concepts such as 
freedom, democracy, and national problems. As a result of these grounds for misunderstanding, 
both peoples necessarily had gross misperceptions of the other's aims, motives, viewpoints, and 
expectations. FitzGerald sums up her theme:  
The unknowns made the whole enterprise, from the most rational and tough-minded 
point of view, risky in the extreme. In going into Vietnam, the United States was not 
only transposing itself into a different epoch of history; it was entering a world 
qualitatively different from its own. Culturally as geographically, Vietnam lays half 
a world away from the United States.  
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Many Americans in Vietnam learned to speak Vietnamese, but the language gave no 
more than a hint of the basic intellectual grammar that lay beneath. In a sense there 
was no more correspondence between the two worlds than that between the 
atmosphere of the earth and that of the sea. . . . To find the common ground that 
existed between them, both Americans and Vietnamese would have to recreate the 
whole world of the other, the whole intellectual landscape.”6   
Even during the Vietnam War, some perceptive observers recognized the 
incompatibility of US goals and its methods of pursuing them in Vietnam.  Even while 
defending the American presence in Vietnam, Henry Kissinger observed:  
“What had gone wrong? The basic problem has been conceptual: the tendency to 
apply traditional maxims of both strategy and ‘nation-building’ to a situation which 
they did not fit. . . . We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. 
We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. 
. . . The Tet Offensive brought to a head the compounded weaknesses . . . of the 
American position. To be sure, from a strictly military point of view, Tet was an 
American victory. . . . But in a guerrilla war, purely military considerations are not 
decisive: psychological and political factors loom at least as large. . . . Both the 
Hanoi Government and the United States are limited in their freedom of action by 
the state of mind of the population of South Vietnam, which will ultimately 
determine the outcome of the conflict.  
                                                 





Kissinger later stated in the same article: “It would be difficult to imagine two societies less meant 
to understand each other than the Vietnamese and the American.”7 
The overall focus of the dissertation is an analysis of the evolution of the American 
advisory effort along with an analysis of the use of military advisors with regard to developing 
deeper cultural understandings between American and Vietnam societies, technical innovation and 
development, the nature of the conflict envisioned and executed, and the contemporary working 
environment. A long history of the American Army’s use of “advisors” in fighting its wars exists, 
such as European professional officers who advised the Continental Army under George 
Washington, Native American scouts used in the pacification of the American frontier, and soldiers 
from Southern states in service to the Union Army during the American Civil War. A rich 
historical background underlying the US Army’s experiences in fighting small wars is too broad 
and deep to be adequately covered in this dissertation.  
The focus of this dissertation is not on the Vietnam conflict in general, which has been 
covered by other scholars, such as the evolution of the formal US commitment to preserving a non-
                                                 
7. Looking back, many historians have directed biting comments on American perceptions of the situation in 
South Vietnam and how the US conducted military operations during the critical “Americanization” period beginning 
in 1964. The majority of these retrospectives were written in the immediate aftermath of the war and in many cases are 
patently unfair to both the Johnson and Nixon administrations because while American perceptions of Communist 
political subversion throughout the rapidly decolonizing third world were shown (in the most part) to be fully rational, 
if flawed, these retrospectives were written by authors who knew how the story would end. Author Anthony Marc 
Lewis stated: “It is difficult even to grasp intellectually the fact that we construct the reality in which we operate. We 
take our perception of the world for granted. . . . We know what is real. We live in this reality and we act accordingly. . 
. . If someone else points out that our perceptions may be wrong, we may intellectually admit the possibility, but we 
continue to act as though our perceptions were true. We are familiar with illusions but dismiss them as interesting 
playthings. Our reality seems so solid, and we feel so in touch with it, that it is impossible for us to act with the 
realization that in fact our reality is inferred by us and may not match the reality which future events reveal. It is 
precisely in this feeling of certainty that the danger lies.” (emphasis added). Lewis goes on to quote a paper by Henry 
Kissinger prior to his joining the Nixon Administration for Foreign Affairs on the results of the Tet offensive of 
January 1968, in which he states: “overthrew the assumptions of American strategy.” Anthony Mark Lewis “Re-
examining Our Perceptions on Vietnam,” Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, August 04, 2011. 
Declassified 1994. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol17no4/html. For those 
wishing another perspective on American misperceptions, see Frances FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake the Vietnamese and 




Communist South Vietnam that began in 1955; the roles of China and the Soviet Union in their 
support of Communist forces; developments in Laos and Cambodia that affected South Vietnam; 
the changes in Congressional sentiment as US involvement deepened after 1965; the battlefield 
tactics and evolution of US policy; Hanoi's strategy at key moments, such as the Tet Offensive in 
1967–68, or the final months of US combat involvement in 1972–73 after US withdrawal of 
ground forces from Vietnam.8 These are all interrelated aspects of this war, but they are beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. 
By the time American forces became heavily involved on the ground in Vietnam, North 
Vietnamese and their South Vietnamese allies, the Viet Cong, had been conducting offensive 
operations for thirty years against both the Japanese and French. The Communist-led North 
                                                 
8. For those wishing to understand the background of the thinking within US foreign policy circles in the period 
1950‒54 and the beginnings of US support for both the French and later for what came to be called South Vietnam,  
see Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Vol. 1, 361‒62 (Boston, Beacon Press, 1971), 
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/doc2.htm; 363‒66, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ 
pentagon/doc3.htm; and 367‒69, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/doc4.htm. For a decidedly different 
perspective on whether the US should become involved in Southeast Asia, see George Kennan, Memoirs, 1950-
1963 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 58‒60. In an August 21, 1950 memorandum to the Secretary of State I 
complained that, “In Indo-China, we are getting ourselves into the position of guaranteeing the French in an 
undertaking which neither they nor we, nor both of us together, can win. . . We should let Schuman [Robert Schuman, 
French Foreign Minister] know . . . that the closer view we have had of the problems of this area, in the course of our 
efforts of the past few months to support the French position there, has convinced us that that position is basically 
hopeless. We should say that we will do everything in our power to avoid embarrassing the French in their problems 
and to support them in any reasonable course they would like to adopt looking to its liquidation; but that we cannot 
honestly agree with them that there is any real hope of their remaining successfully in Indo-China, and we feel that 
rather than have their weakness demonstrated by a continued costly and unsuccessful effort to assert their will by force 
of arms, it would be preferable to permit the turbulent political currents of that country to find their own level, 
unimpeded by foreign troops or pressures, even at the probable cost of an eventual deal between Viet-Nam and Viet-
Minh, and the spreading over the whole country of Viet-Minh authority, possibly in a somewhat modified form. We 
might suggest that the most promising line of withdrawal, from the standpoint of their prestige, would be to make the 
problem one of some Asian regional responsibility, in which the French exodus could be conveniently obscured.” This 
judgment with regard to the folly of a possible intervention in Vietnam rested, incidentally, not just on the specific 
aspects of that situation as we faced it in 1950, but on considerations of principle, as well. In a lecture delivered earlier 
that year (May 5) in Milwaukee, I had said, this time with reference to the pleas for American intervention in China, “I 
wonder how many of you realize what that really means. I can conceive of no more ghastly and fateful mistake, and 
nothing more calculated to confuse the issues in this world today than for us to go into another great country and try to 
uphold by force of our own blood and treasures a regime which had clearly lost the confidence of its own people. 
Nothing could have pleased our enemies more. . . . Had our Government been carried away by these pressures . . . I am 
confident that today the whole struggle against world communism in both Europe and Asia would have been 
hopelessly fouled up and compromised. Little did I realize, in penning these passages, that I was defining, fifteen years 
before the event, my own position with relation to the Vietnam War. 
.   
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Vietnamese government clearly demonstrated a resolve to continue the struggle no matter what 
actions the South Vietnamese and their American allies undertook. 
The chronology of the American advisers’ role in confronting the Communists’ insurgency 
in South Vietnam involves six distinct, but interrelated, periods, each of which represents a 
qualitative change in the way in which the US government approached rural pacification in South 
Vietnam. Beginning in the first two years of Ngo Dinh Diem’s administration, from 1954 to 1956, 
Colonel Edward Lansdale, who reported directly to the Director of Central Intelligence Allen 
Dulles, hoped to recreate his earlier successes in the Philippines confronting the Hukbalahap 
Rebellion under the Presidency of Ramon Magsaysay. Lansdale led a drive to establish military 
and civilian civic action programs to compensate for the absence of a South Vietnamese 
governmental presence in the countryside. The CIA meanwhile began building a rural political 
organization to create popular support for the new government with decidedly mixed results. 
Neither effort was helped when President Diem, who tolerated if he did not always welcome these 
initiatives, set the tone of his own approach to rural pacification with a campaign of repression 




The second period began with the conclusion of the First Indochina War after the battle of 
Dien Bien Phu and the signing of the Geneva Accords on July 21, 1954.   During the four years of 
the French-Indochina War, the United States furnished the French military with large quantities of 
military equipment—tanks and aircraft to small arms, ammunition, and spare parts valued at more 
than $1.2 billion.9 At the conclusion of the war, the material was to revert to the United States 
                                                 
9. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to Secretary of Defense, 25 Jan 56, 1-12377/6, 
U.S.-Vietnam Relations, 10:1045. The following is based, in part, on Vincent H. Demma, “The Turnover in South 
Vietnam after the Indochina War,” Center for Military History Monograph, 1969. quoted in, Ronald H. Spector, Advice 
and Support The Early Years: The U.S. Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: Center of Military History 1985), 257 
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Table 1. Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, 1956.  
Table 2. Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission, 1960.  
under the terms of the Pentalateral Agreement of December 25, 1950 between the United States, 
France, and the Associated States.10  
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 Despite that requirement, American officials in Saigon had made no plans or preparations 
for the return of the equipment. The understaffed American advisory group had kept no accurate 
records or inventories of material delivered to the French during the war. There was thus no 
recourse but to rely on the French for that information. The lack of records also made it impossible 
to determine which items of American equipment the French had purchased and which had been 
supplied under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. 
Under the Collins-Ely Agreement of December 1954, the United States and France would 
jointly survey surplus military equipment of American origin in South Vietnam to determine which 
items would be returned to the United States, transferred to the South Vietnamese, or retained by 
the French. American inspectors were to be allowed to examine French depots and embarkation 
points, and losses incurred in combat or through wear were to be charged off equally to French- 
and American-owned equipment. Faced with a growing military crisis in Algeria, the French 
proceeded to strip the best equipment for themselves. French officials sometimes refused to permit 
American inspection of their depots, and members of the advisory group reported that the French 
tried to remove assistance program markings from the equipment they wanted to take with them.11 
Remarkably, it was during this period that Diem nearly destroyed the Communist 
organization in the countryside. But in so doing he also “dried the grass,” as the Maoists liked to 
describe the process of peasant alienation. The National Liberation Front for South Vietnam was 
authorized in 1959 by Hanoi to conduct armed insurgency through increased assassinations of 
South Vietnamese governmental officials, severely weakening Saigon’s hold on its rural 
population. 
                                                 
11. Command and General Staff College, “Staff Study on Army Aspects of Military Assistance,” (Leavenworth, 
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Figure 2. President Lyndon B. Johnson 
meeting with Robert Komer. 
The third period ran from 1961 to late 1963, when the incoming Kennedy administration 
met expanding insurgency in Vietnam with a fresh increase of military and economic aid and with 
an eagerness to test current theories of counterinsurgency. The CIA launched a series of programs 
designed either to assist South Vietnamese village self-defense or to attack the insurgent 
organization at the local level. It also reinvigorated the Strategic Hamlet program, which became 
the core of President Diem’s pacification strategy until his death in the coup d’état of November 
1963. Following the assassinations of both Diem and Kennedy, there ensued a period of stagnation 
with a revolving door of South Vietnamese generals vying for power in Saigon, while in 
Washington a newly installed President Johnson prepared for the 1964 presidential election.  
In the fourth period, from late 1963 through 1965, the US military and the CIA worked at 
the provincial level, experimenting with variations on earlier programs in the search for a 
pacification formula. As before, it emphasized village self-defense, local political organization, and 
an attack on the communist political and administrative apparatus. 
Following Johnson’s landslide 
election in 1964, his administration 
ordered a massive expansion of both US 
combat formations to help stabilize a 
tottering South Vietnamese government 
and the pacification effort. In 1967, 
recognizing that the situation in South 
Vietnam was becoming untenable, President 
Johnson appointed Robert Komer as head of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development 
Support (CORDS) program to reorganize the pacification effort.  
White House photo by Yoichi Okamoto, 




Once in Saigon, Komer quickly reinforced his reputation as a man with a take-no-prisoners 
attitude resulting with CIA programs becoming the foundation of a unified US pacification 
strategy, the CORDS program. The critical feature of this fifth period, which lasted until 1969, was 
the realization that the decentralized pacification programs of the various US government agencies 
were unable to coordinate their activities efforts under Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.  
Nor were they able to successfully integrate intelligence and the Phoenix and Provincial 
Reconnaissance Unit programs in direct-action missions against the Viet Cong Infrastructure. 
 On November 3, 1969, in a nationally televised speech, newly elected President Richard 
M. Nixon announced that his administration had decided to return responsibility for the conduct of 
the war back to the South Vietnamese.  Vietnamization, a program developed by Secretary of 
Defense Melvin Laird, was intended to expand, equip, and train South Vietnam’s forces and assign 
to them an ever-increasing combat role, and at the same time steadily reduce the number of US 
combat troops. It was at this point that the sixth and final period (1969–75) saw the gradual decay 
of the pacification programs. The South Vietnamese chose not to, or possibly could not, invest the 
energy and resources into the program now that the Americans were withdrawing. Sadly, the first 
to go were the programs used to win the loyalty of the rural peasants, followed by the decline of the 
Phoenix program against the Viet Cong. 
With the departure of large US ground forces and the ensuing withdrawal of tactical air 
support, it was clear that the South Vietnamese government would not survive without the support 
of the South Vietnamese population.  After twenty years of “hearts and minds” programs aimed to 
win their allegiance to the Saigon regime, they simply did not have it. The ignominious end came 
with the North Vietnamese general offensive of 1975 and the total collapse of the South Vietnam 
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government and despite the efforts of some revisionist historians’ attempt to say otherwise, the US 
did lose that war.12  
The scope of this dissertation is limited to the study of military and civilian advisory efforts 
in the Vietnam War from 1955 to 1963. The content is limited to only those records of military and 
CIA advisor activities and does not include a detailed analysis of similar efforts conducted by other 
US government entities conducting similar missions, which are only discussed when military and 
CIA advisors supported them directly or vice versa. Nonetheless, available unclassified records in 
the US National Archives, the Combined Arms Reference Library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; 
the Vietnam Center and Archive at Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas; the Pentagon Papers at 
the National Archives at College Park, College Park, Maryland, and other various resources allows 
extensive research and provides analysis of the advisor program.  
Forty years after the Vietnam War, a trove of primary, declassified material of the 
Department of the Army is now found in the National Archives, Washington, DC, along with 
numerous government and commercial publications of the period yields essential data. Many of 
these are to be found in Military Assistance Command, Vietnam/Military Assistance Command, 
Civilian Operations for Revolutionary Development Support (MACV/MACCORDS), Records 
Group 334, currently found in the National Archives.  
In the years since the end of the American participation in the Vietnam War many scholars, 
foremost among them Dr. George Herring, have conducted extensive research in trying to 
understand why the United States became involved in Vietnam. Some have emphasized the 
importance of the Domino Theory believing that if South Vietnam fell to the Communists, it would 
simply be the first of many Southeast Asia nations to succumb. Others have stressed the horrific 
                                                 
12. Michael Lind, The Necessary War.  
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aftermath of the appeasement of the Nazis and Fascists in Europe and the militarist in Japan 
resulting in the deaths of millions. These facts were on the minds of those who lived through the 
1930s and who were now in power in Washington, DC.13 
To understand the role advisors played in the Vietnam War, the author relied heavily on 
The Pentagon Papers.14  Archival materials found in the Presidential Libraries and Museums of 
Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon; and additional information in the Historical 
and Special Collections Archives at the Central Intelligence Agency library, Langley, Virginia, 
provided invaluable recorded interviews, capturing many of the principal actors of the period. 
Additional sources are to be found among the many Rand Corporation studies sponsored by the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). One final but significant element 
concerns the amount of available declassified research data. It is impossible to know whether or not 
the declassified data accessible for research portrays the most accurate description of the bulk of 
advisor activities throughout the Vietnam War. The records of failures or successes may be 
classified, undocumented, or lost.15  
Chapter 2 begins with a discussion of Vietnam’s long history of fighting for independence 
from foreign domination and up to the time Ho Chi Minh, Ngo Dinh Diem, and Vo Nguyen Giap 
come into power. 
                                                 
13. Pentagon Papers, Vol. 1, 75-107. 
14. The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, 12 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).  
15. For those wishing to broaden their knowledge of the evolution of the US Army’s efforts on counterinsurgency 
and pacification from an American point of view, see Andrew J.  Birtle U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency 
Operations Doctrine, 1860-1942 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1998); Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army 
Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1946 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 
1976); and Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War 
(New York Praeger, 2006). There are many fine works from both British and French authors as well as the former 
Soviet Union that offer the reader nuanced perspectives on the practice of these techniques—perspectives that would 




Chapter 3 discusses the background and events influencing the eventual decision for 
military intervention by the United States in Vietnam in the context of the Cold War struggle with 
Communists expansion. 
 Chapter 4 traces the development of the Communist’s insurgency and their struggle to 
overthrow French control beginning in the 1930s to their seizing power in Hanoi following World 
War II. It addresses the use of terror and assassinations by the Viet Minh as tools for domination 
and control of the population and finishes with the surprising rise of Ngo Dinh Diem as first 
president of South Vietnam after partition in 1954. 
 Chapter 5 discusses the formation and goals of the National Liberation front and the 
subsequent acceleration of the Vietnamese Communists (Viet Cong) offensive against the South 
Vietnamese government. Finally, the chapter discusses the organizational structure of the People’s 
Revolutionary Party and its components and their functions. 
 Chapter 6 recounts the ouster of Emperor Bao Dai and the establishment of the government 
of South Vietnam and the rise of Ngo Dinh Diem as first president of South Vietnam. It offers a 
review of the resettlement of some 900,000 predominantly Catholic Tonkinese refugees and other 
ethnic groups fleeing the north. The chapter discusses the measures Diem employed with the 
assistance of Colonel Edward Lansdale  of the CIA to counter the influence of the Cao Dai and 
Hoa Hao along with the Binh Xuyen gangsters to consolidate power. The chapter outlines 
numerous programs that were began to assist the people, recounts their aims and shortcomings, and 
addresses the security efforts made to counter Viet Cong terrorist activities. 
 Chapter 7 goes into depth on Diem’s Strategic Hamlet Program. It outlines the background 
of events leading to the need for the program, its objectives, problems of convincing the villagers 
to uproot and move to a new hamlet far from their field, the problems of planning, construction, 
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and administration which led to dissatisfaction and upheaval among those forced at gunpoint to 
move. The chapter also recounts the Viet Cong efforts to frustrate the program along with the 
establishment of several additional security organizations, the Civil Guard, Self-Defense Corps and 
the Force Populaire specifically conceived to protect the hamlets. 
Chapter 8 sums up the pacification effort in South Vietnam, focusing on the situation we 
encountered with the Communist stronghold, the corruption of the South Vietnamese government 
and their unwillingness to work with the United States to resolve issues. Lessons learned on the 





A Thousand Years of Resistance 
For the Vietnamese, the war for independence from foreign domination began many 
centuries before with the Chinese invasion. Their long history of resistance to invasion started in 
AD 40 when the Trung sisters, Trung Trac and Trung Nhi, led the first Vietnamese insurrection 
against Chinese rule.1 A traditional story recalls a woman who fought with them named Phung 
Thi Chinh, who according to legend gave birth during the battle but continued fighting with the 
infant strapped to her back.2  The Trungs’ newly independent realm extended from southern 
China to the ancient city of Hue. When the Chinese crushed their hard-fought independence two 
years later, the Trung sisters committed suicide by drowning themselves in a river. They have 
been revered by the Vietnamese ever since and are venerated in temples in Hanoi and Son Tay, 
both of which lay in North Vietnam in 1965.3  In 1962, Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, sister-in-law of 
South Vietnam's President Ngo Dinh Diem, erected a statue of the Trung sisters in downtown 
Saigon, to commemorate their patriotism and promote herself as their reincarnation.4  In AD 248 
another woman, Trieu Au, Vietnam’s equivalent of France’s Joan of Arc, led another revolt. 
Wearing golden armor, she rode into battle on an elephant at the head of a thousand men. She 
was just twenty-three when she was soundly defeated and committed suicide. Like the Trung 
sisters, she was commemorated in a temple and is remembered for her words of defiance: “I 
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want to rail against the wind and the tide and the whales in the sea: sweep the whole country to 
save the people from slavery, and I refuse to be abused.”5  
French Indochina 
China referred to Vietnam as Annam, the “pacified south, but it was seldom pacified.”6  
There were regular rebellions, often led by Chinese colonists who sought independence from the 
mother country. In 938‒39, a provincial mandarin named Ngo Quyen defeated the invading 
forces of the Southern Han state of China and put an end to centuries of Chinese imperial 
domination in Vietnam. Using innovative tactics to overcome superior odds, Ngo Quyen ordered 
his men to drive iron-tipped spikes into the river bed in the estuary of the Bach Dang River, so 
their points remained hidden just under the surface of the water. Ngo Quyen ordered his own 
ships to withdraw as the tide ebbed. When the Chinese fleet gave chase and impaled themselves 
on the spikes, Ngo Quyen's boats turned back and destroyed them. The Vietnamese have a very 
long history of using guerrilla tactics to defeat a superior force.7   
In 1258, 1285, and 1287–88 the Mongol emperor Kublai Khan invaded Vietnam to take 
control of the spice routes of the Indonesian archipelago to the south. Each time the Vietnamese 
general Tran Hung Dao defeated the vastly superior Chinese forces. Using tactics that were 
copied countless times over the succeeding centuries, Tran Hung Dao abandoned the cities, 
avoided frontal attacks, and used mobile forces to harass the enemy until they were confused and 
exhausted and ripe for a great defeat. In the Battle of Bạch Dang River in 1287, the Vietnamese 
routed 300,000 Mongol troops. Tran Hung Dao celebrated his victory with a poem in which he 
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declared that “this ancient land shall live forever.”8  General Vo Nguyen Giap, the North 
Vietnamese military strategist responsible for beating the French, evoked Tran Hung Dao’s 
memory when he attacked the French in the same area.  
At that time, Vietnam, Annam, only occupied the northern part of the country, roughly 
the area that became North Vietnam. After defeating the Mongols, the Vietnamese turned their 
attention to Champa, the kingdom occupied by the Cham people, which lay to the south. The war 
against Champa raged on for nearly 200 years until 1471 when the Vietnamese were able to 
capture and destroy the capital Indra-Champa, leaving only its magnificent stone sculptures 
which can still be seen today.9   
With the conquest of Champa, Vietnam was exhausted and once again vulnerable to 
invasion by China. This time, the Chinese imposed brutal slavery on the conquered land forcing 
the peasants to mine for gold and other ores, while systematically looting the country. To impose 
their rule, the Chinese forced the Vietnamese to adopt their form of dress and hairstyles, issued 
identity cards, and instituted punitive taxes. In perhaps the cruelest form of subjugation, they 
outlawed the worship of the Vietnamese gods, suppressed literature, and taught only Chinese in 
schools.10   
Vietnam’s own King Arthur revolted against this oppression. According to legend, he 
was a young fisherman named Le Loi who cast his net into a lake one day and brought up a 
magic sword. In reality, Le Loi was a wealthy landowner from Thanh Hoa Province in the north 
who served the Chinese before turning against them. In 1418, Le Loi declared himself the 
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“'Prince of Pacification,” withdrew to the hills, and began a guerrilla war against the Chinese.11  
As the insurrection spread, the Chinese held on to the cities, but their columns used the roads 
which were defended by fortified towers. Le Loi’s adviser, the poet Nguyen Trai, set down their 
strategy in an essay that could be a handbook of modern-day insurgencies. “Better to conquer 
hearts than citadels,” he wrote.12   
With the coming of the sixteenth century, the country was divided between two powerful 
factions, the Trinh and the Nguyen families whose regions of control corresponded roughly 
along the lines of the later division of the country into North and South Vietnam. In 1630, the 
rivalry became so acute that the southerners built two walls across the plain at Dong Hai, along 
the 18th parallel to the jungle, sealing off the north until the late eighteenth century. Meanwhile, 
the Nguyens actively courted Chinese help in their conflict with the Trinhs.13   
With repeated incursions by the Chinese lasting for the next two hundred years, Vietnam 
did not free itself from Chinese domination entirely until 1802, when the country was reunited 
under Nguyen emperor, Gia Long, with the help of the French. Using Western technology and 
French material support to free his country, Gia Long then turned against the French, expelling 
his French advisers and executing French missionaries. In 1858, Napoleon III sent an army to 
Vietnam which established the Cochinchina colony in the south. Central Vietnam, Annam, and 
the north, Tonkin, were taken over as protectorates in 1883. Along with Laos and Cambodia, 
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Vietnam was incorporated into French Indochina and the Vietnamese struggle for independence 
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 Figure 3. French Division of Indochina, 1954. 
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Ho Chi Minh 
In the aftermath of World War I, a young Vietnamese man, Nguyen Ai Quoc, who called 
himself “Nguyen the Patriot,” while attending the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference in France, 
stood up and demanded his country’s freedom.15  Born Nguyen That Thanh in Vietnam in 1890, 
he used numerous aliases throughout his life. He called himself Ba when he visited New York 
and Boston as a ship’s cook in 1911. After living in London from 1915 to 1917, he moved to 
France, where he worked a variety of jobs as a gardener, sweeper, waiter, photograph photo 
retoucher, and oven stoker.16  Although his demand for freedom for his country in 1919 at the 
Versailles Peace Conference fell on deaf ears, it made him a national hero to many politically 
conscious Vietnamese.17  In 1920, inspired by the success of the Communist revolution in Russia 
and Lenin's anti-imperialist doctrine, he became a founding member of the French Communist 
Party when they split from the Socialist Party.18  In 1923 he went to Moscow and in January 
1924, on the death of Lenin, he published a eulogy to the founder of the Soviet Union in the 
Communist Party newspaper Pravda.19  Six months later, at the fifth Congress of the Communist 
International, he criticized the French Communist Party for not opposing colonialism more 
vigorously.  In his statement to the congress, he formulated the revolutionary role of oppressed 
peasants, as opposed to the industrial workers mentioned by the founder of Communism, Karl 
Marx.20  In 1924, he travelled to Canton, a Chinese Communist stronghold, under the name Ly 
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Thuy, where he began recruiting fellow Vietnamese for his nationalist movement. In 1930, he 
founded the Vietnamese Communist Party with former school friend Vo Nguyen Giap.21   
Vo Nguyen Giap was born in 1912 at An Xa, Vietnam, just north of the 17th parallel 
which later became the border between North and South Vietnam. While studying law at Hanoi 
University, he met Ngo Dinh Diem, who went on to become President of South Vietnam and 
Giap’s bitter enemy. In 1939, Giap’s anticolonist views brought him to the attention of the 
French colonial police forcing him to flee to China, leaving his young wife and child behind. 
They were arrested and died in a French jail three years later and his sister-in-law was 
guillotined.22   
With the coming of World War II and the defeat of France in 1940 the political winds 
were changing, it was at this time that Ly Thuy changed his name to Ho Chi Minh, which means 
“he who enlightens.” It was under this name that he became the father of Communist Vietnam 
and, despite his authoritarian rule, the seemingly kind “Uncle Ho” became a symbol of resistance 
to his people. On May 19, 1941, he and Giap founded the League for the Independence of 
Vietnam, or Viet Minh. Ho Chi Minh was the political leader of the Viet Minh, while Giap 
became its military leader.23  Returning to Vietnam, Giap formed “armed propaganda teams,” 
guerrilla bands which would later form the nucleus of the North Vietnamese Army, while Ho Chi 
Minh found himself languishing in the jail of an anti-Communist warlord for over a year.24  With 
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the backing of the US, the Viet Minh fought the Japanese who occupied Vietnam during World 
War II. When the Japanese were defeated in 1945, Giap entered Hanoi at the head of his troops. 
Soon after, in a speech in Hanoi where he quoted the US Declaration of Independence, Ho Chi 
Minh proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which he led as president until his death 
in 1969.25   
However, while the Viet Minh held Hanoi in the north of the country, the British had 
liberated Saigon in the south. To legitimize the reoccupation of its own colonies in Asia, the 
British rearmed newly released French prisoners of war to keep order until fresh French troops 
arrived.26  Under the Potsdam Agreement of August 1945, which settled territorial disputes that 
arose at the end of World War II, the Nationalist Chinese were to disarm the Japanese in the 
north. A Chinese army under General Lu Han arrived in Hanoi and began looting the city and 
killing all political opposition. Giap barely escaped with his life. Meanwhile, the Chinese 
Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek agreed to hand North Vietnam, Tonkin, back to the French in 
return for relinquishing its old concessions in Shanghai and other Chinese ports.27  During this 
period, Ho Chi Minh tried to get other countries to recognize his government in Hanoi. The US, 
in a bid to court French acceptance of its policies in divided Germany, backed the French. The 
Soviet Union refused to send an observer to Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh’s old comrades in the French 
Communist Party also deserted him. The Vietnamese Communists conducted their revolution 
without aid from abroad.28   
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Ho Chi Minh was quick to appreciate the political reality of the situation. Upon their 
return to Tonkin, the French return showed every intention of reestablishing their old colony of 
Chochinchina in the south, while leaving the north in the hands of the Chinese who seemed to be 
in no hurry to leave. Ho Chi Minh was committed to national unity. He agreed to permit 25,000 
French troops to garrison the north for five years, provided the French recognized Vietnam as an 
independent state within the French Union, the new name for the old French Empire.29  The 
question of uniting Tonkin and Chochinchina would be decided later by a referendum. Ho Chi 
Minh came under heavy criticism from his fellow comrades for allowing the French back in 
without setting a date for the plebiscite. At a meeting in Hanoi, he fought back fiercely and 
stated:  
You fools! Don't you realize what it means if the Chinese remain? Don't you 
remember your history? The last time the Chinese came, they stayed for a 
thousand years. The French are foreigners. They are weak. Colonialism is dying. 
The white man is finished in Asia. But if the Chinese stay now, they will never go. 
As for me, I prefer to sniff French shit for five years than eat Chinese shit for the 
rest of my life.30   
In 1946, Ho Chi Minh went to France to try and negotiate the unification of Vietnam. 
Again, he received no help from the French Communists. The political lobby for the 
establishment of a separate “Republic of Cochinchina” was so strong that he was forced to initial 
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an interim agreement to that effect. As he left the room, he said to his bodyguard, “I’ve just 
signed my death warrant.”31   
Indeed, when Ho Chi Minh returned to Hanoi, Giap and other militant members of the 
Viet Minh were preparing to depose him when fighting broke out between the Viet Minh and 
French troops in the port of Haiphong over customs duty collection rights. On the morning of 
November 20, 1946, a French patrol boat seized Chinese smugglers. The Viet Minh intercepted 
the French boat and arrested its crew. This incident sparked unrest and by the afternoon there 
were barricades in the streets.32  A ceasefire had been agreed upon, but the French decided to use 
the incident as an excuse to drive the Viet Minh out of the city resulting in hand-to-hand fighting. 
In addition, Viet Minh positions were bombed and strafed by the French Air Force and shelled 
by the French Navy. Estimates of the death toll vary, although in 1981 reliable Vietnamese 
sources claimed that there were “between 500 to a 1,000 dead.”33  No one denies that there were 
several thousand civilian dead and wounded casualties.  
The French then ordered Ho Chi Minh to disarm the Viet Minh. This was easier said than 
done: Giap deployed a reported 30,000 armed men in the suburbs, and on the evening of 
December 19th, fighting broke out again.34  The French were confident of victory to start with by 
dint of force of arms. But they ignored the real cause of the war which was the desire of the 
Vietnamese people, Communist and anti-Communist alike, to achieve independence for their 
country. However, the French could offer unity. In 1949, they reunited Cochinchina with the rest 
of Vietnam, proclaiming the Associated State of Vietnam with former emperor Bao Dai as head 
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of state.35   Succeeding his father in 1925 at the age of twelve, Bao Dia did not ascend to the 
throne until 1932 after completing his education in France. He cooperated first with the French 
colonial government then with the Japanese in World War II. In 1945, he abdicated and briefly 
joined the Viet Minh before fleeing to Hong Kong in 1946 where he led a playboy lifestyle. In 
nationalists’ eyes, the playboy emperor was nothing more than a French puppet when he returned 
in 1949. Meanwhile, the Viet Minh waged an increasingly successful guerrilla war, aided after 
1949 by the new Communist Chinese government. Fearful of the spread of Communism in Asia, 
the US began sending large amounts of aid to the French.36  But Giap had learned the lessons of 
Ngo Quyen, Tran Hung Dao, and Le Loi well and after harassing the enemy for five long years, 
he surprised French military strategists by moving his artillery 400 miles over rough terrain and 
supplying his troops over that huge distance to besiege the remote garrison at Dien Bien Phu, 
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Figure 4. South Vietnam. 
Britain, France, the US, and the Soviet Union had already called a peace conference in 
Geneva to negotiate a ceasefire. To separate the warring factions, it was decided that the Viet 
Minh should stay north of the 17th parallel, while the French remained to the south. Between 




them would be a five-mile-wide Demilitarized Zone.38  Bao Dai rejected the peace plan. 
Nevertheless, he was defeated in a referendum by his Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, who 
proclaimed himself president of a newly created Republic of Vietnam, that is, non-Communist 
South Vietnam.  
The Communist-controlled area north of the 17th parallel became known as North 
Vietnam, though it was still officially the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with Ho Chi Minh as 
head of state and General Giap as Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of Defense. Both were 
committed to reunifying the country; by peaceful means at first. Under the Geneva Peace 
Accords, an election was to be held in 1956 with the aim of unifying the country under one 
government.39  The Communists, who had built up a powerful political organization in both 
halves of the country, were confident of victory.40  Diem refused to hold the elections and he was 
backed by the US who feared a Communist takeover. The Communists saw Diem as an 
American puppet and in 1960, the government in Hanoi decided that the only way to reunify the 
country was by force. While the avuncular Ho Chi Minh spent his time portraying the war as the 
defensive action of a backward nation bullied by a superpower, Giap took charge of the war. In 
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1961, Giap spelled out exactly how he intended to reunify the country by publishing a manual of 
guerrilla warfare called People's War, People's Army, that in a remarkably candid fashion told 
the US military and Central Intelligence Agency exactly what they were set to encounter.41  
To fully understand the complexity of a “peoples war,” one must first place into context 
the argument that in Vietnam the Communists, often viewed as “North Vietnamese,” triumphed 
in 1975 using a conventional-war strategy rather than engaging in a successful people’s or 
revolutionary war. This argument is obviously not a new one, and it may even represent the 
predominant view of the war among senior American military officers and government officials. 
At first glance the argument appears to be quite reasonable, buttressed by the credentials of the 
people making it, and it has great appeal to readers who may want to avoid interpretations 
implying that the United States lost the war in Vietnam because of its inability to combat a 
Communist insurgency.42   
Finally, with the landside 1964 election safely behind him, newly elected President 
Lyndon B. Johnson had his mandate to govern. On March 2, 1965, one hundred US jet bombers 
took off from Da Nang air base to strike at targets in the north. This was the first air strike 
against North Vietnam that could not be justified as retaliation against the Viet Cong and it 
began a sustained campaign of graduated bombing known as Operation Rolling Thunder that 
continued on and off for the next three years. Its aim was to slow the infiltration of men and 
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supplies from the north and bomb the Communists to the negotiating table. It succeeded in 
neither, but America was now committed to a course of action and President Johnson had raised 
the political price of failure. That same day, the four ships of Amphibious Task Force 70 set sail 
from Japan. The Second Indochina War—the American war in Vietnam—was now underway.43   
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The US Army’s Effort to Counter the 
Communist Insurgency in South Vietnam 
 “How Can We Lose When We’re So Sincere?”1  
If anything can be safely said of what Americans call the Vietnam War it is that the 
conflict demonstrated all the following elements: anticolonialism, nationalism, xenophobia, and 
the horrendous loss of life. Each element played a part in the war.  At the time, however, the war 
was seen by the Communists in Hanoi as one of national liberation and by the American political 
and military leaders in terms of the existential struggle between communism and liberal 
democracy. 
Domino Theory 
 To fully understand why the Vietnam War became a disaster for both Vietnams (North 
and South) and the Americans sent to that war,  observers must recognize two flawed perceptions 
linked to the Domino Theory: (1) Many of Washington DC’s foreign policy élite viewed 
Vietnam through the prism of two historical events. First, the “who lost China?” question was of 
major political significance within Washington governing circles—and one which had a 
particular constraining effect on the Democratic Party significantly shaping political decisions 
made by Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Second, the recently concluded 
and bitterly fought Korean War made an inescapable immediate historical precedent.  The 
conventional wisdom within the decision-making circles of Washington firmly held that the 
Domino Theory dictated that a loss of a country to the Communists was a zero-sum game. The 
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true implications of a newly established Red China sharing a border with North Vietnam, both 
dedicated to destabilizing the post-World War II political status quo, would not become clear 
until several decades later. (2) Viewing events through the prism of the Domino Theory, 
American policymakers completely misinterpreted the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 
and France’s subsequent withdrawal from Vietnam. Instead of seeing France’s defeat as the end 
of the colonial era in Southeast Asia, Washington was still coming from a Cold War perspective 
and held on to its inflexible belief that China was the main threat to South Vietnam.2 In fact it 
was the fervent, unyielding, nationalistic desire of the North Vietnamese to reunify their country 
that was our true opponent.3 An interesting footnote to confronting Communists’ aggression in 
South Vietnam deals with the actual reason the United States became involved in the conflict. 
Although President Lyndon B. Johnson stated that the aim of the Vietnam War was to secure an 
“independent, non-Communist South Vietnam,” a January 1965 memorandum by Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara stated that an underlying justification was “not to help a friend, but 
to contain China.” On November 3, 1965, McNamara sent a memorandum to President Johnson, 
in which he explained the “major policy decisions with respect to our course of action in 
Vietnam.” The memorandum begins by disclosing the rationale behind the bombing of North 
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Vietnam in February 1965: “The February decision to bomb North Vietnam and the July 
approval of Phase I deployments make sense only if they are in support of a long-run United 
States policy to contain China.”4 
In Gordon M. Goldstein’s book, Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to 
War in Vietnam, he details the role played by Bundy, Kennedy’s national security adviser, in 
taking the country to war in Vietnam. According to Goldstein, Bundy and many within the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations were committed to the Domino Theory, and as Henry 
Kissinger puts it in his review of the book:  
Bundy and his senior colleagues defined the domino effect as involving the 
Philippines, Thailand, Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan. . . . 
The new Kennedy administration even added a philosophical refinement. Vietnam 
was no longer treated as one of the many fronts in the global cold war, but as the 
central front.5 
Nor was this thinking unreasonable to those who had lived through the prewar 
appeasement of the fascists in Europe or the militarists in Japan.  George Kennan’s theory of 
containment was the essential organizing idea used in fighting the Cold War. The combination of 
the generous Marshall Plan in stabilizing postwar privation in those countries stripped of their 
industries, coupled with the establishment of NATO to provide security to shattered nations 
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constituencies. Both Kennedy and Johnson, according to Goldstein, occasionally went so far as to instruct cabinet 
members on what recommendations they would welcome at formal meetings in order to avoid having to overrule 




allied with the United States, was seen to have thwarted direct Soviet attacks on Western Europe. 
But Communist movements had overthrown governments in Eastern Europe, China, and Central 
America. The 1956 Polish Crisis, the crushing of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the 1959 
Cuban Revolution, unrest in both Iran and Guatemala, and the 1968 “Prague Spring” 
demonstrated to Western leaders that the new and emerging Cold War threats were achieved not 
through political debate but through force, subversion, and insurgency.6  
To combat Communist aggression in South Vietnam, “counterinsurgency” emerged as 
the new watchword throughout the Vietnam War consisting of numerous efforts to rid the 
Vietnamese countryside of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA). These efforts 
supported a multitude of specified programs including the Chieu Hoi program, the CIA-
supported Phoenix operation (also known as Phung Hoàng), and the strategic hamlet program, 
with the intent of denying the Viet Cong access to South Vietnamese villages.  
Pacification 
To prosecute the war and to administer the numerous programs established to conduct the 
counterinsurgency/pacification effort, first the MACV and then the CORDS structures were 
created. Pacification was the organizational structure for the policies of the combined US and 
South Vietnamese military efforts for destroying the Viet Cong. The theory behind the 
pacification initiative was to win the “hearts and minds” of the South Vietnamese villagers:  
. . . pacification had become a catchall description for the self-interests of a dozen 
different US agencies, all with their Saigon government counterparts. The results 
were little more than a shared cliché—“winning hearts and minds,” and with the 
                                                 
6.  “COVER STORY: Pentagon Paper.”   
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Figure 5. American advisor and district chief visit 
Catholic school in Long Khanh. 
military in overall control the priority was reflected in a slogan bandied by the 
Marines: Get “em by the balls and their hearts and minds will follow.”7 
The pacification effort in Vietnam 
was designed as a means to both battle 
Communist insurgencies while at the same 
time build support for the popular Saigon 
regime. The stated US justification for 
America’s participation in pacification 
efforts was to ensure an independent and 
sovereign South Vietnamese government 
was able to protect itself. 
 American pacification doctrine first established its roots between the 1950s and 1960s at 
a time in history when the struggle against insurgency in the former European colonies attracted 
widespread attention. For the former European colonial powers, and later the Americans fighting 
the Cold War in the newly decolonizing Third World, pacification meant “getting your hands 
dirty” in poor, underdeveloped nations struggling to resist Communist insurgencies. To defeat a 
Communist insurgency required all aspects of society to be mobilized including, but not limited 
to, the major social organizations, military recruitment, economic/agricultural improvements, 
and international diplomatic relations. In South Vietnam, this meant resolving the villagers’ 
security issues from both the military and civilian perspectives. In the civilian sector, pacification 
encouraged economic development, land transfer, and the expansion of political participation of 
the South Vietnamese within the South Vietnamese Government. In providing security for the 
                                                 
7.  Michael Maclear, The Ten Thousand Day War, Vietnam: 1945-1975 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1981), 
255. 




Figure 6. American advisor helps villagers with the 
construction of a bridge. 
South Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese and their US military police agencies advisors 
provided security with US paramilitary and counterinsurgency forces supported by mobile, light 
infantry units operating to harass and defeat the Viet Cong guerrillas. Through the efforts of 
American advisors, the South Vietnamese military established special “cadre” teams to improve 
rural rice production and provided medical and veterinary services to the villages. In enhancing 
the economic opportunities for the villagers, American and South Vietnamese pacification teams 
offered a political alternative to the South Vietnamese peasant: freedom from oppressive 
Communist-based taxes and coercion and the opportunity to build an economic process 
throughout the countryside. Establishing successful outposts in the countryside required that both 
the South Vietnamese and the Americans fight against the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).  
The term “pacification” assumed many roles throughout the Vietnam War with multiple 
programs exercising varying degrees of 
authority and responsibility for the village 
hamlets. This included, but was not limited to 
improving the economic, medical, agricultural, 
and social futures of the villages. The CIA 
along with the US Army working in concert 
with numerous American civilian agencies 
played a critical role in the attempt. Advisers 
provided not only technical and, administrative 
advice, but, military support as well to South 
Vietnamese villages.  
 




Figure 7. American advisor and interpreter team talk 
with Long Toan district chief. 
Pacification is defined as: 
. . . the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or 
reestablishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of 
the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the 
destruction of the enemy’s underground government, the assertion or re-assertion 
of political control and involvement of the people in government, and the 
initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and 
expansion.8 
Unfortunately, a number of 
influential political factors weakened the 
initiative, the most notable being the 
attempt to merge the independent military 
and civilian agencies under one unified 
command. This problem, exacerbated by 
the South Vietnamese determination to 
preserve their independence vis-à-vis the 
American military and political 
organizations, was not easily solved. Lack 
of a coordinated effort between these 
dueling governmental bodies and a 
                                                 
8.  Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Library, 1980), v. 
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Figure 9. American advisors and trainers with regular 
Vietnam army forces unloading in a heavily infested 
guerrilla zone.  
Figure 8. Advisor with Vietnamese troops.  
general mistrust between an increasingly corrupt South Vietnamese government and the US 
military weakened the effort.  
Counterinsurgency 
A review of the doctrinal concepts 
embraced by the American military during the 
war conclusively demonstrated how a failure to 
adapt a consistent and flexible counter-
insurgency strategy toward pacification efforts 
coupled to unproductive military policies led to 
a long, protracted, and ultimately unsuccessful 
struggle against the Viet Cong. A thorough 
reevaluation of the doctrines utilized by the Viet Cong cadres and their insurgent infrastructures 
will provide a greater understanding of the enemy the United States encountered. Different 
schools of thought, within the American 
military of prior counterinsurgent operations 
along with internal after-action reports 
generated by the military/civilian command 
structure of the United States will focus on 
fundamental problems that existed within both 
the South Vietnamese and the American 
approach to countering the Viet Cong 
Infrastructure within South Vietnam. 
www.vietnam.ttu.edu, Item Number: /VA002160 
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Both the South Vietnamese and American military engaged the Viet Cong and the NVA 
openly in large unit offensive operations, attempted to interdict enemy infiltration using a 
massive bombing campaign, and sought to dismantle the Viet Cong Infrastructure in the 
countryside with the Phoenix counterinsurgency program. An honest analysis shows that 
ultimately these efforts failed to quash the enemy insurgency, and both the South Vietnamese 
and their American advisors failed to modify their strategy in favor of alternative approaches. 
The ineffective US effort, combined with the Viet Cong’s determination to drive the Americans 






The Beginning of the Viet Cong Insurgency 
Nationalist organizations of all stripes flourished within Vietnam in the 1940s. Following 
World War II, they continued to develop throughout the Viet Minh War against the French in the 
1950s under North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh and North Vietnamese military leader 
General Vo Nguyen Giap’s leadership. Both leaders instituted principles of governance 
consistent with the teachings of China’s Mao Tse Tung. Under these men and others, military 
discipline and commitment to the unification of Vietnam would become the foundational 
cornerstones that would both motivate and sustain the Viet Cong insurgency and the North 
Vietnamese regular forces during the next twenty-five years. 
Irrespective of contemporary efforts to characterize the Viet Cong as independent actors, 
the insurgency existed in South Vietnam as an extension of the political leadership of Ho Chi 
Minh and the politburo in Hanoi, North Vietnam. Through the use of propaganda and violence, 
Viet Cong party members sought to control the rural population in South Vietnam to pave the 
way for the North Vietnamese Army to reunite Vietnam under one nationalistic government.1  
Political Infrastructure 
In order to understand the extraordinary success achieved by Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen 
Giap, and the Viet Cong, one must understand the basic structure and function of an insurgency.2 
Based on his experiences in Malaya, Sir Robert Thompson, who served as a consultant in 
Vietnam to the Allies, conflated parallels between the British occupation in Malaya and the 
                                                 
1. Joseph J. Zasloff, The Role of North Vietnam in the Southern Insurgency (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1967).  




French and American experiences in Vietnam.3 In No Exit from Vietnam, Thompson stated that 
the primary objective in an insurgency is a political rather than a military focus:  
The primary weapon is this underground organization within the population. The 
secondary weapon is the guerrilla force which depends on that underground 
organization for all their requirements, but which, at the same time, supports the 
advance of the underground organization into the heart of the threatened 
government and country. The political aim is, therefore, dominant and guerrilla 
operations were designed to achieve political rather than military results.4 
Learning from Mao Zedong’s successful campaign in China to defeat the numerically 
superior forces of General Chiang Kai-shek, Ho Chi Minh’s revolutionary movement conducted 
extensive subversive operations against the South Vietnamese forces to defeat them on both a 
moral as well as a psychological plane while simultaneously attempting to exhaust them through 
terror and attrition. For the Communists, political concerns determined the significance of 
military targets:  
On the Communist side, the military target is always chosen according to its 
political impact. On our side, the enemy revolutionary warfare fighter seems to be 
the major target, if not the only one. The military “kill” becomes the primary 
target—simply because the essential political target is too elusive for us, or worse, 
because we do not understand its importance.5  
                                                 
3. James M. Higgins, “The Misapplication of the Malayan Counterinsurgency Model to the Strategic Hamlet 
Program,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2001).  
4. Sir Robert Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam (London: Chatto & Windus, 1969), 32. 
5. Bernard B. Fall, Viet-Nam Witness, 265. 
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The US military learned that the battlefield tactics of their new enemy proved to 
be unlike any they had seen since the days of the Civil War, Spanish-American War, or 
the Banana Wars in the 1920s.  
The weapons by which this war is fought include politics, diplomatic blackmail, 
interference in the domestic affairs of other nations, propaganda and controlled 
terror, all of which have somewhat dirty connotations in the American mind.6 
In order to achieve Ho Chi Minh’s political goal of a unified Vietnam under the 
leadership of Hanoi, the Viet Cong retained a stay-behind guerrilla force termed “regroupees” 
after partition under the Geneva Accords.7 These guerrilla units consisted primarily of rural 
farmers in the villages led and disciplined by dedicated Communists political officers:  
The other kind of Viet Cong was the local guerrilla: farmer by day, fighter by 
night. While main force units roved as far as 50 to 100 miles from their base 
areas, guerrilla units stayed generally close to home. These local units provided 
the day-to-day presence of the insurgent government in the countryside. Virtually 
every hamlet not immediately under the control of government forces had a Viet 
Cong squad. There was usually a platoon in each village.8 
                                                 
6. Malcolm W. Browne, The New Face of War: A Report on a Communist Guerilla Campaign (New York: 
Bantam, 1986), 274. 
7. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Southern Regroupees and Northerners in the Communists Military 
Forces in South Vietnam,” 9 November 1966. Approved for release: 2002/08/26. https://www.cia.gov/library 
readingroom/ docs/CIA-RDP78S02149R000200160005-7.pdf. 
8. John H. Cushman, “Pacification: Concepts Developed in the Field by the RVN 21st Infantry Division.” Army 




Another important element in establishing control of an area by the Viet Cong was the 
use of assassination and abduction to intimidate the population. The primary targets for these 
terror actions were corrupt village officials along with real or suspected government informers. 
On the other hand, some officials or members of prominent families were apparently marked for 
death just because they were particularly respected or were well-liked by the villagers and 
therefore were even more dangerous to the Viet Cong than the unpopular ones, demonstrating 
that no one was safe.9 
                                                 
9. Pentagon Papers, Vol. 2128‒59. 
Table 3. Viet Cong Assassinations and Kidnappings. 
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The Viet Cong have taken over large parts of the countryside through a 
combination of excellent organization, well developed and tested doctrine, and 
disciplined cadres. If the Republic of Vietnam is to regain these areas of the 
countryside, it must have an equally effective organization, an equally sound 
concept—and dedicated people. . . . Pacification must be planned and executed 
slowly, and in the greatest detail. Broad generalities were not enough. It is not 
enough to say we must win the hearts and minds of the people. Someone must go 
out on the ground and organize, train and equip a “people-winning force,” take 
this force step by step into each hamlet, and win the hearts of the people one heart 
at a time.10 
Anything less than a thorough analysis of the strategies used by the Viet Cong to control 
large areas of South Vietnam would give a deceptively simple explanation of their effectiveness.  
It would not reveal the enormous amount of political groundwork that was necessary prior to a 
takeover and reveal little of the suppression of dissent that had to be taken after the initial 
military phase. Even a relatively peaceful takeover of a village assumes a military and political 
capability, good intelligence, and an adequate supply of money and personnel to maintain 
control. While the Viet Cong always enjoyed some support from outside South Vietnam, in the 
early years of the insurgency this support was confined largely to a trickle of weapons and a 
large stream of trained regroupees returning from the north. The Viet Cong, therefore, had to rely 
heavily on a careful mixture of military force, terror, and propaganda in order to expand from the 
base areas in South Vietnam which they had controlled since before 1954.11 
                                                 
10.  Cushman, “Pacification,” 21‒29.  
11. “210. Letter from the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to the President, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1961-1963,” Report on General Taylor’s Mission to South Vietnam, November 3, 1961, Vol. I, 
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After more than thirty years of conflict, a Viet Cong political infrastructure was 
functioning at a very high level of efficiency by the time the United States made the political 
decision to deploy ground forces to Vietnam in 1965.12 In General Vo Nguyên Giap’s book, 
Banner of People’s War, the Party’s Military Line, the victor of Dien Bien Phu describes the 
growth of the people’s army over two decades of insurgency: 
Our army is truly a people’s army, born of the people and fighting for them. In 
twenty years, it has gradually developed from guerrilla units and masses’ self-
defense units into independent armed groups; from small guerrilla cells into 
increasingly concentrated units, including main-force, regional, and militia units; 
and from poorly equipped infantry units into armed forces with numerous 
branches and services operating with modern equipment.13 
In the contest between the Government of Vietnam (South) (GVN) and insurgency 
forces, the Viet Cong benefited from three main factors in taking over a territory: (1) they might 
build up its political infrastructure and military force to a point where it could successfully 
challenge the government, (2) the government might withdraw its defense elements and even its 
                                                                                                                                                             
Vietnam, 1961, Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series. https://history.state.gov/ 
historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v01/d210. See also Taylor, Maxwell D. Letter from the Military Representative to 
the President. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Vol. III, Vietnam, 1963, Kennedy Library, 
National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-
63v03/d197. In this memo to President Kennedy, General Taylor reviews the actions the guerrillas had inflicted on 
the US ally and stressed that there would come a point when Washington would have to make a decision as to 
whether to extend the war to North Vietnam. No drafting information is given on the source text, but in his memoirs, 
Taylor stated in Swords and Plowshares that the letter was drafted by both Rostow and him. See General Maxwell 
D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 243. 
12. Pentagon Papers, Vol. 3, 433‒85. “The situation which presented itself to the Honolulu conferees was in 
many ways the whole Vietnam problem in microcosm. What was needed to galvanize everyone into action was 
some sort of dramatic event within South Vietnam itself. Unfortunately, the very nature of the war precluded the 
abrupt collapse of a front or the loss of large chunks of territory in lightning strikes by the enemy. The enemy in this 
war was spreading his control and influence slowly and inexorably but without drama. The political infrastructure 
from which he derived his strength took years to create, and in most areas the expansion of control was hardly felt 
until it was a fait accompli.”  
13. Vo Nguyen Giap, Banner of People’s War, the Party’s Military Line (New York: Praeger, 1962), 30. 
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administrative personnel for tactical considerations, or (3) the balance of forces in its favor might 
be affected by military operations in the region.14 
If a village came under Viet Cong military control, in order to ensure that political control 
was also established three things took place: (1) there was a further terror against anyone 
suspected to support the South Vietnamese government, (2) the displacement of the previous 
elite was carried out ruthlessly, and (3) intensive education and political indoctrination took 
place.15 In terrorizing a village after having assumed military control, the Viet Cong were 
apparently carrying to a logical conclusion several developments that had been set in motion by 
earlier terror: thoroughly frightening the villagers, destroying the government administrative 
apparatus, and rooting out the government intelligence system.16     
Infiltration from the North                                                                                   
The Preamble of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) 
promulgated on January 1, 1960, was distinctly bellicose in condemning the United States and 
establishing the reunification of Vietnam as a Democratic Republic of Vietnam national 
objective. During 1959 and 1960, the relatively undeveloped intelligence apparatus of the United 
States and the Government of Vietnam confirmed that over 4,000 infiltrators were sent from 
North Vietnam southward—most of them military or political cadre, trained to raise and lead 
insurgent forces.17 
                                                 
14. The author concludes that the Viet Cong would continue to fight a war of movement in which annihilation 
of the enemy was more important than occupying ground. The guiding principles of Viet Cong strategy and tactics 
are also discussed and analyzed. Pen-t’ao Chung, “Vietcong Strategy and Tactics,” Translated by Wright-Patterson 
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15. W. P. Davidson, “Some Observations on Viet Cong Operations in the Villages (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
1967). 
16. Davidson “Some Observations on Viet Cong Operations in the Villages.” See also Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: 
The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. 
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17. Pentagon Papers, Vol. 1, 242‒69. 
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The guerrillas thoroughly knew the geography and the language of the politically 
contested regions in the south. Infiltration from the north proceeded with little difficulty. For 
example, from 1959‒63 infiltration rates from north to south increased dramatically with 4,556 
infiltrators coming down the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1959 and 1960, to 6,335 in 1961, and nearly 
8,000 in 1963.18 After 1964, a significant change took place in those infiltrated areas in the 
                                                 
18. Michael Clodfelter, Vietnam in Military Statistics: A History of the Indochina Wars, 1772-1991 (Jefferson, 
NC: McFarland Publishing, 1995), 30‒40. See also James S. Olson and Randy Roberts, Where the Domino Fell: 
America and Vietnam, 1945 to 1990 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 97. 
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 Figure 10. Ho Chi Minh Trail. 
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Figure 11. Infiltration routes used by the 
Viet Cong  and the North Vietnamese Army.  
south. 
 
 For the first time, ethnic North Vietnamese began infiltrating into South Vietnam. In 
October 1964, MACV estimated that about seventy-five percent of the infiltrators thus far that 




year were ethnic northerners recently drafted into the NVA. Later information indicated that 
between seventy-five to ninety percent of the infiltrators in 1964 were North Vietnamese.19  
In their book The United States in Vietnam, authors George McTurnan Kahin and John 
W. Lewis stated that: 
 Contrary to United States policy assumptions, all available evidence shows that 
the revival of the civil war in the South in 1958 was undertaken by Southerners at 
their own—not Hanoi’s—initiative. . . . Insurgency activity against the Saigon 
government began in the South under Southern leadership not as a consequence of 
any dictate from Hanoi, but contrary to Hanoi’s injections.20 
 There is no contradiction implied by Hanoi in sending thousands of southern-born 
personnel, that later became the Viet Cong, into the south. As stated in the memorandum entitled 
“Everything Senators Might Want to Know About Phoenix and You Were Afraid They Would 
Ask.” the US government was fully aware that:  
After the signing of the Geneva Agreement in 1954 which divided Vietnam into 
two zones, the Communists withdrew 75,000 native southern Viet Minh cadres 
and troops – who came to be known as “regroupees” members (approximately 
40,000 to 50,000) – also infrastructure – did not regroup and remained in the 
South to spearhead the political struggle against the new-formed Diem 
government. The Party’s early hopes and expiations of Diem’s collapse were 
frustrated by his success in holding the newly formed State of South Vietnam 
together and maintaining it as an ongoing, steadily improving nation. By the late 
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1950s, the Party organization in the South which had been left behind after 
Geneva was virtually paralyzed and shattered. To arrest the decline, rebuild the 
Party apparatus, and undermine the Diem government, the Lao Dong Party 
Central Committee in January 1959 at its 15th Plenum resolved to initiate an 
armed struggle in the South. The infiltration of regroupees began in earnest. The 
regrouped cadres returned to their native areas, traveling through Laos and 
Cambodia and had the mission of reviving the weekend Party apparatus, 
rebuilding the infrastructure, organizing the population into farmers’ groups, 
women’s organizations, youth groups, etc., and reestablishing guerrilla groups.21 
Of paramount importance was the cohesion of the revolutionaries when it came to the 
execution of internal and external policy in the formation of the insurgency in South Vietnam. 
By 1960, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was a thoroughly orthodox Communist state. 
Both the government and the society were dominated by the Communist Lao Dong (Workers) 
Party, and power within the party was concentrated to a small elite group—Ho Chi Minh and his 
lieutenants from the early beginnings of the Indochinese Communist Party in the 1920s.22 These 
groups of leaders were unique in the Communist world for their homogeneity and for their 
harmony—research by the US intelligence services indicated that there was little evidence of the 
kind of turbulence which had splintered the leadership of many of the Communist parties at that 
time. To be sure, both the South Vietnamese and US intelligence service personnel were aware 
of disputes within the Lao Dong hierarchy—the fallout from the disastrous land reform program 
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introduced by North Vietnam at the urging of their Chinese advisors in 1955‒57 appears to be a 
critical period in that regard. Nonetheless, the facts are that there has been no blood-purge of the 
Lao Dong leadership and except for changes occasioned by apparently natural deaths; the 
leadership in 1960 was virtually identical to what it had been in 1954 or as far back as 1946.23 
This remarkably dedicated and purposeful group of men apparently agreed among themselves as 
to what the national interests of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam required, what goals should 
be set for the nation, and what strategy they should pursue in attaining them.24  
Viet Cong Terror Tactics  
By the fall of 1959, the insurgency in South Vietnam began in earnest with the systematic 
implementation of assassinations, acts of overt terror, and kidnappings of prominent families.  
For the first time, Viet Cong units offered a direct challenge to the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam (ARVN). Large Viet Cong formations seized and held district and province capitals for 
short periods of time and assassinations and kidnappings proliferated markedly.  
With the launching of a general offensive, the terror tactics employed by the Viet Cong 
had two main purposes:  
First, it aims to destroy the local government leadership notably as the main 
source of order and to destroy or intimidate other natural or potential leadership 
which would otherwise compete with the Communists. Second, it aims to create 
fear and a sense of insecurity among the people in general in order to make them 
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responsive to Viet Cong demands upon them, and reluctant to support or 
collaborate with Government efforts.25 
With the opening of Vietnamese archives along with the declassification of CIA reports, 
a consensus indicates that whether the rebellion against Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam 
proceeded independently of, or even contrary to directions from Hanoi through 1958, Hanoi 
moved thereafter to harness the revolution and bind the insurgency to reunify the country under 
North Vietnamese leadership.26 There is little doubt that Hanoi exerted some influence over 
certain insurgents in the south throughout the years following the Geneva Accords. There is 
evidence which points to its preparing for active support of large-scale insurgency as early as 
1958.27 Whatever differences in strategy may have existed among Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi, 
it appears that at each critical juncture, Hanoi obtained concurrence in Moscow with an 
aggressive course of action.28 As stated in a declassified report within the Pentagon Papers:  
Accordingly, it was not “peaceful coexistence,” or concern over leadership of the 
“socialist camp” which governed Hanoi’s policy. What appeared to matter to 
Hanoi were its abiding national interests: domestic consolidation in independence, 
reunification, and Vietnamese hegemony in Southeast Asia. Both Soviet and 
Chinese policy seems to have bent to these ends rather than the contrary. If Hanoi 
applied brakes to eager insurgents in South Vietnam, it did so not from lack of 
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Figure 12. General Maxwell Taylor (left) and 
Robert McNamara receive brief on 
Vietnamese Army Special Forces. 
purpose or because of Soviet restraints, but from concern over launching one 
more premature uprising in the South.29   
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that Ngo Dinh Diem was entirely correct when he 
stated that: 
. . . his was a nation at war in early 1959; South Vietnam was at war with both the 
Viet Cong insurgents and with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, in that the 
latter then undertook to provide strategic direction and leadership cadres to build 
systematically a base system in Laos and South Vietnam for subsequent, large-
scale guerrilla warfare.30  
It was clear to General Maxwell 
Taylor upon his return from Vietnam, as a 
special representative of President Kennedy, 
that persuasive evidence existed by 1960 that 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam support of 
the insurgency in South Vietnam included 
materiel as well as personnel.31 In any event, 
by late 1959 it seems clear that Hanoi 
considered the time ripe to take the military 
offensive in South Vietnam and that by 1960, circumstances were propitious for more overt 
political action.32  
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Setting the Stage for Revolution in the South 
For over a thousand years guerrilla warfare was a way of life in Vietnam, having well-
established roots in bloody, protracted rebellions against several Chinese occupations as well as 
against French rule. With the explosive birth of Marxism acting as a catalyst for social change, 
Ho Chi Minh’s revolutionary warfare sought to establish a totally new social order in Vietnam. 
In this sense, Ho Chi Minh’s revolutionary efforts differed from previous Vietnamese 
insurgencies whose aim was either independence from foreign domination or a change in 
government. The North Vietnamese Communists along with their South Vietnamese allies, the 
Viet Cong, undertook aggression against their fellow countrymen on a scale previously unknown 
in Vietnamese history.33 Communist aggression concentrated on socio-psychological rather than 
military goals. Extensive efforts and resources were devoted to the development of organizations 
through which the Communists could exercise political and social control. Such organizations 
were paramilitary or political fronts, political parties, and guerrilla units. The chief activities of 
the organizations’ members were agitation and propaganda supported by terrorist and 
paramilitary activities.34 The Marxist revolution was imported to the south and the grievances 
used to organize resistance against Saigon, though extensive and in many cases substantive, were 
often artificially induced or exaggerated. 
While the 1954 Geneva Conference gave Vietnam an independent international identity 
separate from French colonial rule, it split the country at the 17th parallel into two political 
entities: the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was north of the 17th parallel and the Republic of 
Vietnam was south of the 17th parallel. The Communist leadership of the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh considered the partition transitory; their South Vietnamese 
                                                 
33. Pentagon Papers Vol. 1, 314‒46. 
34. Pentagon Papers Vol. 1, 314‒46. 
62 
 
counterparts did not. In the aftermath of their decisive defeat of the French, Ho Chi Minh and the 
members of the North Vietnamese Politburo were bitter that the fruits of victory had been denied 
them by their fellow Communists in both the Soviet Union and Mao’s China—each for their own 
reasons wanting to accommodate the Western powers led by the United States. That denial was 
strongly felt by the Vietnamese living in the north, who experienced the disastrous land reform 
program carried out under the guidance of Chinese advisors and wanted nothing more to do with 
Communism.35 
 Under the terms of the Geneva Accords, all Vietnamese were allowed free movement 
between North and South Vietnam. In 1954‒56, the US conducted Operation Exodus, assisting 
somewhere between 800,000 to 1 million North Vietnamese moving to South Vietnam.  It was 
estimated that somewhere between 30,000 to 100,000 South Vietnamese moved to North 
Vietnam. The mass migration to South Vietnam seeded the population at a ratio of about 1:10 
with people strongly opposed to Communism and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.36 
War According to Mao’s Teachings 
To compensate for the numerical and material advantages enjoyed by French colonial 
forces in the aftermath of World War II, a coalition of numerous nationalist political parties 
along with the Indochina Communist Party established the Vietnamese Lao Dong (Workers) 
Party, under the auspices of Ho Chi Minh’s Communists within the Viet Minh Front.  The Viet 
Minh leadership recognizing the relative strengths of the two forces strategically utilized Mao’s 
successful strategy of protracted engagement against the French and their Vietnamese allies 
while conserving their own strength until they could move into the offensive.  
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From 1946‒54, the Viet Minh employed terror tactics as old as war itself to compel the 
Vietnamese population to break with the old colonial administration. They employed such 
methods as assassinations of government officials and policemen, kidnappings of prominent 
Vietnamese and French families, as well as ambushes and hit-and-run engagements to keep the 
French off balance while the Viet Minh fought for time.37 For the next eight years, the Viet Minh 
trained and expanded their forces and received sufficient supplies from sympatric Communist 
governments, primarily the USSR and Mao’s China, to begin to engage the French and their 
allies in static, main-force battles.38 
With sufficient time to observe the Communists’ methods against the French, American 
forces understood what they would face as they stepped into the fray. On May 25, 1961, in a 
speech before a joint session of Congress, President Kennedy provided the following description 
of a new terror campaign initiated by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam: 
Their aggression is more often concealed than open. They have fired no missiles; 
and their troops are seldom seen. They send arms, agitators, aid, technicians and 
propaganda to every troubled area. But where fighting is required, it is usually 
done by others, by guerrillas striking at night, by assassins striking alone, 
assassins who have taken the lives of 4,000 civil officers in the last 12 months in 
Vietnam, by subversives and saboteurs and insurgents, who in some cases 
control whole areas inside of independent nations.39  
Following the end of the First Indochina War and French withdrawal, the character of the 
post-1954 struggle to reunite all of Vietnam changed. Due to an extensive underground of stay-
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behind Communist cadre ordered to keep a low profile along with the increasing infiltration of 
southern-born Vietnamese returning from the north, the conflict that developed between the 
Communists and the newly created government of South Vietnam was perceived by many 
southerners as deliberately instigated by Hanoi. This differentiated the post-1954 conflict from 
the anti-French war, which was clearly anticolonial and nationalist.40  
The Rise of Ngo Dinh Diem and a Vacuum in the South 
In the aftermath of the First Indochina War, Emperor Bao Dai’s abdication, and the Viet 
Minh later deposed by the election of Ngo Dinh Diem, the newly formed Republic of Vietnam 
suffered from a lack of organization and skilled civil service. The departure of the French civil 
administrators, particularly in the rural areas, created a vacuum that greatly aided the 
Communists in creating a virtual shadow government that provided medical services, security, 
and most importantly collected taxes to support their recruitment and propaganda efforts.41 In 
addition to the lack of any government structure, there was a great shortage of hands-on technical 
expertise to man everything from the electrical system to the simple requisitioning of supplies 
along with the leadership skills needed to oversee the work. Making progress more difficult was 
rigid native conservatism, particularly under President Ngo Dinh Diem, all of which limited the 
government’s ability to make the political compromises needed to secure the loyalty and support 
of the various diverse religious and political groups then existent in the south. To American 
observers there existed widely divergent political and religious entities—such as the Hoa Hao, 
Cao Dai religious factions and the Dai Viet, monarchists, Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang political 
parties, and incredibly, the Bình Xuyên river pirates who controlled not only organized crime but 
also the Saigon police department. Many of the groups numbering as many as one million 
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members, were heavily armed and often controlled large areas of the countryside, existing as 
virtual governments. 
These factions maintained fierce independence, refusing to submit to the Diem 
government to form a united effort against the Communists. Many patriotic Vietnamese 
nationalists, who at one time had been members of the Viet Minh but who were not Communists, 
came under suspicion and were not allowed to participate in the newly formed South Vietnamese 
government under Diem.42 
Adding to these worries, the North Vietnamese refused to renounce their claim of a 
united Vietnam, believing that in defeating the French that they and they alone represented the 
true wishes of the Vietnamese people. On September 2, 1945, in North Vietnam’s Declaration of 
Independence, Ho Chi Minh stated:  
We, members of the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam, solemnly declare to the world that Viet Nam has the right to be free and 
independent, and in fact is so already. The entire Vietnamese people are 
determined to mobilize all their physical and mental strength, to sacrifice their 
lives and property in order to safeguard their freedom and independence.43  
With the signing of the Geneva Accords in September 1955 and the dividing of 
Vietnam along the 17th parallel, the Communists announced the formation of the 
Fatherland Front: 
In every respect, historical, geographical, economic, cultural, social and national, 
Vietnam is a single, indivisible entity, built up by our ancestors in generations of 
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labor and struggle. Certainly, no force can divide it. This is why our entire people 
from North to South, both men and women, regardless of class or creed should 
assume the sacred duty of reunifying our country, in a single-hearted common 
effort.44 
Emphasizing that the goal of a unified Vietnam was the one issue that Hanoi would not 
compromise on with the South Vietnamese. On January 1, 1960, the North Vietnamese revised 
their Constitution stating: “Vietnam is a single entity, from Lang-Son to Camau.” This was 
further stressed in international forums and was stated forcefully at the Third Lao Dong Party 
Congress of September 1960, where this statement was issued: 
In the present stage, the Vietnamese revolution has two strategic tasks: first, to 
carry out the socialist revolution in North Vietnam; second, to liberate South 
Vietnam from the ruling yoke of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen in order 
to achieve national unity.45 
In an article published in the Communist newspaper Hoc Tap, Hanoi explicitly laid out 
its determination to unite all of Vietnam using any means necessary stating: 
The path of Vietnamese revolution in the South is the path of general uprising to 
seize political power . . . it is the objective . . . of the struggle of the whole Party 
and people at present. Therefore, all facets of activities must be actively carried 
out. . . .  The path of general uprising to seize political power is the path of long-
term political struggle combined with armed struggle. . . . Armed struggle is 
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aimed at serving political struggle . . . it aims chiefly at building the political 
forces of the working-class peasants.46 
In this same article, Hanoi gave detailed instructions for the southern Communists to 
establish both political and military organizations to advance the cause of liberation, placing a 
heavy emphasis on the formation of military formations.47 On March 28, 1960, the Lao Dong 
Party Committee for South Vietnam party chapters wrote a letter giving instructions on what 
actions were to be taken regarding these South Vietnamese civil and military programs.48 In 
December 1960, the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam in a radio address announced 
that: “The sacred task” of the National Liberation Front “was to liberate the south.”49 From these 
statements and actions, it was clear to see that Hanoi was directing the National Liberation Front 
of which there were some 4,556 northern and “regrouped” agents in the south.50  
 “It Would be Like Putting a Baby in a Cage of Hungry Lions”51 
In the wake of the French disaster at Dien Bien Phu, Diem’s resources were so few and 
his opponents so numerous that many, even his US sponsors, anticipated a speedy Viet Minh 
victory. In addition, until 1955 the French maintained their hold on both the army and the 
national treasury limiting Diem’s freedom to maneuver.  Diem had no political base outside a 
modest following in Central Vietnam. His assets consisted of an iron will, US support, the 
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loyalty of the Catholic minority, and the forbearance of the southern Communist organizations, 
90,000 of whose activists were about to be regrouped to the North.52  In truth, the US 
commitment sprang not from any perception of political vitality in the new government, but from 
the sense that Communist expansion must be resisted no matter the odds.  
The foundation for US support for the newly established government in Saigon was 
based on a consensus within the American foreign policy establishment that both a military but 
also an ideological struggle for influence was necessary. The United States had to rebuff any 
Communist’s moves to expand its influence into former European colonies. In a Joint Staff 
Planners meeting on August 29, 1945, Vice Admiral Russell Wilson read from his draft on the 
new military policy:  
When it becomes evident that forces of aggression are being arrayed against us by 
a potential enemy, we cannot afford, through any misguided and perilous idea of 
avoiding an aggressive attitude, to permit the first blow to be struck against us. 
Our government, under such conditions, should press the issue to a prompt 
political decision, while making all preparations to strike the first blow [if] 
necessary.53 
American Perceptions and the Coming of National Security Council 68 
American policymakers chose to employ containment in Vietnam beginning in the mid-
1950s not because they saw the Communists as implacably hostile in the near term, although 
many certainly were. Policymakers knew both the Soviets and the Chinese wanted peace to 
rebuild after their own devastating wars, yet they feared that unchecked expansion could lead to 
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additional confrontations offering unforeseen dangers. Thus was set the conditions for the 
ideological confrontation that would see a clash of ultra-nationalist revolutionaries bent on 
reuniting their country under Communist leadership and an American administration acting as a 
champion for self-determination.  
To better understand the complexity facing the Americans and the South Vietnamese of 
managing the war, it is important to understand that there were several wars overlapping each 
other. Each with their own goals, advocates, and logic comprising three overlapping forms. First 
is the military, a war of movement carried to the battlefield in the holds of the ubiquitous “Huey” 
helicopters, pitting US and ARVN forces against the Communists’ NVA regulars. Second is the 
struggle of the South Vietnamese government to create national political institutions and win the 
support and loyalty of the people in the countryside. Third, the part of the story told here, is the 
struggle to suppress the Viet Cong and protect the peasantry. It is told primarily from the 
perspective of the CIA and American military advisors who supported and helped to shape the 
South Vietnamese government’s effort to defeat the insurgency through the creation of specific 






Communist Administrative Structure in South Vietnam 
Design and Concept  
The formation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam was announced 
by Radio Hanoi on December 20, 1960.1 The National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was 
designed in accordance with Hanoi’s doctrine of adapting politics, military strategy, and tactics 
to political objectives, such as the implication that the struggle in South Vietnam was an 
indigenous “war of liberation.” 
The National Liberation Front was an umbrella organization for the insurgency, 
embracing various fronts, parties, and an alternate government to the Government of Vietnam. 
Several organizational units emerged from the National Liberation Front including the People’s 
Revolutionary Party on January 1, 1962 (actually the southern branch of the Lao Dong Party), 
the Central Office of South Vietnam in March 1962, and the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government of the Republic of Vietnam in 1969. The People’s Security Service, under the direct 
control of the Ministry of Public Security in Hanoi, maintained links between these organizations 
by inserting its own members in key positions for surveillance and to discipline members and 
sympathizers.  
Providing current secret intelligence to Hanoi and Lao Dong-People’s Revolutionary 
Party leaders, but operating independently from the National Liberation Front, was Hanoi’s 
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Central Research Agency. Originating during the war against the French, the Central Research 
Agency kept agents in the south and in foreign countries to collect intelligence. Together, the 
leaders and agents of these organizations along with their subordinate units made up the VCI 
with links via various channels to the Liberation Army regular forces, regional forces, and local 
guerrilla units. 
The military aspects of Communist organizational development, however, took second 
place to political organization, at least until 1964. Essentially, Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap 
and President Ho Chi Minh orchestrated the use of social-military concepts to maintain control 
through paramilitary guerrilla activities. Douglas Pike’s excellent book written while Vietnam 
was still ongoing, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front 
of South Vietnam, states as follows: 
Just as we overrate the military significance of revolutionary warfare so do we 
underrate its power as a social force. The contribution of Mao-Giap to 
sociological theory is a set of instructions on how to mobilize people into a potent 
force, which includes military force, for political purposes under circumstances in 
which one does not have the controls available ordinary rulers embarked on 
creating a nationwide political-military establishment.2  
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This does not deny the importance of Viet Cong guerrilla and terrorist activities but rather 
suggests that these were political rather than military in focus. However, these terrorist and 
military activities occupied the attention of both South Vietnam’s and the United States’ 
governments, particularly the US military. The threat to security, and hence political stability in 
the south, was the real result of Viet Cong infrastructure organization, but the military aspects 
were the prime target of the Government of Vietnam and the United States. The year 1957 did 
see a revision of US strategy in the form of the CORDS staff, to include an organized effort 
against the Viet Cong infrastructure, but the major effort remained militarily dominated and 
Table 4. Vietnam Communist Organization for South Vietnam. 
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oriented. This skewing of strategy permitted the Communist organizations to function effectively 
despite military setbacks.3 As long as the Communist organizations could survive or expand the 
insurgency in the south, the war would continue. 
National Liberation Front  
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Formed on December 20, 1960, after two years of intensive covert organizational 
preparation, the National Liberation Front represented Hanoi’s first overt effort to create a 
political paramilitary and military organization in the south. It was the first vehicle by which the 
liberation struggle would be waged while enabling the northern-based Lao Dong Party to deny 
its controlling role, personnel, and covert actions. 
There was little difficulty in forming the National Liberation Front since a trained 
network of 10,000 hardcore Communist Lao Dong agents remained in the south. As early as 
1959, these clandestine infiltrators were aided by an ever-growing influx of agents from the 
north. Initially made up of former southerners who had been rigorously trained since 1954, they 
had established excellent communications, intelligence, propaganda, and paramilitary networks. 
Indeed, the National Liberation Front became a front organization but, unlike most front 
organizations elsewhere, had a military structure.4 In its formation, the National Liberation Front 
was also unique when compared to the merger of political parties which constituted the popular 
fronts of Europe in the 1930s. The National Liberation Front created paper organizations which 
later became real subordinate fronts, such as the Youth, Women’s, and Farmers’ Fronts.5 The 
National Liberation Front set up these skeleton organizations to give the appearance of support 
from among workers, religious orders, soldiers, youth, women, farmers, and intellectuals in 
South Vietnam. The broad spectrum of persons added prestige to the National Liberation Front; 
in addition, it was intended to win active public support. Reports on the structure of the 
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organizations affiliated with the National Liberation Front clearly suggest that the secretaries of 
the various committees were members of the Lao Dong Party,6 which later surfaced as the 
People’s Revolutionary Party. 
        
 
 
In its formation, the National Liberation Front was also unique when compared to the 
merger of political parties which constituted the popular fronts of Europe in the 1930s. The 
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Table 6. Important Cadres: 
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National Liberation Front created paper organizations which later became real subordinate 
fronts, such as the Youth, Women’s, and Farmers’ Fronts.7 The National Liberation Front set up 
these skeleton organizations to give the appearance of support from among workers, religious 
orders, soldiers, youth, women, farmers, and intellectuals in South Vietnam. The broad spectrum 
of persons added prestige to the National Liberation Front; in addition, it was intended to win 
active public support. Reports on the structure of the organizations affiliated with the National 
Liberation Front clearly suggest that the secretaries of the various committees were members of 
the Lao Dong Party,8 which later surfaced as the People’s Revolutionary Party. 
Political Power Programs 
The National Liberation Front Central Committee and Presidium were formed and 
dominated by northern Lao Dong agents.9 The Central Committee and Presidium, established in 
1960, was the head unit of the operational framework completed in order to organize the masses 
of the southern population. The rest of the operational organization was to consist of a variety of 
political parties and a broad spectrum of fronts designed to encompass all segments of 
Vietnamese society in a political paramilitary struggle for absolute power. 
Political power was the National Liberation Front’s objective. The National Liberation 
Front purported to be the sole, genuine, legitimate representative of the South Vietnamese 
people, and it labeled the Saigon government “rebel” and illegitimate.10 In an interview with a 
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London Daily Worker journalist, reprinted in the North Vietnamese magazine Viet Nam Courier, 
July 15, 1965, Ho Chi Minh described the National Liberation Front objectives: 
The program of the South Viet Nam National Liberation Front clearly specified 
its principal aims. These are: to struggle against aggressive U.S. imperialism, to 
liberate the South, to achieve independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality, 
and advance step by step toward the reunification of the country. The South Viet 
Nam National Front for Liberation is an organization of the patriotic movement, 
set up by the mass of the people. The Front is the leader, the organizer of the 
South Vietnamese people’s struggle against U.S. imperialism to recover 
independence. The Front is the only genuine representative of the South 
Vietnamese people. It is the sacred duty of the whole people of Viet Nam to 
support the South Vietnamese People’s liberation struggle, waged under the 
leadership of the National Front for Liberation. We (DRV) respect the policies of 
the Front and hold that the two zones must take their respective characteristics 
into account, understand each other, restore normal relations between them and 
gradually achieve national reunification. Viet Nam is one. The Vietnamese are 
one people. Our entire people have the duty of opposing foreign aggression and 
defending the Fatherland.  
To extend its popular appeal, the 1960 National Liberation Front program included the 
following points: 
• Help for industrialists and traders;  
• Rehabilitation of agriculture;  
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• Provision of jobs for the unemployed;  
• Modernization of farming;  
• Improvement of living conditions for workers and public employees;  
• Protection of orphans, the elderly, and the disabled;  
• Relief for localities suffering from crop failures, fire, and natural calamities; 
• A guarantee to country folk and urban persons of the opportunity to earn their living 
in security;  
• Protection of the legitimate right of ownership by peasants of the plots of land 
distributed to them; 
• Elimination of illiteracy;  
•  A policy of assistance to families of poor army men, plus other acts of benevolence. 
Also included among these provisions and guarantees was the confiscation of lands owned by 
US “imperialists and their agents,” and the promise to “promulgate all democratic freedoms.” 
Included, as well, was a pledge “to support national liberation struggles of peoples in other 
countries.”11 
In 1967, the 1960 program was revised. In its most authoritative pronouncement of 
objectives, a 7,500 word document listed the four major planks: to save the nation (from U.S. 
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aggressors); to work for reunification of the fatherland; to build an independent, democratic, 
peaceful, neutral, and prosperous Vietnam; and to apply a foreign policy of peace and neutrality. 
The third plank was broken down into fourteen concrete policies: 
• To establish a progressive government;  
• To develop the economy;  
•  To institute land reform;  
• To promote education, culture, science, technology, and public health;  
• To improve working conditions;  
• To develop the armed forces;  
• To provide veterans’ benefits; 
• To establish equality of the sexes;  
• To provide social welfare benefits;  
• To integrate minorities;  
• To guarantee religious freedom;  
• To implement an amnesty program;  
• To protect the rights of absent Vietnamese;  
• To protect the rights of foreigners in Vietnam.12  
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Political Parties  
Beginning in 1905, a bewildering number of parties, groups, united fronts, etc., fought for 
control in a divided Vietnam. The sheer number of these organizations does not testify to the 
vigor of the various nationalist movements, but rather demonstrated the inability of its various 
leaders to agree on aims and tactics; to create strong, united organizations; and to subordinate 
their personal ambitions and prejudices to the need for united action. As an example of the 
ephemeral nature of these groups the New Vietnam Revolutionary Party, was created in 1925 
giving rise to a separate Communists group, the Dong Duong Cong San Lien Doan (Indochina 
Communist Alliance) which later helped found the Indochina Communists Party in August of 
1929, after dissidents from Tonkin and Annam quarreled with the Revolutionary Youth 
Association at a reunification meeting in Hong Kong and set up their own organization. Its 
various programs reflected those of the National Liberation Front.13 Then, in January 1962, the 
People’s Revolutionary Party (Party of the Working Class) was created as “the party of patriotic, 
democratic, and progressive intellectuals, and industrialists in South Vietnam,” with the 
assignment “in the present phase to struggle to achieve the NFLSVN objectives. . . .”14 The 
Radical Socialist Party was identical to the North Vietnam Socialist Party, as was the new 
Democratic Party, which was a copy of its northern namesake.15 Finally, Liberation Radio went 
on the air in 1968, and a Liberation Red Cross was formed. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
13. Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, 1234‒53. See also Turner, Vietnamese Communism, 231. 
14. Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, 1234‒53. See also CIA, “The Organization Activities and 
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82 
 
The associations, or fronts, were active at the national, interzone, zone, province, district, 
and village levels. In a liberated area, they sought to serve as an overt government, and in 
contested or Government of Vietnam-controlled areas, they formed shadow governments. 
The National Liberation Front Central Committee, with its affiliated parties, acted as the 
policy and strategy forming level. As early as 1961, the National Liberation Front began 
concentrating on organizing at the province, district, and village levels. Associations, specifically 
for farmers, students, women, youth, and urban workers were set up.16 At the village level, 
peasants were organized into a number of functional liberation associations, the most important 
of which were the Peasants’ Liberation Association (Hoi Nong Dan Giai Phong), the Women’s 
Liberation Association (Hoi Phu Nu Giai Phong), the Liberation Youth Association (Hoi Thanh 
Nien Giai Phong), the Association of Liberation Students and School Children (Hoi Lien Kiep 
Sinh Vien, Hoi Sinh Giai Phong), and the Liberation Cultural Association (Hoi Van Nghe Giai 
Phong). Additionally, a number of professional associations were created for journalists, 
businessmen, physicians, and other professionals.17  
Ascertaining the actual membership in National Liberation Front organizations is 
difficult. Statistics on Vietnam are varied, conflicting, and changing. Many scholars have for 
these reasons avoided statistical analysis. However, Douglas Pike in War, Peace and the Viet 
Cong, estimates that the National Liberation Front had, as late as 1968, approximately ten to 
fifteen percent support, including hardcore supporters as well as sympathizers. Pike also notes 
                                                 
16. “Party in Revolution.” See also CIA, “The Communist Liberation Committees in South Vietnam,” 2. 
17. “Party in Revolution,” 232. See also Turner, Vietnamese Communism, 232‒33. 
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that as Buddhist opposition to the Government of Vietnam increased, National Liberation Front 
sympathizers decreased in number.18  
Village-Level Politics 
The rationale for the National Liberation Front concentration on village organization was 
basically that the peasants lived in the villages, and it was at the village level that the Saigon 
government had either neglected or failed to develop and properly staff popular socio-political 
organizations.19  The National Liberation Front moved in on the villages and assumed control. 
This was made relatively easy because the peasants’ personal commitments were not based on 
circumstances or tradition. Recognizing this, the Viet Cong infrastructure developed two parallel 
programs. The first was to make the South Vietnamese Government, not the village population, 
the propaganda enemy. Thus, the Government of Vietnam was forced to make its own survival 
the priority objective, and support to the local population a secondary priority. As for the people, 
particularly the peasants, the Communists developed and relied on superb organization at the 













                                                 
18. “Increasing Number of Defectors from Viet Cong Ranks,” Texas Tech University, Vietnam Center and 
Archive, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05—National Liberation Front, Box 17, Folder 05, Item Number: 
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Table 7. Nha Trang City Party Committee: 
City-Level Organization. 
 
The recruitment and training of guerrillas was, in fact, one of the first steps toward 
establishing a revolutionary organization in the villages. One of the first, largest, and most 
important and enduring of these Communist organizations was the Farmers Liberation 
Association (Nong Hoi), or simply the Farmers’ Association. For security purposes, this group 
had a cellular structure consisting of a Communist leader and two or more peasant members. The 
cell nucleus had the objective of suborning the peasants by controlling their primary activity, 
agricultural production, their only means of existence.20   
                                                 
20. “Program and Summary of the Regulations of the Liberated Farmers Association,” Texas Tech University, 
Vietnam Center and Archive, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05—National Liberation Front, Box 10, Folder 07, Item 
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The key elements of this shadow government involved an upward chain of command: 
1. At the top, the National Liberation Front Central Committee, which was responsible 
for policy planning and supervision of organizational expansion.  
2. Three interzone headquarters, where after 1963 agitation/propaganda policy was 
determined, with agitation/propaganda teams responsible for indoctrination and 
training of the population. 
3. Seven geographical zones, in effect, sub offices for the interzones, existing mainly 
because travel and communication barriers did not easily permit administrative 
directives directly between the interzone headquarters and the province committees.  
4. Some 30 (later 43) provincial committees, the chief operational units of the National 
Liberation Front, with the task of administering the liberation associations and 
assigning military duties to local guerrilla units.21   
5. The lower echelons—district, village, and city committees and organizations 
carrying out the political struggle, the military task of proselytization, and the armed 
struggle.22    
The support that the National Liberation Front generated was rarely ideological. Rather, it 
was of social motivation. Both social pressure and Viet Cong coercion caused young men and 
women to join the ranks of the National Liberation Front army, and social pressure ensured their 
                                                                                                                                                             
2311007003.pdf.  See also: R. Michael Pearce, The Insurgent Environment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
1969), 33‒42. 
21. Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 360-518, “Know Your Enemy: The Viet Cong” (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 8 March 1966), 3‒21. https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/reports/images.php?img=/images/ 
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“organization seems cumbersome and the chain of command indirect and slow, in contrast to orthodox military 
practice of establishing a direct military chain of command from top to bottom. However, the Viet Cong’s political 
and military structure conforms to the classic Communist pattern of strong central authority at the top and operations 
at lower level decentralized, with Communist Party control over the government at all levels, and political control 
over the military at all levels.” 
22. Department of the Army, DA Pamphlet 360-518, “Know Your Enemy: The Viet Cong,” 3‒21, See also 
Pike, Viet Cong, 113. 
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loyalty. Moreover, the Viet Cong had controlled areas of South Vietnam for a generation, and in 
the villages, the local leaders were obeyed and even protected. 
The village level was the lowest echelon with any decision-making authority and at the 
lowest party level. Leadership was generally in the hands of a single People’s Revolutionary 
Party member with an Executive Committee of five to seven members and from three to a dozen 
branches. Members lived in the various hamlets constituting the village, and they provided the 
party’s “link to the masses.”23  
By 1957, the Party was primarily occupied with two major problems: political control of 
the National Liberation Front military army and implementation of the political struggle by 
means of military and civilian proselytizing activities. Political commissars, all People’s 
Revolutionary Party members, were found in all National Liberation Front units and fronts as 
controlling but not commanding officials. The entire struggle was controlled by the People’s 
Revolutionary Party agents working through the National Liberation Front, which served as a 
front for public activities.24 The party thus became the decisive channel of the organization. 
From it preceded direction, control, and supervision, and only within its councils were policy and 
strategy planned.25  
                                                 
23. “Organization of the Viet Cong Infrastructure,” Texas Tech University, Vietnam Center and Archive, 
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1968. https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/reports/images.php?img=/images/231/2310813012.pdf. 1‒8. See also Pike, Viet 
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Although the villagers’ attitudes toward the National Liberation Front deteriorated to 
outright dislike or worse, the villages continued to support the National Liberation Front from 
1962 to 1973. The explanation for this lies in the organizational strength of the Viet Cong 
infrastructure. The National Liberation Front never sought to rely on the voluntary support of the 
population but instead sought to control the population for the National Liberation Front’s own 
objectives.26 The Viet Cong infrastructure offered the people one choice: either to incur the 
active enmity of the Viet Cong infrastructure or not to cooperate with the Government of 
Vietnam. As the Viet Cong infrastructure organizations expanded, most Viet Cong violence was 
designed to achieve desired effects by punishing anti-Viet Cong or pro-Government of Vietnam 
activities, thus providing an example to others.27 
It was at the village level that the National Liberation Force faced its chief organizational 
challenge. A mass movement had to be created, drawing from a body of distrusting and reluctant 
farmers who had nonetheless been recruited, energized, and controlled.28 To meet this challenge, 
from its inception through 1964, the National Liberation Front employed functional liberation 
associations such as the Farmers’ Liberation Association, Youth Liberation Association, 
Women’s Liberation Association, and the like. These fleshed out the fronts created in 
conjunction with the National Liberation Front. Each of the fronts was guided and controlled at 
every level by an administrative liberation association. The associations were elite, narrow, and 
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Archive, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 05—National Liberation Front, Box 05, Folder 07, Item Number: 
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structurally hierarchical, branching out of the National Liberation Front Central Committee via a 
number of intervening administrative levels (zone, province, and district) to the administrative 
Village Liberation Committee. Each level was controlled by hardcore Lao Dong Party members, 
constituting the 1964 Viet Cong shadow government of Vietnam.29  
“Know Your Enemy: The Viet Cong” goes into great detail on the organizational 
structure stating that while the “organization seems cumbersome and the chain of command 
indirect and slow, in contrast to the orthodox military practice of establishing a direct military 
chain of command from top to bottom. However, the Viet Cong’s political and military structure 
conforms to the classic Communist pattern of the strong central authority at the top and 
operations at lower level decentralized, with Communist Party control over the government at all 
levels, and political control over the military at all levels.”    
The failure of American and South Vietnamese analysts to grasp the method of Viet 
Cong propaganda and organizational techniques led many decision makers to assume that the 
Viet Cong infrastructure was the enemy of the people and that given the opportunity, the people 
would revolt against the Viet Cong.30 What the Government of Vietnam officialdom failed to 
understand was that the National Liberation Front could and did exploit the Government of 
Vietnam’s weakness at the district and village levels, focusing on the corruption and 
incompetence of local Government of Vietnam officials. In fact, the Government of Vietnam 
officials contributed to the disaffection of the peasantry by poorly planned and implemented 
                                                 
29. Mark Moyer, “The War Against the Viet Cong Shadow Government,” Box 01, Folder 01, Texas Tech 
University, Vietnam Center and Archive, Mark Moyar Collection, Box 01, Folder 01, Item Number: 1530101001, 
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resettlement and land reform program, plus repressive measures against former Viet Minh 
guerrillas and their families.31  
Furthermore, the Government of Vietnam’s reaction to National Liberation Front policies 
was harsh and often indiscriminate, thus playing directly into National Liberation Front hands. 
According to a sample of peasants interviewed, the Government of Vietnam’s most serious error 
was the promulgation of Law No. 10 in 1959, which highlighted the 1957‒60 “denunciation of 
Communism” campaign instituted by the Ngo Dinh Diem government. 32 Under Law 10/59, the 
government became the sole interpreter of subversive activity and could choose its targets with 
impunity—a virtually unlimited hunting license. Anyone convicted of “acts of sabotage” or 
“infringements on national security” could be sentenced to death or life imprisonment with no 
appeal.33  
The primary Government of Vietnam targets were former Viet Minh guerrillas—many of 
whom were nationalists, not Communists—regardless of whether or not they were known to 
have participated in subversive activities. This insensitive implementation of Law 10/59 further 
alienated the peasants from the Government of Vietnam, for many peasants viewed the former 
guerrillas as heroes of the anti-French war. 
Between 1953 and 1960, in response to Law 10/59, extensive North Vietnamese 
propaganda was directed at exploiting the Government of Vietnam’s errors and heavy-
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handedness, reactivating former Viet Minh, and recruiting young men to be trained as guerrillas 
for future activity.34  
The recruiting of guerrillas and the establishment of Nong Hoi moved rapidly in remote 
areas outside Government of Vietnam influence since the hardcore infiltrator agents worked 
unhindered. In areas of Government of Vietnam influence or presence, the development of 
peasant support for the Viet Cong infrastructure proceeded slowly. When the Communist 
guerrillas began to make armed forays into Government of Vietnam areas, however, the 
magnitude of the Communist threat became apparent.35  
The announcement in 1960 of the formation of the National Liberation Front of South 
Vietnam accomplished two things. First, relating to the opposition facing President Ngo Dinh 
Diem, the National Liberation Front provided an alternate organization which spoke in 
nationalist terms and promised to remedy the excesses of the Diem regime. Second, it placed all 
the revolutionary-subversive activities of the numerous agent factotums in the south under the 
leadership of a single organization. From an estimated strength of 6,000 agents in 1957, National 
Liberation Front strength hovered around 25,000 in 1960, of which one-third was thought to be 
composed of regular guerrillas.36 By early 1962, the cumulative National Liberation Front 
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membership stood at an estimated 500,000, where it remained until the fall of the Diem regime 
in November 1963, when it dropped 400,000‒450,000. During 1965 and 1966, membership was 
probably between 250,000 and 300,000. The National Liberation Front, however, claimed as of 
December 19, 1963, that it had 750 organizations and 7,000,000 members.37 Further, by mid-
1964, Viet Cong armed forces in South Vietnam were estimated to comprise 50,000 to 60,000 
regular troops, about one-half of them trained in North Vietnam, plus perhaps 80,000 to 120,000 
local guerrillas.38  
Limitations on National Liberation Front Success 
One of the significant developments, in both the National Liberation Front and in the 
organizations which it generated, was the drain on the limited number of Lao Dong hardcore 
agents in the south. This manpower drain led to Hanoi’s takeover, or regularization, of the 
National Liberation Front. From mid-1963 to the end of 1965, large numbers of replacement 
agents began infiltrating from North Vietnam.39 The new agents ascertained Hanoi’s domination 
of the southern organizations of not only the National Liberation Front but all affiliated political 
parties, associations, and allied groups. This takeover, implementing the weeding out of the 
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Post, (January 27, 1965); A-l, A-5. Mid-1965 estimates were 100,000 guerrillas and 46,000 regulars. 
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unreliable agents was continued throughout the war.40 Additionally, all military units were under 
Hanoi’s control.  
The People’s Revolutionary Party 
The People’s Revolutionary Party was a direct outgrowth of inherent flaws in the 
National Liberation Front organizational and operational structure. From Hanoi’s point of view, 
the National Liberation Front suffered from severe problems. First, the appeal of the National 
Liberation Front was designed to be broad enough to attract dissident southern nationalists who 
might not favor reunification with the North. Second, the National Liberation Front 
organizational structure and membership had expanded rapidly, and consequently, discipline and 
leadership needs had outrun the capabilities and resources of the southern Lao Dong Party 
agents. Third, as the armed struggle increased, Hanoi had to consolidate direction and control of 
the insurgency in the south. 
By 1961, the situation had become urgent, because guerrilla operations had expanded 
under the auspices of the National Liberation Front as the National Liberation Front Liberation 
Army. Since the army and the party formed a dual system, political control of the armed 
struggle, as well as of the National Liberation Front, was essential. Consequently, all policies, 
strategies, and operations became the responsibility of the newly created People’s Revolutionary 
Party, which maintained its ideological purity by remaining a separate organization within the 
National Liberation Front with its own communications and command structure. The People’s 
Revolutionary Party was, in fact, the southern branch of the Lao Dong Party.41  
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On January 1, 1962, the People’s Revolutionary Party was officially organized. Radio 
Hanoi quoted the Liberation News Agency of January 13, 1962, to the effect that the People’s 
Revolutionary Party was formed in late December 1961 by a “conference of Marxist-Leninists 
meeting in South Vietnam . . . under the guidance of veteran revolutionaries.”42 The People’s 
Revolutionary Party never denied its Communist nature. Nor did it deny that it was more than 
merely an equal member unit of the National Liberation Front. It was, it insisted, “The vanguard 
of the National Liberation Front, the paramount member.”43 The People’s Revolutionary Party 
considered itself to be the reinforcing steel spine of the National Liberation Front organization.44  
The Lao Dong Party in the south had remained a covert organization from 1954 to 1962. 
Coincidental with the public formation of the People’s Revolutionary Party in 1962, the Lao 
Dong Party began a rapid organizational expansion, and while the People’s Revolutionary Party 
denied its official ties with Hanoi, it nonetheless used the Lao Dong communications network to 
Hanoi. 
In 1963, Hanoi established “The Committee for Supervision of the South,” with 
administrative supervision of the People’s Revolutionary Party.45 In fact, a memorandum 
circulated among National Liberation Force agents at the time of the People’s Revolutionary 
Party’s formation stating that the revolutionary movement in the south lacked organization and 
leadership and that the People’s Revolutionary Party was the paramount organization to fill this 
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role.46 It is also interesting to note that in April 1962, the Central Committee of the People’s 
Revolutionary Party issued a foreign policy statement damning the US presence and lauding the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Chinese, Russian, and Communist bloc support; as well as 
demanding implementation of elections under the 1954 Geneva Accords.47 This declaration had 
the overtones of a government coming into being, and it set the stage for the subsequent 
emergence of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. 
The organizational structure of the People’s Revolutionary Party was independent of but 
meshed with the National Liberation Front structure it controlled. There were, however, two 
exceptions. First, a classic Communist cell structure linked individual members. Second, a 
separate chain of command was created for urban areas, similar to but separate from the rural 
chain of command.48  
Initially, part or all of the People’s Revolutionary Party headquarters for the Central 
Committee, and probably most of the National Liberation Front, was located in the famed Zone 
D area north of Saigon in the Binh Duong Province. There were also reports that the People’s 
Revolutionary Party National Liberation Front leadership spent much or most of its time in 
another headquarters just inside the Cambodian border, west of Hau Nghia Province. The 
confusion was heightened when a joint US-Government of Vietnam military operation overran 
the Zone D headquarters in January 1966, capturing nearly 6,000 documents. The idea took hold 
that the actual headquarters directing the insurgency was located in Cambodia and went by name 
of the Central Office, South Vietnam.49  
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Whatever the case may be, the National Liberation Force, People’s Revolutionary Party, 
and the various fronts and alliances shared one command structure. It appears probable that after 
1966,  the Central Office of South Vietnam was located in a safe haven in Cambodia and that the 
instructions emanating from the Central Office of South Vietnam were those of the People’s 
Revolutionary Party. 
The People’s Revolutionary Party Central Committee had three functions: first, provide 
direction for the National Liberation Front; second, provide general administration; and third, the 
increasingly important responsibility of the military-political commissar.50 This latter 
responsibility took on major importance as the military phase expanded rapidly, beginning in 
1964 with a large increase in arms and infiltrators from the north.51 
 While the National Liberation Front army and guerrilla forces were controlled by the 
People’s Revolutionary Party, the North Vietnamese army units, or People’s Army of Vietnam, 
operating in South Vietnam, retained their own chain of command direct from Hanoi.52 The 
administration and guidance at People’s Revolutionary Party headquarters were divided among a 
number of sections, including economic and financial units as well as vital security, intelligence, 
counterintelligence, communication, and liaison functions. 
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Complete centralization was inhibited by security, geography, and the National 
Liberation Front structure. An interzone unit was designed to decentralize these functions. Each 
interzone had a 21-man Central Committee which was essentially a conduit from People’s 
Revolutionary Party headquarters to zones (regions) which might consist of two or more 
provinces.53 As with the National Liberation Front, the Provincial Committee was the key link 
in the People’s Revolutionary Party command chain, since it supervised policy implementation 
of district, village, and hamlet levels where the People’s Revolutionary Party National Liberation 
Front was in direct contact with the population.54  
The district- or city-level Central Committee was probably the most important lower 
level element of the People’s Revolutionary Party. It oversaw all day-to-day activities in its area 
and had considerable latitude in its operations. Prior to 1964, it was the lowest operating level of 
the party.55 After 1964, and certainly by 1967 when Phoenix (Phung Hoang) made its debut, the 
People’s Revolutionary Party was well organized at the village and hamlet levels. 
The Central Office for South Vietnam 
The original Central Office of South Vietnam was created by the Lao Dong Party in 1951 
to replace the Nam Bo (Southern) Regional Party Committee to carry out party policy in 
Cochinchina during the war with the French. It was headed by Le Duan, with Le Due Tho as his 
deputy. This office was dissolved in 1954.56  
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Prior to March 1962, South Vietnam had been divided into two interzones: Intersector V 
and Nam Bo. Each zone was responsible to the Central Committee of the Lao Dong Party in 
Hanoi. In March, they were made into a single operational headquarters—Central Office of 
South Vietnam. Supervision of the Central Office of South Vietnam was exercised through the 
Lao Dong’s Central Committee Reunification Department.57 Further, the Central Office of South 
Vietnam headquarters was highly mobile and often geographically diversified, obviously for 
greater security of personnel. 
After 1964, when Hanoi decided to escalate the fighting, one of the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam’s two four-star senior generals, Nguyen Chi Thanh, a Politburo member, was sent 
south to assume command of the Central Office of South Vietnam. Thanh was killed in July 
1967 and was replaced by another Politburo member, Pham Hung, an original member of the 
1951 Central Office of South Vietnam and believed to be its head as late as 1973. At the time of 
General Thanh’s assignment, direct Central Office of South Vietnam communication with the 
Politburo in Hanoi was established.58  
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Current Affairs Committee  
Within the Central Office of South Vietnam headquarters structure was the Current 
Affairs Committee. Theoretically, the Current Affairs Committee was the highest operational 
echelon of the People’s Revolutionary Party. It was at the Central Office of South Vietnam that 
the Party Congress, made up of high regional and provincial officials, was convened. Its most 
important function was to elect from among its own members a Central Executive Committee of 
30 to 40 members. The Central Executive Committee appointed from its members the Current 
Affairs Committee and Current Affairs Committee functional units, that is, the Secretary Section 
(or Communications Section) and the Security Section. The Current Affairs Committee thus 
became the action agency of the Central Office of South Vietnam and the party, conducting the 
day-to-day business of the Central Executive Committee. After coordination with the Military 
Affairs Committee, it was the Current Affairs Committee that issued the various Central Office 
of South Vietnam directives which were sent down through the People’s Revolutionary Party 
hierarchy.59  
Since the Current Affairs Committee met continuously, it often was referred to as the 
Permanent or Standing section. The activities of the Current Affairs Committee ensured control 
and direction. When the situation warranted, the Current Affairs Committee also met jointly with 
the Military Affairs Committee to review past activities and to plan future operations.60  
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The Secretary Section was the administrative element of the Current Affairs Committee 
and was headed by a party secretary and two deputy secretaries. The party secretary was the 
most important member because he decided what matters the Current Affairs Committee would 
consider.61  
The Security Section was responsible for the investigation of party members accused of 
deviating from party ideology or instructions. Although this section would normally handle only 
cases involving high-level party officials, its members could investigate any party member. It 
also had independent communication links with the Ministry of Public Security in Hanoi, which 
provided most Security Section personnel.62  
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At the next level below were five strengthened interprovincial zones and a special 
Saigon-Gia Dinh organization. Beneath the regional committees were provincial and district 
party committees, which supervised the activities of village and hamlet-level members. The basic 
party unit was the party cell.63 
 A most important operational headquarters was that of the Provincial Committee, a key 
center for the coordination and control not only of the party but also of the activities of the extra-
party infrastructure such as the National Liberation Front, its fronts, associations, and the armed 
units.64  
The number and nature of the functional agencies of the Provincial Committees varied 
with requirements, situation, and geography. The Party emphasized limiting the number of 
agencies to those essential to operations. In general, these included six vital functions:  
• Communications;  
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•  Propaganda and party training;  
• Mass organizing work among the civil population and psychological operations 
against the enemy;  
• Economy, production, and supply;  
• Military affairs;  
•  Security.65  
At the district, city, and village levels, the number of committees and their subordinate 
basic units varied according to conditions. Flexibility was more the order of the day than at the 
provincial level.66  
In conclusion, the Central Office of South Vietnam was established in order to provide 
Hanoi with the essential coordination and control, including military control, relative to the 
overall insurgency in the south. The Central Office of South Vietnam itself was a southern 
command structure dominated by People’s Revolutionary Party Lao Dong members. It meshed 
the policies, strategies, and activities of the insurgency at the top command level. Below that 
level, it utilized the People’s Revolutionary Party structure to carry its instructions to its various 
organizations.67  
The Provisional Revolutionary Government 
The achievement of Hanoi’s international goals required at least partial diplomatic 
recognition that a southern provisional government did, in fact, exist. Foreign recognition of a 
provisional government other than that of Saigon had certain obvious advantages. 
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To establish such a government, a formal civil administration had to be created not only 
at the national but at the provincial, district, and village levels. Such a civil administration had to 
have a flexible organizational form with the objective or goal of expanding de facto insurgent 
control. The intermediate step was the creation of the People’s Liberation Committees, 
sometimes referred to as the People’s Revolutionary Councils.68  
A March 1968 Central Office of South Vietnam directive set out the size and ideal format 
for the People’s Liberation Committees. For example, at the provincial and district levels, 
People’s Liberation Committees were elected, but if elections were not possible, appointments 
were made and announced by the local National Liberation Front associations. In villages with a 
population of 3,000 or less, fifteen members were selected; villages of between 3,000 and 5,000 
persons selected twenty to twenty-five members; and so forth. Committee members, who were 
also People’s Revolutionary Party members, were appointed to posts of information and culture, 
security, education, public and social welfare. The hamlet followed the village format. The 
authority vested in the People’s Liberation Committees was that of governmental jurisdiction.69  
The National Liberation Front mass associations were often absorbed by the newly 
formed People’s Liberation Committees, but the Central Committee of the National Liberation 
Front remained the spokesman for the entire Viet Cong organization.70  
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In late 1963, the Central Office of South Vietnam issued Directive 27, which called for 
the establishment of a “revolutionary government” in order to “keep pace with the development 
of the situation.” The directive continued: 
At present, we do not establish the People’s Liberation Committees for the Sub-
Regions and Regions (Zones and Inter-zones), but all Regions and Sub-Regions 
must organize sections for directing governmental affairs. The section chief will 
be the deputy secretary of the Party Committee. The section also has a deputy 
section chief (who was a Party Committee member), and a number of section 
members. The section will assume the responsibility of the People’s Liberation 
Committees in the Region and Sub-Region. The Region and Sub-Region 
government sections will help the Party Committees provide leadership for and 
supervise the activities of People’s Liberation Committees at various levels in the 
implementation of Party policies and lines concerning governmental matters in 
the Regions and Sub-Regions.71  
The directive also called for the establishment of a governmental leadership section for South 
Vietnam.72  
By October 15, 1968, twenty-two Provincial Liberation Committees and thirty-five Viet 
Cong district committees were formed, mostly in Government of Vietnam Corps I and IV. At the 
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village level, over nine hundred committees were functioning.73 During the first part of 1969, the 
National Liberation Front and the “Alliance of Democratic Peace Forces,” along with the 
People’s Revolutionary Party and the Liberation Peasants’ Association, reportedly held a joint 
conference to establish a People’s Revolutionary Government, and June 6‒8, 1969, a “South 
Vietnam People’s Delegate Congress” was reportedly held to select government membership.74  
International Role 
The formation of the People’s Revolutionary Government, which was recognized by the 
bloc countries—India, Burma, and Indonesia—was the key to Viet Cong infrastructure efforts to 
gain international recognition and support for its forthcoming role in international negotiations 
on Vietnam. In particular, the People’s Revolutionary Government focused on the forthcoming 
Paris Conference on Vietnam, while also providing a vehicle for the eventual reunification of 
North and South Vietnam which would have some semblance of legality. This argument is 
substantiated by the Peace Proposal of the People’s Revolutionary Government of the Republic 
of South Vietnam, July 1, 1971, which stated its negotiating positions for the Paris Conference.75  
The strategy was successful. In the Paris Agreement on Vietnam, January 27, 1973, the 
People’s Revolutionary Government participated as an equal power with the United States, the 
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Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the Government of Vietnam. The result was the cease-
fire.76 
Communist Intelligence and Security Systems 
There were two clandestine functions vital to the Communist effort in South Vietnam. 
One was to obtain intelligence on the opposition and its allies. The other was to maintain internal 
security and perform disciplinary and terrorist functions within the Communist organizations and 
the areas they controlled or influenced. In this latter sense, there was a similarity to the repressive 
functions of the Soviet KGB. Terrorism received considerable attention in the Western press, but 
security and disciplinary activities were not given equal coverage. 
There is some question as to whether both functions came under one office situated both 
in Hanoi and Central Office of South Vietnam, or were separate but coordinated organizations. 
The preponderance of evidence suggests that two separate organizations existed, each with its 
own specific mission. They were the Central Research Agency and the Security Service. At the 
local level in the south, however, the missions of these two organizations at times overlapped, 
with individual agents performing dual functions.77  
The Central Research Agency  
The Central Research Agency was essential to Hanoi’s command and control of the 
southern insurgency. A complex, sophisticated, and excellent professional intelligence system, it 
had its beginnings as far back as the war with the French. Agents were in place in 1954 and 
reported directly to Hanoi by means of a superb electronic communications system.78 After 
collection, intelligence data was analyzed and collated with additional information from other 
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parts in the south, as well as from abroad. Hanoi was able to provide accurate and timely 
information to its southern units, as well as to impose additional requirements where needed. 
Thus, southern sector commanders could be kept informed not only about their own area but also 
about the overall picture of insurgency in the south. Campaign plans could be drawn up and 
targets selected with the knowledge of all strategic implications.  
Communist intelligence operations were extensive and well planned from the very 
beginning. The Central Research Agency, which operated directly under the National Defense 
Committee of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, was coordinated with the Lao Dong Party. 
As evidence of the importance to Central Research Agency operations, Central Research Agency 
membership included—at least until the early 1960s—President Ho Chi Minh, Prime Minister 
Pham Van Dong, and Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap.79  
The Central Research Agency had six main sections: cadres or agents, communications, 
espionage, research, training, and a special code unit. Each section had its subunits. For example, 
the Research Section included political, economic, and military affairs units.80 The Central 
Research Agency also supervised and directed centers for overseas operations. Special units 
were located in Hai Phong and Hongay, which ran operations from Hong Kong, Paris, and other 
overseas points. A special unit at Vinh was responsible for operations into Laos and Cambodia. 
And finally, a unit based at Vinh Linh handled operations along the Demilitarized Zone and was 
responsible for infiltrating highly trained intelligence agents and supplies across the 
Demilitarized Zone by sea and through Laos and Cambodia to wherever intelligence bases were 
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located.81 Within South Vietnam, a network of bases was maintained to provide reception 
facilities for agents from the north, and to relay equipment to Viet Cong units in the south. For its 
communication needs, the Central Research Agency maintained its own radio network plus an 
extensive system of couriers.82  
Under Hanoi’s direction, the regional committees were responsible for their areas but as a 
rule, did not establish permanent bases. The exception arose with the development of the Central 
Office of South Vietnam, which provided a more or less stable location in Cambodia. 
Intelligence officers often remained apart from military units, which they might use as decoys if 
Government of Vietnam troops approached.83 
 According to intelligence reports, through 1962 most operations in South Vietnam, 
except for high-level operations controlled directly from Hanoi, were run by the regional or 
interzone committees. Later they came under the Central Office of South Vietnam. These 
included a wide variety of activities such as penetration of Government of Vietnam offices to 
determine plans and capabilities, recruiting Government of Vietnam military members, and 
providing intelligence for paramilitary activities, espionage, subversion, and other political 
operations.84  
This system was excellent and provided timely and accurate information, enabling the 
Communists to avoid Government of Vietnam military operations, or conversely, to identify 
situations where effective raids might be undertaken. The information was often so detailed as to 
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identify not only the Government of Vietnam units and their strength, but also lists of their 
members and positions.85  
In summary, the Central Research Agency directed three kinds of operations: 
• Those it conducted itself in the south with agents trained in the north;  
• Those carried out by its Foreign Intelligence Service, including the massing of 
political and strategic information;  
• The activities of the Military Intelligence Service, that part of the People’s Army of 
Vietnam general staff which was primarily responsible for espionage in South 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and which included strategic and tactical 
intelligence.86  
The Central Research Agency organization, professionalism, and effectiveness were of 
the highest caliber. This enabled Hanoi and Central Office of South Vietnam to determine policy, 
strategy, and tactics of the highest order. The Central Research Agency possessed the decisive 
advantage of lengthy experience and continuity of activity in its area of responsibility. Without 
such an organization, it is doubtful that Hanoi’s efforts to liberate the south would have been 
effective. 
The People’s Security Service 
 Under such adverse conditions of warfare, particularly after US intervention, how was 
the Viet Cong infrastructure able to maintain its cohesiveness, its hierarchical control, and 
discipline?  How was it able to avoid, if not mass defections to the Government of Vietnam, at 
least significant numbers of dissatisfied and disillusioned Communist agents either simply 
quitting or defecting to the Government of Vietnam?  Certainly, the dedication of the People’s 
                                                 
85. Zasloff, The Role of North Vietnam in the Southern Insurgency, 29. 
86. Zasloff, The Role of North Vietnam in the Southern Insurgency, 29‒30. 
109 
 
Revolutionary Party and the many organizations of the National Liberation Front and the 
idealism of their programs provides a partial answer to these questions.  Another part of the 
answer lies in the People’s Security Service, which the Viet Cong called An Ninh.87  
This pervasive organization reached down to the village and hamlet level and was the 
primary instrument of control in the south.88 The Viet Cong Security Service was an organic part 
of the Ministry of Public Security in Hanoi. It reported directly and regularly to that ministry, 
and each of its echelons above district level was at times subject to direct orders from the 
Ministry of Public Security. Hanoi’s control was further ensured by the fact that many key posts 
in the Security Service, from Central Office of South Vietnam down to the village level, were 
held by Ministry of Public Security officials from the north. These officials, whose training was 
extensive and whose loyalty absolute, operated in all areas of the south.89  
Infiltration of Ministry of Public Security officials began as early as 1960 and by 1967 
was estimated to have reached a rate of 500 or more agents per year. In 1966, the total number of 
northerners working in the security service in the south was estimated at between 15,000 and 
20,000, and by 1968, the number was put at over 25,000.90  
The People’s Security Service was organized along hierarchical lines. In 1968, it 
consisted of a 500-man headquarters operating out of the Central Office of South Vietnam, plus 
subordinate levels in the regions, provinces, districts, and villages. A typical provincial security 
section might be staffed by over 100 agents and be divided into four subsections: 
• An administrative subsection which handled routine communications.  
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• A political protection subsection which ran internal security, party security, and 
counterintelligence operations.  
• An espionage subsection which operated in Government of Vietnam-controlled areas. 
• A legal affairs subsection which was responsible for all interrogation facilities and 
prisons. 
This formal organization was, in turn, supported by a recruited network of thousands of 
secret agents and informants in both urban and rural areas.91 As a result, the People’s Security 
Service exercised pervasive control over the Viet Cong infrastructure and the population in Viet 
Cong areas. 
The People’s Security Service performed a number of critical missions in the south. It 
collected information on various Government of Vietnam security and intelligence agencies, thus 
duplicating a Central Research Agency function. This duplication also provided confirmation as 
to the exactness of Central Research Agency information. Yet another major responsibility was 
the protection of liberated and Communist base areas against allied agents. In this function, 
People’s Security Service agents tracked down and investigated any suspected Government of 
Vietnam agents and exercised surveillance over those who might be sympathetic to the 
Government of Vietnam. Intensive and frequent indoctrination programs for both Viet Cong 
infrastructure and the general population were conducted. 
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A third major function of the security apparatus was to maintain constant surveillance 
over all agents and personnel serving in the Viet Cong infrastructure, in order to ensure their 
political reliability. Files were kept on all agents in local Viet Cong organizations who were 
thought potentially unreliable. All echelons of the Viet Cong bureaucracy, even senior officials, 
were subject to such surveillance. A chief of a provincial security section could bypass the 
provincial bureaucracy, including the Current Affairs Committee, and report directly to the 
regional security section.92  
At the district level, the security section’s functions were primarily those of supervision 
over the village sections, although the People’s Security Service could conduct investigations 
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found unfeasible by the village security agents. Additionally, the district security section could 
carry out interrogations, prepare dossiers on suspects, pronounce judgments, transfer prisoners to 
higher echelons, maintain files on district residents working for the Government of Vietnam in 
other areas, and run prisons.93  
It was at the village level that population control by the Security Service was pervasive. 
The Security Chief generally had an assistant and various agents in charge of different functions. 
The chief of the Village Security Section had direct access to a higher authority. Full control by 
the Village Party Secretary would have negated the value of the security branch as an 
independent observer and a counterbalance to the Village Party Secretary.94  
Members of the Village Security Section were required to maintain files on village 
personnel, including Party chapter members. The secret agents of the Security Section normally 
kept 15 to 20 families under surveillance, and these were categorized according to their degree of 
allegiance.95 The objective of the Security Section was to make each peasant responsible for the 
actions of his neighbors and their families. 
Subsidiary functions included control of peasant travel by use of a permit system, upon 
return to his village, if a peasant was suspected of a security violation, his family was held in 
custody until he was either cleared or punished.96  
The Village Security Section also exercised control over mail and radio broadcasts and 
conducted intensive proselytizing with the objective of isolating villages from outside events and 
from other villages.97 While population and Viet Cong infrastructure control were the primary 
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functions of the Security Section, the direction and conduct of repression had still another facet 
to its operations. It was the Security Service which drew up the “notorious blacklists” of persons 
to be killed or imprisoned.98 The Security Service manned the Armed Reconnaissance Teams 
which abducted and assassinated victims in Government of Vietnam-controlled areas. The 
Security Service interrogated and recommended punishment of prisoners and finally carried out 
death sentences.99  
In addition to controlling and disciplining the population and the Viet Cong infrastructure, 
the purpose of Security Section Armed Reconnaissance Teams was to achieve the disintegration 
of the Government of Vietnam. Through assassination, demoralization, and subversion of 
personnel at all levels of the Government of Vietnam structure, the Viet Cong sought to erode 
and eventually paralyze the Government of Vietnam’s ability to govern.100 The target list 
embraced the leadership of the Government of Vietnam’s administrative apparatus, both civil 
and military, from Saigon down to the village or hamlet level. Of particular importance were the 
Government of Vietnam’s civil and military intelligence organizations and agents: rural 
development agents, Chiu Hoi (returnees), officials and Viet Cong defectors, police, and 
especially Phung Hoang personnel.101 From mid-1966 to the end of 1969, 44,000 were 
assassinated or abducted.102  
                                                 
98. For an explanation on Communists use of assassinations and kidnappings to control the population, see 
“Exploitation of Communist Atrocities,” Texas Tech University, Vietnam Center and Archive, Douglas Pike 
Collection: Unit 03—Insurgency Warfare, Box 13, Folder 06, Item Number: 2171306008, 17 July 1965. 
https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/reports/images.php?img=/images/217/2171306008.pdf. See also The Human Cost of 
Communism in Vietnam: A Compendium Prepared for the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the 
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate,” 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972). https://vva.vietnam.ttu.edu/repositories/2/ 
digital_objects/96979.  
99. “The Viet Cong Security Service: A Professional Apparatus,”15. 
100. Conley, The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure, 8. 
101. Conley, The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure, Vol. I, 8‒14, 21. 




Thus, the Security Service was the glue that held the Viet Cong infrastructure together. It 
exercised control and maintained discipline. Additionally, the Security Service carried out 
destabilizing operations in the form of terrorist and paramilitary operations against the 
Government of Vietnam. It was pervasive in Communist-controlled regions and it possessed 
both organization and the power of life and death over the Viet Cong infrastructure, as well as 
over the general population. The Security Service fulfilled all the requirements of a model police 
state.  
The two Communist organizations—the intelligence organization controlled by the Central 
Research Agency and the Security Service controlled by the Ministry of Public Security in 
Hanoi—were absolutely essential to the conduct of insurgency in the South. Without these two 
organizations, the insurgency would have failed. 
Summary  
To summarize, the North Vietnamese regime used as its initial core South Vietnamese 
Lao Dong Party members, most of who had been in place during and since the end of the anti-
French war in 1954. These forces were supplemented by infiltrators from the North. Then, in 
1960, the National Liberation Front was established with the purpose of overthrowing the 
Government of Vietnam. 
The National Liberation Front and its various subordinate fronts were designed to attract, 
organize, and control anti-Government of Vietnam dissidents, sympathizers, and uncommitted 
peasants. It had, as well, the objective of attracting international attention, recognition, and 
support, and it was successful in this. Further, the National Liberation Front provided an 
umbrella for the emergence of a southern Communist Party, and the facade of a South 
Vietnamese revolutionary government. Again, the National Liberation Front was successful. 
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Control of the fronts, the People’s Revolutionary Party, and the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government was exerted from Hanoi by means of the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government and the People’s Security Service. The People’s Revolutionary Party to some 
extent, and the Security Service in an absolute sense, maintained a pervasive discipline and 
control over party membership and sympathizers, the Provisional Revolutionary Government, 
and the fronts. Controlled and primarily staffed by Hanoi, the Secret Service employed measures 
of repression similar to those of the Russian KGB. These elements together constituted the Viet 
Cong infrastructure. 
With the creation and functioning of the Viet Cong infrastructure with all its varying and 
parallel organizations disciplined and guided by means of an interlocking structural design, a 
formidable force for insurgency was forged. It was an accomplishment of such skill, precision, 
and refinement that one must give a large measure of credit to its guiding genius, Ho Chi Minh, 
and to the Communist Politburo in Hanoi. They created a force which had to be neutralized if the 
war was to be won by the Government of Vietnam, and this task became a primary motivation 














The Failure of South Vietnamese Pacification Programs, 1954‒60 
Ngo Dinh Diem’s Presidency 
Upon Ngo Dinh Diem’s assumption of office in 1954, few, if any French, American or 
Vietnamese observers were willing to predict that he or his regime would last. With the departure 
of the French, Diem soon found that the upper echelons of the emerging army were controlled by 
his principal rival, General Nguyen Van Hinh, a once and future Vietnamese officer of the 
French Army who had long been a protégé of Emperor Bao Dai.1 The Saigon police were under 
the control of the Binh Xuyen, a powerful organized crime syndicate that controlled prostitution 
in Saigon as well as the narcotics trade. The Binh Xuyen gained control of the police by bribing 
Emperor Bao Dai during the last stages of the French-Indochina War.2 Economically, the 
country showed the scars of eight years of war: 
 Farmland was abandoned and overgrown with weeds; irrigation and drainage 
facilities had fallen into disrepair; canals, the indispensable waterways of the 
South, needed dredging; the greater part of the work animals had been killed off; 
and all of this was reflected in a sharp decline in production and the disappearance 
of the all-important surplus of rice for export.3  
                                                 
1. Pentagon Papers, Vol. 1, 242‒69.  
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in Vietnam (Reinhardt),” Saigon, June 7, 1955 in “210. Dispatch from the Ambassador in Vietnam (Reinhardt) to 
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Figure 13. Vietnamese woman and her children. 
Most importantly, with the removal of long-serving French bureaucrats, there were 
precious few native-born Vietnamese capable of making the important decisions necessary to 
cope with the serious problems facing the country. It was not an exaggeration to say that the 
reach of Diem’s government virtually stopped at the boundaries of Saigon. Much of what was 
formerly Cochinchina was ruled by the dissident, quasi-religious Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects, 
“which were not only separatist but virtually enclave governments defended by their own private 
armies and maintaining only the loosest federated relations with Saigon.”4 The rest of the 
countryside was nominally under the control of whatever remnants of local village government 
existed. There was little if any assistance from the national government in Saigon. 
To complicate Diem’s problems further, 
the US Navy and other Allied nations brought 
between 750,000 and 900,000 refugees from 
Haiphong and other North Vietnam ports to 
Saigon during Operation Passage to Freedom in 
compliance with the terms of the 1954 Geneva 
Accords.5 In the aftermath of the war, cities in 
the new South Vietnam were teeming with 
Vietnamese peasants who had fled the war seeking security in urban areas, confronting Diem 
                                                 
4. Pike, Viet Cong, 58. For the American Ambassador’s assessment of the standoff between General Hinh and 
Prime Minister Diem, see “Ambassador Heath to Department of State,” 27 August 1954, 751G.00/8–2954, records 
of Department of State. “By late August General Hinh was freely admitting to members of the Military Assistance 
Advisory Group that he had been consulting with leaders of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects on forming a 
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5. Fred Ray Blakemore, “Vietnam: The Untold Miracle at CAP Echo 4,” February 8, 1968, Texas Tech 
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with one crisis after another. Hovering in the background was a persistent, low-level insurgency 
in South Vietnam from 1954‒60. Believing that he knew best, Diem alienated many political and 
social elements in South Vietnam which might have offered him political support. As time 
progressed, Diem’s government and his party became strikingly out of touch with the people. As 
dissatisfaction with the new government in Saigon grew, resistance to Diem intensified, 
providing fertile ground for those willing to listen to Hanoi’s message.6 The Viet Cong seized 
the opportunity to expand, thus filling the gap between the government and the populace. 
Fighting for his political (and personal) survival, Diem had neither the time nor the 
inclination to address the question of growing resistance to his authoritarian rule nor to deal with 
the initial stages of an insurgency. Lacking a broad political base of support, Diem realized that 
to survive he would need to include refugees arriving from the north, among them were many 
Catholics. The mass movement out of North Vietnam provided three key benefits to Diem: (1) In 
1955 and 1956, the refugees were the most convincing support for Diem’s argument that free 
elections were impossible in the DRV; (2) The refugees engaged the sympathies of the American 
people as few developments in Vietnam have before or since, and solidly underwrote the US 
decision for unstinting support of Diem; and (3) The predominantly Catholic Tonkinese refugees 
provided Diem with a claque: a politically malleable, culturally distinct group, wholly distrustful 
of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV, dependent for subsistence on Diem’s government, and attracted to 
Diem as a co-religionist.7  
Having now established a more substantial base of political support, Diem was then able 
to turn his attention to other problems facing the nation, especially those in the rural areas. High 
                                                 
6. Pentagon Papers, Vol.1, 283‒314. See also Department of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic 
Documents, 1:755, recounted in Spector, Advice and Support, 225‒26. 
7. Pentagon Papers, Vol. 1, 283‒314. 
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priority had to be given to improving the condition of the northern refugees who came south 
during the ten months following the Geneva settlement. A majority of the refugees simply 
squatted in Saigon, causing near anarchy due to the increased pressures on social services. 
 Although the subsequent resettlement of the refugees and their integration into the life of 
the country are not matters of specific concern to this study, these efforts are important because 
some of the techniques employed by Diem and his government were later used in other 
Vietnamese pacification programs. This was especially true in the case of the Land Development 
Centers, which, to a certain extent, were a logical extension of the refugee resettlement 
program.8 Finally, although the overwhelming majority of the refugees were peasant farmers, 
those who were better educated or politically important quickly found their way into the South 
Vietnamese civil service, often in high positions.9  
In what was to become a much-repeated imitation of the Communists’ methods of 
population control, the South Vietnamese government began organizing the population into 
Mutual Aid Family Groups (Lien Gia Tuong Tro), whose primary purpose was to function as 
security cells. Each five-family group was supposed “to control the behavior of its members and 
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to report any irregularities to village or city security officers”—in effect, to spy on each other.10 
Although this act merely formalized and legalized the existence of political reeducation centers, 
it also had the effect of advertising the growing trend toward political repression existing in 
South Vietnam. In January 1956, President Diem escalated his anti-Communist program by 
signing a decree formally providing for the arrest and imprisonment of “any person considered to 
be a danger to the defense of the state.”11 Thousands of innocent people were jailed under this 
law—the majority of whom were neither Communists nor pro-Communists. In April 1959, Diem 
would carry this law one step further. Special military tribunals were created and specifically 
empowered to sentence to death anyone committing crimes “with the aim of sabotage or 
infringing upon the security of the State or injuring the lives or property of the people” (Law 10 
of 1959).12  
In 1956, partially for reasons of security but also to establish centralized government and 
political control over rural Vietnam, Diem increased the number of provinces to 41 and 
personally appointed the province chiefs. His criterion, of course, was loyalty rather than ability. 
On paper, the province chiefs were responsible for the district chiefs and village officials; 
however, in practice, the heavy hand of the Saigon was felt in all matters. Diem and his brother 
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Nhu frequently sent down personal orders on even the most trivial matters. Also, ostensibly on 
security grounds, President Diem committed a critical error in his relations with those in 
leadership positions throughout the provinces by decreeing that all previously elected village and 
municipal councils were abolished.13 New officials were appointed by Diem’s hand-picked 
province chiefs on the recommendation of the district chiefs, who also were appointed by 
Saigon. According to CIA officer Rufus Phillips, this was one of Diem’s greatest blunders. A 
former press officer in Diem’s government stated the ramification clearly when he remarked, 
“Even if the Viet Minh had won some elections, the danger of doing away with the traditional 
system of village elections was greater. This was something that was part of the Vietnamese way 
of life . . . it wouldn’t have made much difference if the Viet Minh had elected some village 
chiefs—they soon established their own underground governments anyway. Diem’s mistake was 
in paralyzing himself.”14  
Along with some of the anti-Communist measures outlined above, military and police 
campaigns were undertaken in rural areas during 1956–57 to seek out and eliminate the Viet 
Cong. Although there are conflicting accounts of exactly what took place “there can be no doubt, 
on the basis of reports of the few impartial observers . . . that innumerable crimes and absolutely 
senseless acts of suppression against both real and suspected Communists and sympathizing 
villagers were committed. Efficiency took the form of brutality and a total disregard for the 
difference between determined foes and potential friends.”15  
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In a remarkable acknowledgment of the effectiveness of the Communist’s apparatus to 
manipulate and control the peasantry, the South Vietnamese government mirrored many of the 
Communist’s techniques.16   
Early Pacification Efforts of the Regime 
While dealing with his political and security problems, President Diem simultaneously 
undertook a program to address conditions in the rural areas with an eye toward building rapport 
with and expanding support for his government. Initially emerging from a military effort to 
stimulate and assist local peasants in rebuilding war-damaged public facilities, the Civic Action 
Program quickly developed into a program of community development. According to one 
source, Colonel Edward Lansdale, a detached American military officer attached to the CIA, 
created much of the program.17 Small teams of approximately ten Civic Action cadres visited 
rural areas, especially villages formerly controlled by the Viet Minh, and worked with the 
peasants on a variety of self-help projects, such as rebuilding roads, digging wells, and building 
schools and dispensaries. The cadres also distributed drugs and seeds, gave inoculations, and 
taught the peasants how to hold elections. Dressed in the traditional black pajamas, 150 teams of 
cadres lived and worked among the peasants. To be sure, they also engaged in propaganda 
efforts for the Government of Vietnam, explaining new programs such as land reform and 
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discussing the peasants’ needs.18 Although the Civic Action Program apparently showed signs of 
success in its first full year of operation, it was curtailed at the end of 1956 because of 
interagency rivalries between the Civic Action Directorate and the Ministries of Health, 
Information, and Agriculture. The latter organizations apparently felt threatened by the intrusion 
of the Civic Action Program into areas traditionally under their jurisdiction. Despite objections 
from the American US Agency for International Development (USAID) mission, which 
modestly supported civic action, after 1956 the program “became more propagandistic and 
political, with less emphasis on economic and social services to the people.”19 
Learning important lessons from the recent experience of resettling thousands of refugees 
from the north, the South Vietnamese expanded its pacification effort with the launch of Land 
Development Centers (dinh dien or centres d’implantation) by President Diem in late 1956. 
Having successfully resettled thousands of northern refugees on abandoned tracts of fertile rice 
lands, located primarily in the Delta, Diem saw additional opportunities to apply some of these 
newly acquired skills in other rural areas and also to expand the political base of his regime. The 
primary motivation for this new program, however, was the need to improve internal security 
rather than economic considerations.20 In spite of the Government of Vietnam’s efforts since 
1954 to suppress armed resistance, security was still a serious problem in several areas because 
the government simply did not have the manpower to adequately patrol the countryside. The 
western Central Highlands (Haut Plateau) provinces bordering on Laos and Cambodia were 
readily susceptible to Communist infiltration from the north. There were still vast unsettled areas 
in the Delta where armed bands of bandits were free to establish hidden base camps and gain 
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19. Nighswonger, Rural Pacification in Vietnam, 36. Rural Pacification in Vietnam is probably the most 
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Figure 14. Vietnam Regions. 
access to important food supplies. Rejecting the advice of his advisors to concentrate on the 
Delta, Diem placed a higher priority on guarding the Central Highlands because he believed that 
that was the most likely route of attack from the north. It was in Pleiku, the former royal hunting 
retreat of past Vietnamese emperors, that Diem envisaged that the true danger lay.  
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A secondary motivation for the Government of Vietnam’s Land Development Program 
was the alleviation of the overcrowding and poverty along the central coast where four million 
people were living on only 264,500 hectares (about 654,000 acres) of arable land.21 By settling 
some of these people on undeveloped land, it was further hoped that agricultural production 
would be increased. There were also political considerations behind the Land Development 
Program. The Central Highlands, Emperor Bao Dai’s former hunting preserve, was inhabited by 
500,000 Montagnard tribal people. Relations between the Montagnards and the Vietnamese had 
never been particularly friendly. Diem hoped to integrate the Montagnards into Vietnamese 
society by regrouping them into permanent villages and thus subjecting them to greater 
governmental and administrative control. It has also been suggested that Diem planned to resettle 
families in Viet Minh-dominated areas who were considered unreliable by the new government. 
Unfortunately, the Land Development Centers for these people were to be little more than armed 
detention camps.22  
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247. For a more concise explanation of the complex nature of contesting the VC within the villages and to provide 
context when describing a “secure” and “unsecured” village, see “Background for the Village Development Program 
Including Aspects of the Vietnamese Village Today,” Texas Tech University, Vietnam Center and Archive, Harry 




Figure 15. South Vietnam Ethnic Map. 
 
When the Land Development Program first officially began on April 23, 1957, the United 
States agreed to commit an initial ten million dollars in economic aid to it. Although the United 
States Operations Mission (USOM) was active in the initial stages of the program in both 
planning and implementation, wide divergences of view began to develop as to the program’s 
Courtesy  of Army University Press 
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scope, direction, and tempo. While the Government of Vietnam had declared agricultural 
development to be one of the program’s long-term goals, USOM believed it should be given 
primary attention right away. As the Government of Vietnam placed more and more emphasis on 
the political and security objectives of the program, other incompatibilities soon came into focus. 
The USMO wanted to concentrate on the Delta; Diem concentrated on the Central Highlands. 
The USMO believed each family in the highlands would require three to five hectares of land to 
subsist; Diem doggedly persisted in claiming one hectare would suffice. Tensions also arose over 
the management and use of USOM-supplied agricultural equipment. As a result of all this, by 
late 1957 multiple agencies within the American advisory effort had withdrawn financial support 
for the program, with the exception of providing equipment, spare parts, and tools. From that 
point on, the Government of Vietnam had to pay the costs of the program on its own.23  
As with other projects throughout his time in office, Diem favored the Land Development 
Centers as a pet project. As was his habit, he took a great deal of personal interest in its direction 
and implementation, frequently making all the decisions himself. 
 Although the program was initially under the direction of the Agriculture Development 
Directorate, in April 1957 Diem created a special agency, the Commissariat General for Land 
Development (CGLD), which reported directly to him. Since Diem was fully committed to the 
program and “determined to push forward with all possible speed . . . planning and preparations 
for the implementation of land development quickly gathered momentum. . . .” From the 
beginning, the commissariat undertook operations at an almost breathtaking pace, and quickly 
extended the scope of its activities far beyond the original plans and schedules.24  
                                                 
23. John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 72‒83. 
24. William Henderson, “Opening of New Lands and Villages: The Republic of Vietnam’s Land Development 
Program,” in Fishel, Problems of Freedom, 127. 
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As originally conceived, the Land Development Program was to be implemented 
step by step in accordance with an orderly and predetermined timetable. This 
schedule called for careful selection of sites suitable for resettlement . . . Such 
studies would make possible fairly accurate estimates of the amount of land 
available for cultivation . . . the number of people to be settled . . . the fertility of 
the soil, the supply of water. . . . Once it was decided to establish a center at a 
given place, the next step was to prepare for the actual reception of the new 
settlers. This involved . . . extensive land clearing operations and leveling of land 
surfaces to accommodate public and private buildings. Wells had to be drilled, 
roads cut, and, depending on the nature of the terrain, dams, dikes, canals, and 
bridges had to be constructed. Temporary reception shelters and a great many 
other structures for headquarters, storehouses, dispensaries, and so on had to be 
built. Meanwhile, the movement of Vietnam’s modern pioneers to the new centers 
had to be coordinated with all of these preparatory activities. The settlers were to 
be collected at various points . . . their transportation arranged . . . and provisions 
made for their sustenance after arrival and for an indefinite period in the future. 
As quickly as possible they had to be put to work completing the centers for 
permanent habitation, and, even more important, getting on with the business of 
farming, which was to furnish their livelihood and eventually make them 
independent of government support. Families were given subsidies for food, 
house construction, various household goods, farm implements, seeds, and 
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fertilizers, and provided with cheap credit to facilitate the transition to 
independence.25  
In practice, however, the Land Development Program did not proceed in quite such an 
orderly fashion. Although a few Land Development Centers had been established in the Delta in 
the initial stages of the program, by mid-1957 the Government of Vietnam had shifted the 
geographic focus of its effort to the Central Highlands, which subsequently became a 
preoccupation of President Diem, as already noted. Second, the Government of Vietnam was in a 
hurry to achieve results, and the quickened pace of program implementation left little time for 
orderly planning and preparations. Third, since the program was being actively pushed by Diem, 
government officials were almost always reluctant to criticize his decisions or point out 
shortcomings. For instance, Diem himself frequently selected the sites for the Land Development 
Centers solely on the basis of military maps or aerial photographs, ignoring the analyses 
prepared by the Vietnamese and American technicians in the field. Diem’s insistence on speed 
led to the program’s overextension and to charges by USOM officials that the project was 
uneconomic. New centers were begun while earlier ones were never completed. In addition: 
many sites turned out to have been poorly chosen, and all too often the number of 
settlers sent to a given center was all out of proportion to its potentialities. Most 
sites had been insufficiently prepared, and equipment and stores were frequently 
in short supply. The pioneers in many cases arrived at their new homes at the 
height of the rainy season, when little or no construction work could be done, and 
                                                 




when conditions inevitably tried the patience of even the most optimistic. Morale 
sagged and often there was much confusion.26  
In spite of such criticisms and shortcomings, by mid-1959 the Government of Vietnam 
had resettled over 125,000 people in approximately ninety Land Development Centers. 
According to available statistics, approximately 44,000 people were resettled in the Haut Plateau, 
25,000 in central and southern forest areas, and 55,000 in the Delta. Approximately 22,000 
houses were constructed; 48,000 hectares of land cleared; and 31,000 hectares planted, 23,000 of 
that in rice.27 To many people, these were certainly impressive achievements. It is also 
noteworthy that there seems to have been only a minimum amount of coercion used in resettling 
the people, although it seems unlikely those considered politically undesirable were given much 
choice. In some of these new settlements, the people enjoyed an improved standard of living, 
especially in terms of the social services provided. Schools and dispensaries were features of 
each center. On the other hand, in spite of the fact that each family had its own plot of land for a 
garden and farmed an additional amount of land, even after two years many, possibly most, of 
these new communities were still dependent on the Saigon government for additional 
subsidies.28 Economic viability was not a top priority. Furthermore, even if one discounts the 
lack of progress in the agricultural-economic fields, the Land Development Centers did not prove 
to be anything like the settlements that Diem envisaged. Infiltration from the north seems to have 
been in no way inhibited by these settlements, and many of the settlements actually became easy 
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targets for Viet Cong terrorism from 1968 on. It is also quite likely that the centers themselves 
were susceptible to Viet Cong infiltration, and it is conceivable that whole centers may, in 
reality, have been under Viet Cong control.29  
Although the Government of Vietnam planned to construct additional Land Development 
Centers in 1960, Diem did not pursue the program any further. As early as 1959 his attention 
began again to shift geographically: the Delta was the next area on which Diem chose to focus 
Vietnamese pacification efforts. Rather than building on the concepts of the Land Development 
Program and perhaps modifying them in the light of actual experience, Diem created a new 
program, Agroville, which was formally announced in July 1959. 
The Agroville Program 
On July 7, 1959, the fifth anniversary of Ngo Dinh Diem’s accession to power, the 
Agroville Program was formally inaugurated as the next step in South Vietnam’s rural 
pacification effort. Diem had solved his early political problems, and he enjoyed the generous 
support of the United States whose aid kept the country on its feet and contributed to what many 
would consider spectacular gains in the field of economic recovery. A constitution had been 
written and elections for the National Assembly were held. On the surface, South Vietnam in 
1959 was indeed “one of the more stable countries in Southeast Asia.”30 On the economic side, 
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the statistical evidence from 1954‒59 presented an encouraging picture of economic expansion. 
The successful resettlement of the refugees from the north was a dramatic achievement, although 
its success was primarily due to American aid. Agricultural production had increased, new 
schools and dispensaries had been built, and roads and bridges repaired; the country seemed on 
its way to further economic stability. 
Although there were no serious political contenders for the presidency, there was some 
dissatisfaction and dissent among the urban population. In part, this was due to Diem’s 
increasing reliance on his family—brother Ngo Dinh Nhu was his “Political Councilor” and 
brother Ngo Dinh Can was the most powerful figure in central Vietnam. In addition, the fact that 
Diem would tolerate no legitimate political opposition hastened the process of political alienation 
on the part of many of the country’s intellectuals, who were among the people he needed most.31 
The only legal political organizations were those approved by the government—the Personalist 
Labor Revolutionary Party  (Can Lao), the National Revolutionary Movement, and the 
National Revolutionary Civil Servants League.32 Can Lao, created by Ngo Dinh Nhu in 1956, 
was based on Personalism philosophy, which “as espoused by Nhu, was a peculiar mixture of 
Western and Eastern thought that pretended to stress the development of individual character as 
the basis of community democracy in Vietnam. It sought to mesh the individual’s spiritual 
growth with the community’s social needs, and together these would stimulate the nation’s 
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emerging political life.”33 Personalism was a vague and difficult-to-define ideology which 
combined Western individualism with collectivist ideas and translated the whole into the 
Vietnamese idiom as an answer to the Communist challenge. In his speeches, Nhu often spoke of 
“a new life achieved within the framework of personalism. . . . and the transformation of 
strategic hamlets into centers of democratic civilization, into generators of combatants and 
heroes, whose light will flood the entire country.”34 Imitating the Communist, as well as the 
c1assical Confucian-mode of expression in dealings with the masses, Nhu employed a set of 
three slogans made up of three catchwords each. The three basic purposes of Personalism 
comprised the “Three Sufficiencies”—self-sufficiency in organization, self-sufficiency in 
equipment, and self-sufficiency in ideology. The Three Sufficiencies were to be instructed by the 
“Three Enlightenments—Morality, Knowledge, and Mettle—which constitute the “Three 
Motivations” of the Personalist revolution.35 The single most distinguishing feature of 
Personalism, and one that was clearly present in the Strategic Hamlet Program, was its emphasis 
on individual self-reliance.36 It was Nhu’s conviction that the Vietnamese people must do for 
themselves what they wanted to be done. This did not mean that they were to be ignored by the 
government, but that the goal of the program should be to prepare the people as quickly as 
possible to shoulder the burden of their own defense and development. These three Strategic 
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Hamlet Program objectives were well understood by Ngo Dinh Nhu, who was mainly 
responsible for the plan’s direction and supervision as well as its formal articulation. Nhu 
believed that his political philosophy, Personalism, would provide an important ingredient in the 
program, somewhat analogous to the ideology that helped bind the enemy cadres into a dedicated 
and effective force.37 The Can Lao, however, functioned not as a political party in the usual 
sense of the word, but rather as Nhu’s secret political intelligence agency to spy on anyone 
suspected of Communist sympathies or anyone showing oppositionist tendencies. Its 
membership consisted of trusted government employees occupying key positions, “as well as 
individuals, carefully selected by Nhu, who moved anonymously through all the echelons of 
government, down to the level of villages and hamlets, factories, schools, and small military 
units, tracking down cases of malfeasance and corruption and disloyalty to the regimen.”38  
The National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) in reality was simply another instrument 
of control over the government administration. It was, in other words, an adjunct of the regime.39 
Designed to mobilize support for the government and to indoctrinate the population, the NRM’s 
leadership consisted of high-ranking government officials. Provinces were usually headed by 
chiefs, district information chiefs, and village political commissioners–all of them appointed by 
and representing the government.40 Like Can Lao, the NRM was also organized along 
Communist lines with ultimate control resting in the hands of Diem’s brothers. 
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The Civil Servants League was the vehicle for the maintenance of the support of the 
government bureaucracy. Membership in the league was “practically concomitant of government 
employment,” the second largest occupation group in the country.41  
Thus organizations such as these, designed to control important segments of the 
population rather than to foster in them a sense of real participation in the political life of the 
country and to give them a stake in its future, merely tended to create conditions of further 
political alienation and resentment. Some of the methods Diem used to deal with his opponents 
not only exacerbated the gap between the government and the South Vietnamese people, but 
actually gave the Communists causes to champion. Opponents of the Diem regime who were 
financially unable to leave the country often ended up in either in government’s jails and 
political reeducation centers or in underground anti-Diem groups.42 
By 1959 the security situation in the countryside, especially in the rice-rich Delta, had 
deteriorated to the point that stiffer measures bordering on police-state tactics were resorted to. 
In a five-year span, the country had teetered on the brink of civil war from 1954‒55, to relative 
quiet from 1956‒57, and back to increasing insecurity from 1956‒59.43  
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Organization of the Agroville Program 
The Agroville Program was formally announced by President Diem in his nationwide 
anniversary speech of July 7, 1959. 
This year I propose to create densely populated settlement areas in the 
countryside, where conditions are favorable to communication and sanitation and 
where minimum facilities for the grouping of farmers living in isolation and 
destitution in the back county exist. These settlement areas will not only improve 
the life of the rural population, but they will also constitute the economic units 
which will play an important role in the future development of the country as a 
whole.44  
Diem further stated that the Agrovilles would provide a framework for the social and 
economic development of the countryside. Each new settlement would provide schools, medical 
facilities, electricity, and other social services for its inhabitants. New crops would be cultivated, 
and training would be provided in modern agricultural methods, artisan activity, and 
manufacturing.45 Diem envisioned that the Agrovilles would provide “the happy compromise 
between hustling, teaming city life and the placid rural existence  . . . a French term was coined 
for the centers—ville charniere (hinge city).”46  
According to Thao, who was later put in charge of the security aspects of the Agrovilles, 
the Agroville Program was to be part of a broad security plan for the whole country. The plan 
consisted of four basic elements: 
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1. Regroupment of the Population into Agrovilles. The Agrovilles were to be 
constructed along a new strategic road system in the Delta. Two new roads were 
to be built in the Camau Peninsula, and the canals, which were overgrown with 
trees and shrubbery, were to be cleaned out and improved. By building Agrovilles 
along these improved transportation routes, increased protection would be 
afforded the rural population. 
2. Development of a Competent Local Administration. It was hoped that 
improved security and living standards in the Agrovilles would stimulate more 
competent people to settle as village leaders. Apparently, many local officials 
were incompetent, dishonest, and inefficient and the rural population often would 
not support them or be sympathetic toward the Saigon government. It was hoped 
that paying higher salaries would also attract more competent local officials. 
3. Economic Development. It was also anticipated that the Agroville Program 
would stimulate economic development in the countryside by increasing 
agricultural production in the rice fields, as well as by developing public lands. 
The public lands in each Agroville were to be given over to raising fruit trees, 
growing vegetables, and perhaps keeping a few animals. Each Agroville would 
also have a central pond in which the inhabitants could raise fish and have a 
market center. Thus, it was expected that the Agrovilles would provide additional 
sources of village revenue. The Government of Vietnam hoped that the increased 
security provided by the Agroville would permit it to collect more taxes—the Viet 
Cong was then thought to be a major inhibitor of the government’s tax collection 
effort. Yet another economic consideration behind the Agroville Program was the 
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reduction of certain public expenditures. By regrouping the scattered rural 
population into larger communities, the Government of Vietnam believed it 
would not be necessary to build as many schools and medical facilities. 
4. Organization of the Youth. Young men between the ages of 18 and 35 were to 
be organized into groups whose initial task would be to assist in the actual 
construction of the Agroville. Later these young men would serve as the 
Agroville’s voluntary self-defense force, replacing the traditionally paid guards. 
These groups were expected to stimulate community development efforts to 
inspire a sense of pride in the Agroville inhabitants, and finally to accede to 
administrative positions within the village or Agroville hierarchy.47  
The Agroville Program Envisioned 
A model Agroville, based on the Vi Thanh–Hoa Luu Agroville was designed by an 
internationally recognized Vietnamese architect to have the following characteristics (which 
might not necessarily be typical): Each regrouped family was to have about an acre of land on 
which would contain a substantial house modeled after one of four standard types. The land was 
being used for vegetables and fruit, with coconuts to become the prime fruit crop. During the 
growing season, the farmer would return to his own farm, anywhere from two to five kilometers 
away, to cultivate rice, but his family would remain within the Agroville for protection. Surplus 
labor in the Agrovilles would be devoted to handicrafts and cottage industries.48  
In addition, the Government of Vietnam planned to construct “agglomerated hamlets” 
which were to be smaller editions of Agrovilles with a capacity of 1,000 to 1,500 persons 
each. Two identifiable financing sources for the Agroville Program budget were provided by the 
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Commissariat for Civic Action and from a special contingency and reserve account. In addition, 
funds from the National Lottery were to augment the construction budget.49 The principal 
construction materials for administrative and commercial buildings were reinforced concrete, 
tile, and cement-plastered brick. Such buildings included a school, hospital, market, and hotel, 
and for esthetic reasons, were to look substantial as well as pleasing to the eye. Elaborate 
artificial lakes were envisioned to add beauty to the city centers. 
Limitations of the Agroville Program 
Although President Diem laid considerable stress on the socio-economic aspects of the 
Agroville Program, the real outcome was much different:  
Even if the program did promote physical security, its much-touted provision for 
economic and social development remains uncertain. The promised social 
services-schools, maternity clinics, dispensaries-could have been as easily 
provided, in most cases, to the people in their traditional living arrangement. Tan 
Luoc, for example, was a village where the dwellings were relatively closely 
grouped so that most children would have only a short walk to a new school. At 
Caisan, people were brought into the agroville from a radius of six kilometers, a 
distance not at all unreasonable for a clinic to serve. The regrouped peasant was 
then obliged to walk a good distance to his rice fields, and he could not maintain 
his former vigil against rodents, thieves, and intemperate weather; yet, the radical 
alteration of the living pattern did not seem to offer significant economic 
advantage. The fundamental agricultural system remained unchanged. Possibly 
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fruit orchards, fish cultivation, and home artisan activity would have been 
strengthened with training programs that might be initiated with agroville living. 
On balance, however, it appears that the economic and social contribution of the 
agrovilles was grossly overestimated. The heavy human costs incurred in their 
construction seem hardly to be compensated by the promise of better living 
standards.50  
On July 7, 1959, the Government of Vietnam launched its “prosperity and density 
centers”—the “Agroville” Program—and Ngo Dinh Nhu and his wife leaped into organizing 
rural youth, women, and farmers’ organizations. The US assessment of March 1960 cited 
widespread abuse of police powers by local officials for extortion and vendetta and pointed out 
that arbitrary and corrupt local officials compromised Government of Vietnam efforts to root out 
the Viet Cong undercover cadres. Moreover, 
While the Government of Vietnam has made an effort to meet the economic and 
social needs of the rural populations through community development, the 
construction of schools, hospitals, roads, etc., these projects appear to have 
enjoyed only a measure of success in creating support for the government and, in 
fact, in many instances have resulted in resentment. Basically, the problem 
appears to be that such projects have been imposed on the people without 
adequate psychological preparation in terms of the benefits to be gained. Since 
most of these projects call for sacrifice on the part of the population (in the form 
of allegedly “volunteer” labor in the case of construction, time away from jobs or 
school labor in the case of rural youth groups, leaving homes and lands in the case 
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of regrouping isolated peasants), they are bound to be opposed unless they 
represent a partnership effort for mutual benefit on the part of the population and 
the government.51  
“The situation may be summed up in the fact that the government has tended to treat the 
population with suspicion or to coerce it and has been rewarded with an attitude of apathy or 
resentment.”52 The Viet Cong also attempted to intimidate local officials responsible for 
implementing the Agroville Program. One source quoted in Zasloff’s “Rural Redevelopment” 
stated, “they cannily selected for special punishment those officials who were active in Agroville 
work and also unpopular among the villagers.”  
Several threatening letters were sent to local officials warning them to cease 
implementing the Agroville Program:  
While facing failure the Americans and Diem have a more dangerous plot. They 
are building Agrovilles everywhere. Agrovilles are big prisons and hells on earth. 
When these Agrovilles are completed, they will concentrate the peace-loving, 
patriotic families there in order to exploit their wealth [and] to draft young men so 
that they have enough forces to start the invasion of the North, causing bloody 
killing among brothers. . . .  
You are very efficient in recruiting workers for Agrovilles. In this undertaking, 
you and the hamlet chief accept bribes from the people. If someone wishes to 
remain home, he pays you privately, such as in the fourth collection of pay in lieu 
of work on March 27, 1960. You have forced many (93) people to work at Tan 
Luce Agroville. Some of them who have not yet finished with their farming work 
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came to you to ask for a cancellation and you threatened to bring them to the 
village council to settle the matter and you accepted bribes from those who stayed 
home. There were people who had to pay you four times in lieu of work. Besides 
bribes in cash, you and the hamlet secretary accepted bribes in kind such as 
mangoes, vegetables, tea, etc. . . . 
On behalf of the revolution and the people, we, the commanding staff of 
Company 256 of the Battalion Ly Thuong Kiet, once again order you to stop your 
servant job. . . . 
If you violate this order, the revolution and the people will not guarantee your life 
nor your property. . . .53  
Looking back, several factors combined to defeat the Agroville Program, chief among 
them the Vietnamese peasants’ traditional attachment to their ancestral homes and family tombs. 
The peasants resented the forced abandonment of their homes, particularly the move to 
undeveloped locations sometimes far from their rice paddies and gardens. They were also 
enraged at having to provide the labor to construct communal facilities without compensation. 
Although the president’s technical advisers assured him that the government had the resources to 
pay for the labor, Diem refused to authorize compensation. The peasants also had to build their 
own houses, and the 300 piasters provided by the government were rarely sufficient to cover 
costs. The resentment occasioned by the disruption facilitated Viet Cong support and 
recruiting.54 For unknown reasons sometime in 1961, the plan appears to have been simply 
abandoned. Although no formal announcement of termination was made, new construction was 
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no longer initiated and the government’s effort to convince the peasants to continue to move 
ceased.55  
As to the economic viability of the Agroville, US Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow posed 
this question, “Will the advantages of markets, schools, recreation centers, maternity wards, 
hospitals, and security protection be sufficient to keep the people contented for at least the 5 
years until the cocoanut crop comes in and they receive something approaching the predicted 
40,000VN$ annual income?” In his analysis, the answer at least for at the beginning was no.56  
Durbrow’s dispatch to the State Department provided a critique of the Agroville Program 
that cast doubt as to the cost and effectiveness of the effort:  
The concept of agglomeration villages is a complete reversal of tradition and the 
social and economic pattern of the people affected. It is apparent that all planning 
and decisions have been made without their participation and with little if any 
consideration of their wishes, interests or views.57  
Security in the whole region was reported to be far from good. As reported, it is 
already relatively unsafe after dark, the Agroville, with its captive concentration 
of population, could be subject to night infiltration, subversion, and propaganda 
from the surrounding vacant lands.58  
A review of historical documents of the era indicates that the Government of Vietnam did 
not discuss the Agroville Program with US embassy officials until well after the decision had 
been made to initiate the program. One source has commented that Diem deliberately refrained 
from discussing preliminary plans for the Agrovilles with the Americans because of the criticism 
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he had received from USOM over the Land Development Centers.59 USOM and USAID also 
seemed to have relied strongly on the South Vietnamese for information concerning the 
Agroville Program, as well as on other developments in the country. While the United States 
diplomatic mission to South Vietnam had a great stake in the stability of the countryside, there 
were few Americans in the rural areas able to verify what was actually going on.  
Final Analysis of the Agroville Program 
By the end of 1960, the Government of Vietnam had ceased actively promoting the 
Agroville Program as the answer to the deteriorating internal security situation in South Vietnam. 
Although Diem and Nhu both cited other reasons for the government’s decision to terminate the 
program, it seems apparent that a combination of a continuing erosion of security in the 
countryside (owing to increased activity by the Viet Cong) and a general failure of the Agroville 
Program to achieve its advertised objectives resulted in this decision. Although the Government 
of Vietnam never officially dropped the program, it was gradually allowed to lapse. Once the 
Government of Vietnam stopped pushing new construction, the people were dissatisfied and 
drifted back to their original villages, moved to larger cities, or simply left and became refugees.   
In an effort to shore up internal support within the population, it seems apparent that the 
Government of Vietnam confused the end of the program with the means of achievement. It 
concentrated on the potential security offered almost to the exclusion of all other aspects of the 
program. This gave the impression that confining peasants within fortified compounds of itself 
was expected to provide security. To be sure, President Diem envisaged the Agrovilles as 
providing the framework for a social revolution in the countryside, but he expected this would 
occur spontaneously. 
                                                 
59. “169. Despatch From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbow) to the Department of State.” 
146 
 
The chief failure of the Agroville Program was in the haphazard way it was implemented. 
Upon reflection, the Agroville concept was fundamentally unsuitable to the people of the Delta, 
who preferred to live in a scattered fashion.60 Yet, it can also be argued that if the government 
had taken account of the peasants’ initial skepticism and had shown more of an interest in their 
reactions, the Agroville Program might have been able to provide the population an alternative to 
the Viet Cong. From the very beginning, however, it seemed obvious that the government had 
never examined the basic assumptions of the program and acted without the consent of its own 
people. Barring the placing of armed guards to keep the people from leaving, the program was 
doomed to fail.  
From the outset, it was clear that the peasants did not like the idea of having to leave their 
traditional homes near their ancestral graves and the village shrine.61 As Bernard Fall remarked, 
The peasant was disturbed by the prospect of uprooting his home, sheltered by 
trees which offered shade and fruit, quitting his ancestral tombs, separating 
himself from his rice fields and his garden. He was compelled to abandon a 
traditional pattern of life for a fresh start in an uninviting site; he was obliged to 
build a new home, plant young trees and till a fallow plot which he had not 
chosen but was required to buy.62  
Another weakness of the program was that the Government of Vietnam forced all the 
peasants within a certain radius of the Agroville to relocate, rather than only those who lived in 
the immediate area, as was originally planned. Since the Government of Vietnam decided not to 
build the smaller Argo-hamlets, those living rather far from the Agroville were simply forced to 
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move in. In addition, many Agrovilles were inaugurated and its inhabitants relocated before the 
promised facilities were completed. Since the government had hoped to sell the Agrovilles to the 
peasants based on improvements in their standard of living, the lack of such improvements did 
little to bolster the peasants’ confidence in either the Agroville Program or the government and 
had the effect of producing greater resentment. 
Probably the single most important factor in causing the dissatisfaction of the peasants 
stemmed from the government’s insistence on the use of forced labor to construct the Agrovilles. 
Diem insisted that there would be no form of monetary compensation to the peasants or to even 
provide food, work implements, or transportation to the farmers. Local officials responsible for 
implementing the program also used forceful methods to compel the people to participate, thus 
alienating the very people the Agrovilles were designed to protect and help. In theory, the 
physical labor required to build the Agrovilles was to be performed after the farmers had planted 
their rice and while they were waiting for the crops to mature. In practice, however, local 
officials wishing to please Saigon insisted that the work be done in conformity with arbitrarily 
decided schedules regardless of the effect on the people. Often, the call to participate in the 
building of these settlements occurred at harvest time or during the planting season and took the 
farmers away from their rice fields. 
The reports made by American observers on-the-ground reveal that no provisions were 
made for adapting various aspects of the program to peculiar local conditions. The Saigon 
government, as has been mentioned, developed a single master plan for the entire program.63 
Direct orders were sent down to the province chiefs who in turn addressed them to the 
appropriate district chiefs, village chiefs, and the ARVN officers in charge of the Agroville 
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construction plan.64 There seems to have been no active participation of local officials in either 
the planning or construction phases of the program. Furthermore, there was little coordination 
between the central government and local authorities regarding implementation—a major 
weakness of such a complex and elaborate program.65 Additionally, few province or district 
chiefs fully explained the problems associated with implementing the program to their bosses in 
Saigon. Diem was apparently unaware of the degree of peasant dissatisfaction and resentment 
created by the Agrovilles. Local officials told him only what they thought he wanted to hear, and 
since they were under constant pressure to meet the deadlines imposed on them, most did not 
dare criticize or report unfavorably on the progress of the program. In what turned out to be a sad 
but prescient observation Sir Roger Thompson later claimed that the very absence of attacks was 
an indicator that the Viet Cong had succeeded in infiltrating the hamlets.66   
That Diem’s Agroville Program was a dismal failure is demonstrated that it could die 
without any explanation after causing disruptions to the very people it was envisioned to help. 
The most conspicuous feature behind its failure was the fact that the Government of Vietnam 
never really understood what was necessary to make it work. The forced relocation, use of 
coerced labor, and the arbitrary and offensive behavior of most of the officials responsible for the 
program produced greater peasant resentment and antagonism toward the central government 
than perhaps did the terroristic activities of the Viet Cong. Such results provided the Viet Cong 
with readily exploitable issues for exploitation which were vital to the fledgling insurgency. The 
Government of Vietnam failed to recognize that the Viet Cong were attracting local support 
because of the government’s policies; many people during this time joined the Viet Cong or at 
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least gave tacit support to them in protest against the government. The rural population of South 
Vietnam, which during those early years represented something close to ninety percent of the 
total population, was the focal point of the enemy’s strategy, but not the center of the 
government’s attention. 
Viet Minh Remnants in South Vietnam  
Although Diem had quickly gained control of the army in 1954, his methods of dealing 
with the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects and the Binh Xuyen resulted in many of their members 
turning to informal alliances with the Viet Minh. To be sure, Diem could not have tolerated 
autonomous rival governments.  After he successfully bought off or crushed their private armies, 
he apparently made no overtures to seek their support.67 Thus, thousands of their forces had fled 
to the forests and the mountains, taking their weapons with them. Many of them remained there, 
“living by the gun, preying on hapless peasants, or cooperating with the Viet Cong agents to 
harass the Government.”68 But it was an anti-Diemist attitude rather than a pro-Communist one 
which attracted them to this life. 
Although the regular, organized military units of the Viet Minh had withdrawn to the 
north following the Geneva Conference, many Communist cadres and other non-Communist 
elements of the Viet Minh remained in the south.69 In parts of the country it grew even stronger, 
in part because the French withdrew from many regions before Diem’s army and administration 
were ready to establish contro1.70 Much of the Delta, particularly the Camau Peninsula and the 
Quang Ngai and Binh Dinh Provinces, were areas in which Viet Minh control was particularly 
strong, although they were beginning to expand organizationally throughout the country.  
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Both the sects and the Viet Minh continued to use acts of violence to harass the 
Government of Vietnam. According to Douglas Pike:  
Violence in the countryside was not uncommon, although until at least mid-1958 
there was no guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam, in the generally accepted 
definition of the term. The government ascribed most of the terror and violence to 
remnants of the Viet Minh, but how could anyone know for sure whether an 
incident in a remote village was the work of the Viet Minh, the armed sects, 
bandits, or someone engaged in personal revenge?71  
Security Efforts to Counter Viet Cong Terrorist Activities  
Security continued to remain a problem and the general trend, starting in 1958, seemed to 
be worsening.72 According to official Government of Vietnam reports to the US Embassy in 
1958, a total of 193 South Vietnamese officials or villagers openly loyal to Diem were 
assassinated by the Viet Cong. In 1959, the Viet Cong murdered 239 bureaucrats and village 
leaders. In 1960, that number rose to 1,400 and to 1,600 in 1961, with another 2,500 kidnapped 
in 1960 and 1961.73 Observers generally agreed that the Viet Cong were becoming more 
effective in their use of terror because the victims were persons of generally greater importance, 
holding positions as village councilors, hamlet chiefs, and district chiefs. The Delta was 
confirmed to have the highest incident of terrorism.74  
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Figure 16. American soldiers moving 
through a rice paddy. 
In an effort to cope with the situation, the Government of Vietnam sought more effective 
and sterner measures. Mobile strike teams composed of a combination of the Civil Guard, police, 
and sometimes ARVN elements were organized to work under the control of province chiefs, in 
coordination with the regional military commanders, to attack suspected Viet Cong.  
Understanding that an effort must be made to counter the Communists’ recruitment in the 
countryside, Diem inaugurated a new pacification plan that was ultimately to give way to the 
Agroville Program. Because this new program lasted but a few months and was largely 
experimental, it had no formal title. “Agglomeration centers plan” was the term generally 
applied. As envisioned, this program recalled efforts by the French in the Red River Delta during 
the last stages of the First Indochina War to move peasants into compact communities for 
protection.75 In February 1959, the Diem government sought to apply this technique in the more 
remote and inaccessible regions of the Delta where the Viet Cong maintained strong control. The 
terrain of this area, particularly the south and 
southwest sections, with their rice paddies 
and swamps crisscrossed by a vast network 
of canals and impenetrable jungle, had long 
been a refuge for the Viet Minh, remnants of 
the defeated religious sects, and bandits.76 
Most of the inhabitants lived in small groups 
of huts clustered together in the middle of 
rice paddies and often separated by as much 
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as a mile from the next cluster. Communication and transportation between these little islands 
were difficult, and the peasants were especially vulnerable to Viet Cong propaganda and terror. 
To combat this situation, two types of collection centers were envisaged. The purpose 
behind both was the physical separation of the Viet Cong from the rest of the population. One 
type of center would regroup the so-called Viet Cong families into special zones where they 
could be closely watched by government authorities.77 Although the criteria for defining Viet 
Cong families were vague, the families included in this category were those who were former 
members of the Viet Minh, those having relatives in North Vietnam, and those who were either 
suspected of being Viet Cong cadres or of sympathizing with them. The other type of collection 
center was for loyal, patriotic, reliable families who were seen as actual or potential targets of the 
Viet Cong. These families were to be regrouped into centers where they would receive 
government protection and would not be in a position, willingly or unwillingly, to lend any 
support to the Viet Cong.78 Initially, it was planned to establish the centers near each other to 
make it easier to protect them. In fact, security was the sole justification for the centers; the 
economic and social improvements were virtually ignored. Peasants were forced to move from 
their traditional homesteads to strange and unfamiliar places where, “often far from their rice 
fields, they were expected to reestablish their lives with only minimal assistance from the 
government.”79 The regrouped peasants predictably reacted with a unanimous protest. Loyal 
families felt that they had been mistreated and subjected to economic hardships. The Viet Cong 
families claimed to be innocent of charges of association with Communists—having relatives in 
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the north hardly justified being placed in what amounted to a concentration camp. Bitter protests 
were lodged by many high-ranking families who had relatives living in North Vietnam.80 
In March 1959 Major Pham Ngoc Thao, who was responsible for developing the 
Agroville Program, was appointed by Diem to study the progress of the centers and to investigate 
its problems. In his report to Diem, Thao stressed the difficulties of distinguishing between 
genuine Viet Minh and nationalist families. Most of the inhabitants of South Vietnam had some 
connection with either the north or with the resistance (past or present) in the south. Thao was 
also critical of the concentration of these two groups of families into separate areas, observing 
that “we grouped our enemies and gave them more reason to be against us.81 He also stated, “we 
grouped our friends without regard for economic and social considerations. We gave them a 
reason to be unhappy with their lot and turn against us.”82 In concluding his report, Thao 
suggested that if the concentration of people was to be continued, there should be no segregation 
of families based on political beliefs.83 Furthermore, any future regroupment program should 
also consider economic and social considerations by providing living facilities, schools, 
hospitals, maternity clinics, and other social services to help establish better living conditions for 
the regrouped population.84 According to Thao, his report formed the basis for the later 
development of the Agrovilles. 
Although Thao’s report may have influenced Diem’s decision to suspend the experiments 
with the collection centers, there are indications that Diem’s brother, Ngo Dinh Can, and other 
high Government of Vietnam officials, including Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho and Minister 
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Figure 17. Vietnamese from 44th Ranger battalion and 
American advisor, behind lead man, forge across stream. 
of Agriculture Lo Van Dong, also influenced Diem. These men believed that more emphasis 
should be placed on positive efforts to gain the support of the rural population rather than relying 
solely on the use of force. President Diem must have seen some merit in this argument. In July 
he announced that the government would establish “prosperity and density centers” designed “to 
improve rural standards of living.”85 
A Question of Priorities 
By March of 1954, Diem had been 
able to outmaneuver Hinh, eventually sending 
him out of the country. Once Diem gained 
control over the army, he used them to help 
crush the rebellious opposition of the 
religious sects. By late 1955, using the 
strategy of “divide and conquer” and aided by 
France’s withdrawal of financial support to 
the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, Diem successfully 
neutralized these two groups as a threat to the 
stability of his government.86 The Binh 
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Xuyen, however, proved to be a more persistent problem. By April, after several bloody 
skirmishes between the two armed factions, Diem got the upper hand and managed to avert a 
full-scale civil war.87 Following the October 1955 national referendum in which Bao Dai was 
deposed and his monarchy abolished, Ngo Dinh Diem proclaimed South Vietnam a republic and 
named himself its first president.88  
Initially, Diem focused on propaganda measures designed to purify the population of its 
Communist sentiments. The most widely known and most important instrument in this regard 
was the “Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign,” which was begun in mid-1955. In his 
government’s effort to combat Communist infiltration, subtlety was not a virtue.  
In a typical denunciation ceremony, Viet Minh cadres and sympathizers would 
swear their disavowal of Communism before a large audience; the repentant 
would recount the atrocities of the Viet Minh and, as a climax to their 
performance, would rip or trample upon the Viet Minh flag and pledge their 
loyalty to Ngo Dinh Diem.89  
Beginning in mid-1955, Diem also embarked on a campaign to counter the threat of the 
Viet Cong. According to Jean Lacouture, “a new enemy was substituted for the sects . . .  the 
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Viet Cong, or Vietnamese Communists. In 1955, every opponent had been denounced as a 
leftover from the “feudal rebels.” After 1956, every opponent was called a “Communist.”90  
Military Assistance Advisory Group 
In February 1955 a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) under General 
John “Iron Mike” O’Daniel, was formed to assume responsibility for training the South 
Vietnamese forces under the overall control of General Paul-Henri-Romuald Ely, 
Commander in Chief of the French Expeditionary Forces.91 For most of 1955, the 
embryonic South Vietnamese army was involved in combat against the armies of the 
religious sects and scattered groups of Viet Minh irregulars. By December 1955, 
however, it appeared that the back of religious sects’ resistance had been broken and the 
scattered South Vietnamese army forces were regrouped into divisions for centralized 
training. With the withdrawal of the French in May 1956, the United States assumed 
complete responsibility for training the South Vietnamese, and in September the US 
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Table 11. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, 1956.  
 
Part of the problem during this period stemmed from the fact that the United States took 
over the French mission of training the ARVN in 1955. Both the MAAG and President Diem 
saw the invasion of South Vietnam by the north as the most likely threat. Based on recent 
experience in Korea, the US military was confident that conventional warfare training techniques 
applied in Korea would prove equally effective in South Vietnam. Thus, during these early years, 
when the insurgency was still in its formative stages, the United States concentrated on training 
and equipping a rather large conventional army to withstand an overt invasion by organized 
NVA units. The need for smaller, less conventional security forces was not taken seriously at the 
time by either the MAAG or the Government of Vietnam. By the time the insurgency was 
recognized for what it was, the appropriate forces for dealing with the terroristic and subversive 
activities of the Viet Cong were not available.92  To put the situation in perspective, the South 
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Vietnamese were not alone in seeing the threat to South Vietnam as an invasion from the north. 
Within the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, the feeling was that they could not afford to 
restructure it to confront counterinsurgencies without jeopardizing its other missions, including 
the defense of Europe and Korea. This was made clear when Army Chief of Staff General 
George H. Decker stated that although he did not doubt that the United States needed to be able 
to fight guerrillas effectively, he challenged Kennedy’s assertion that conventional soldiers were 
incapable of defeating irregulars. He regarded such talk as excessive and ahistorical, believing 
instead that, with proper preparation, “any good soldier can handle guerrillas.” He was not alone, 
as many other military leaders, including Joint Chiefs Chairman General Lyman L. Lemnitzer; 
the President’s personal military adviser and future Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General 
Maxwell D. Taylor; and Marine Corps Major General Victor H. Krulak, the Joint Chiefs’ point 
man for counterinsurgency, shared Decker’s opinion. 
The problem faced by the MAAG was difficult indeed—while the fledgling South 
Vietnamese army was reasonably adequate in strength (142,000 men organized into four field-
type divisions, six light divisions, and thirteen territorial regiments), it had serious qualitative 
deficiencies in the officer corps, as well as a complete lack of capability in the support branches 
(i.e., medical services, transportation, logistics, etc.). During the French-Indochina War, the 
Vietnamese forces had been heavily staffed with French officers and noncommissioned officers, 
and logistic support was the complete responsibility of the French.93   
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In addition to the regular army forces, Diem had grouped various existing paramilitary 
units into a Civil Guard under the direction of the Minister of Interior. This force, approximately 
40,000 strong and organized into lightly armed mobile companies, was to serve as a rural law-
and-order force.94 A local defense force of the Self-Defense Corps was also formed from 
existing local defense units. This organization, with an approximate strength of 60,000, was 
deployed in 10-man squads for local village protection.95  
Basic guidance for the MAAG advisory effort naturally stemmed from the appraisal of 
the enemy threat. The official estimate provided by the CIA during 1956‒59, was that the 
Communist Viet Minh organization in South Vietnam rather than the People’s Army of North 
Vietnam constituted the major danger.96 With the benefit of hindsight, a question comes to mind 
of why the ARVN was organized and trained to meet a conventional invasion across the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) rather than the internal threat posed by the Communist organization 
in South Vietnam?97 US military strategy in the mid-1950s was based on the doctrine of massive 
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retaliation, but at the same time the US containment policy, as evidenced in is many regional 
arrangements, including the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), called for the 
development of indigenous forces to act as a deterrent to Communist aggression. After the 
French defeat in 1954, the Joint Chiefs took the position that ground defense against aggression 
from the north would require South Vietnamese forces to hold the line until the United States 
could intervene with ground forces and tactical nuclear weapons and it was that mission that they 
were trained for.98 Therefore, the role of the ARVN forces in the US Chiefs of Staff point of 
view was to maintain internal security and to deter Communist aggression by a limited defense 
of the DMZ. This view was bolstered by the withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Forces on 
April 1, 1956, which left South Vietnam without military protection. Diem felt strongly about the 
necessity of defending the DMZ, and he urged and supported the buildup of the ARVN to 
embrace this mission. Finally, the fact that the US military thinking had been strongly influenced 
by the North Korean invasion added to the general pressures for expanding the mission of the 
ARVN to that of defense against external invasion, despite the threat assessment which 
continued to maintain that the internal threat was the only significant danger.99 Even though this 
mission statement recognized the South Vietnamese army’s primary responsibility was for 
internal security, creating an army capable to counter a conventional invasion across the DMZ, 
training took precedence. 
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By 1959, the ARVN had been reorganized into a force of seven light divisions, each with 
a strength of about 10,500. Each division was composed of three infantry regiments and one 
battalion of 105mm artillery, 4.2 mortar engineers, and technical logistic support companies. 
Three Corps Headquarters had been established for command and control of operational forces. 
As the security situation deteriorated under the impact of the Communist “armed struggle,” these 
divisions were broken down into regimental and battalion task forces and assigned to the 
provinces. Operations against the Communist forces, for the most part, took the form of battalion 
and regimental-size sweeps—which the Communists readily avoided.100  
In July 1957, Diem, acting on his own conception of the Civil Guard as primarily a 
military rather than a police organization, asked the United States for $60 million worth of heavy 
military equipment, but this recommendation was countered by Michigan State University 
(MSU) and the MAAG, who proposed reequipping the force with lighter weapons. In 1958, the 
US advisory effort gave way in part to the Government of Vietnam pressure for heavy equipment 
with the understanding that the Civil Guard would be removed from the president’s office and 
once again placed under the Ministry of Interior, as proposed by MSU. Diem, however, 
procrastinated, and the United States, in turn, withheld monetary assistance to the Civil Guard. 
Finally in January 1959, Diem gave in and transferred the Civil Guard to the Ministry of 
Interior.101 In June 1959, the newly constituted Public Safety Division of USOM replaced the 
MSU team as the US advisory agency to the Civil Guard. However, this move proved temporary, 
since the MAAG was now convinced that the Civil Guard, by the nature of its operation, was a 
military element, not a police force. Eighteen months later in December 1960, on MAAG 
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recommendation, the Civil Guard’s organizational home was shifted from the Ministry of 
Interior to the Ministry of National Defense, and the MAAG took over responsibility for its 
training from USCM.102  
How the US got involved in training the South Vietnamese Army and why they agreed to 
it are two fascinating questions that require an extensive response. On 22 September the Joint 
Chiefs declared that the provisions of the Geneva cease-fire agreement would present a major 
obstacle to introducing a sufficient number of American training personnel and additional arms 
and equipment. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff went along for a number of reasons, despite their 
reluctance to get involved in Vietnam:   
First, the American military leaders were strong-armed by high-ranking civilian 
government officials.  Secretary John Foster Dulles and presidential assistant 
Robert Cutler expressed “the outspoken desire. . . . to see the training program 
undertaken.”  Furthermore, “they may also have been aware that President 
Eisenhower himself wanted it.” Only three days after the Joint Chiefs acquiesced, 
the President told the National Security Council that “in the land of the blind, the 
one-eyed men are kings. What we want is a Vietnamese force which will support 
Diem . . . the obvious thing to do is simply to authorize  O’Daniel to use up to X 
millions of dollars to produce the maximum number of Vietnamese units which 
Prime Minister Diem can depend on to sustain himself in power.”   
Second, the Joint Chiefs were constrained by political considerations in regard to 
the American government.     They stated bluntly that the creation of an effective 
Vietnamese Army under existing conditions was impossible while agreeing to 
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undertake that task.   In this way, the Joint Chiefs acceded to a bureaucratic 
compromise, to put on record the military’s objections to the training program and 
thereby shift responsibility to the political leaders while at the same time allowing 
the program to proceed.   
Third, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and particularly the Army staff, had recently 
succeeded in preventing the commitment of American combat forces in Vietnam. 
Having risked much, fought hard, and won the fight, Army leaders thought it 
foolish to quarrel over the relatively minor issue of American training assistance. 
As the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, Lieutenant General James M. 
Gavin, recalled, “we in the Army were so relieved that we had blocked the 
decision to commit ground troops to Vietnam that we were in no mood to 
quibble.” Whatever the motives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed to a proposal 
that set in motion a chain of events that would soon prove irreversible.103 
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Diem’s Final Gamble: 
 The Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961‒63 
By 1956, to the surprise of many informed observers, President Diem had succeeded in 
establishing control over the government and administrative machinery of the country.1 South 
Vietnam had not only become a viable political unit, but it also registered impressive economic 
gains during its first few years. These developments produced optimism in Washington, as well 
as in Saigon. This hopeful outlook, however, reflected an inadequate awareness and assessment 
of the Communist threat to the country.2 Both American and Vietnamese leaders viewed an 
invasion from North Vietnam as the major challenge to the security and viability of South 
Vietnam. Consequently, they emphasized the expansion of the ARVN and on training in 
conventional tactics. The US advisory effort, as well as the military aid program, was geared to 
the task of thwarting a Korean-type assault.3   
It wasn’t until 1959 when assassinations of local officials and overt indoctrination of 
villagers attracted serious attention to the fact that the country faced a threat from Communists 
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lists the numbers reported from 1957‒72. Although not necessarily portrayed as killings few if any of those 
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trained in guerrilla warfare. In many respects, this was the moment of recognition, if not 
reckoning, for the Government of South Vietnam.4  
On 29 January 1961, Radio Hanoi announced the creation of the National Liberation 
Front of South Vietnam. This organization had as its sacred task to overthrow of the US-Diem 
“clique” and liberate the south. Soon after this announcement, the Front launched a guerrilla 
offensive aimed at preventing the April 1961 election.5  
Despite their attempts to disrupt the election, President Diem was won without serious 
opposition. In protest, the insurgents launched a guerrilla offensive by attacking and seizing the 
capital city of Phuoc Thanh Province, only 60 miles from Saigon, for a short time.6 With signs of 
serious security deterioration in the countryside, President Diem declared a State of Emergency 
on October 18, 1961.7 The US State Department also published a blue book, A Threat to Peace: 
North Vietnam's Effort to Conquer South Vietnam, outlining evidence that North Vietnam's 
leaders were the masterminds behind the growing problem of insurgency in the south:  
“Communists strength had grown to an estimated 9000 men organized into some 30 battalions. 
An additional 8000 or more troops were operating in the provinces and districts under the 
leadership of VC officers.”8 The enemy not only had a military force but an administrative 
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apparatus as well. Directed at first by the southern branch of the Lao Dong Party (North 
Vietnam) and later by the Central Committee of the People's Revolutionary Party of South 
Vietnam, this apparatus was led principally by southerners. There were interzone, province, and 
district communities as well as village and hamlet cells, including specialized groups for liaison, 
propaganda, espionage, tax collection, and many other activities.9 
The growth of this complex and pervasive guerrilla structure led President Kennedy to 
review US policy toward South Vietnam and to underline the US commitment to Ngo Dinh 
Diem’s government. 
 President Kennedy dispatched the Staley (May 1961) and Taylor (October 1961) 
missions to South Vietnam.10 After negotiations with Government of Vietnam officials, the US 
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sharply increased US economic and military aid to help South Vietnam counter the growing 
insurgency.11  
Between 1961 and 1963, the Government of Vietnam and the Viet Cong openly 
competed for the loyalty and the support of the rural population, both believing that whichever 
side gained this loyalty and support would emerge victorious. While The Viet Cong used 
terrorist tactics to sever the government’s pacification effort with the peasantry in the 
countryside and force it to withdraw back to towns and cities, the Government of Vietnam, on 
the other hand, attempted to force the insurgents back into their base areas where they could be 
isolated and destroyed.12  
To eliminate the guerrilla threat, the Diem regime turned its attention and energy to the 
countryside, where insecurity was widespread and government influence had been neglected. 
The major responsibility for the day-to-day protection of the rural population (whether regrouped 
into agrovilles or living in scattered hamlets) fell on the shoulders of the Civil Guard13 and the 
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Self-Defense Corps.14 The Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps were formed in 1955 and by 
1961 numbered, respectively, a little more than 50,000 and 60,000. In addition to protecting 
important installations and population centers, the Civil Guard operated as a regional reaction 
force. The Self-Defense Corps’ task was more narrowly defined; its main responsibility was 
defense of the villages and hamlets. 
However, both the Self-Defense Corps and the Civil Guard were unequal to the challenge 
posed by the expanding insurgency. Poorly trained and equipped, as well as thinly deployed, 
they were easy targets at night for the aggressive Viet Cong forces. Even if they were able to 
protect a village, the surrounding hamlets were at the mercy of the insurgents. The South 
Vietnamese government realized that a new, more effective framework for security in the rural 
areas was needed.15  
Ngo Dinh Nhu, the President's brother and principal adviser, favored the introduction of 
strategic hamlets as a solution to the problem of mounting rural insecurity. In essence, the 
Strategic Hamlet Program was essentially a modification of the Agroville Program, but it 
reflected a change of focus away from the village to the smaller and sociologically more 
cohesive unit, the hamlet. There was an increased emphasis on the security aspect, with the 
construction of elaborate fortifications around the hamlet and an increase in offensive operations 
to counter Viet Cong activity.16 The chiefs of several provinces (among them Vinh Long, Quang 
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Ngai, and Vinh Binh) had begun constructing fortified hamlets during July and August 1961.17 
Nhu visited a number of these hamlets and was greatly impressed with what he saw. They 
became the inspiration for the Nhu-directed Strategic Hamlet Program. 
The construction of strategic hamlets was not the only plan to be devised and considered 
as a means of combating insurgency in rural areas. It was inevitable perhaps that Nhu's rival, 
Ngo Dinh Can, would emerge with a plan of his own. As the leading figure in central Vietnam, 
Can introduced the Force Populaire in mid-1961.18 The pilot program was started in Thua Thien 
Province and focused on training highly motivated teams of political activists. The basic unit of 
the Force Populaire was a company of approximately 100 men, all indigenous to their area of 
operations. They would move into a village for a period of up to three months and, in much the 
same manner as the Communist insurgents, try to establish their influence over the inhabitants of 
the area.19  
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During 1961, the Force Populaire concept vied with the Strategic Hamlet Program for 
priority in the country's pacification effort. Ngo Dinh Nhu was able to take advantage of his role 
as Diem’s principal adviser to promote the latter program. For example, it was largely through 
his initiative that the Government of Vietnam asked the Malayan Government to loan a group of 
counterinsurgency experts, the British Advisory Mission (BRIAM). BRIAM was dispatched to 
South Vietnam in September 1961 under the leadership of Sir Robert Thompson, the former 
Secretary of Defense in Malaya and an expert on, among other things, protected settlements.20 In 
his capacity as Diem’s adviser, Nhu also called a special meeting of province chiefs at Can Tho 
in September 1961, at which time he instructed them to begin building strategic hamlets in their 
provinces.21  
By the end of 1961, the Strategic Hamlet scheme had acquired the dimensions of a 
national program, and three events during early 1962 led to its formalization. The first event was 
the initiation of a publicity campaign on January 3, 1962, President Diem’s sixty-first birthday, 
to popularize and encourage the extension of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Second, a 
presidential decree that same day established the Interministerial Committee for Strategic 
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Hamlets, a high-level coordinating and decision-making body.22 Third and final, the National 
Assembly Resolution on April 17, 1962, formally established the Strategic Hamlet Program.23  
This program was not the totality of the pacification effort during this period. There were 
programs which fell outside the structure of the Strategic Hamlet Program, such as Land Reform, 
the National Police Plan, the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDGs), and the Self-Defense 
Corps. Nevertheless, the Strategic Hamlet Program represented the main thrust of the US-
Government of Vietnam pacification initiative for what turned out to be the final phase of the 
Diem regime. 
General Concept 
As part of his publicity campaign to popularize the Strategic Hamlet Program, Ngo Dinh 
Nhu toured the provinces in early 1962 and held meetings with government officials. In 
explaining the theory and implementation of the program, Nhu stressed that the fundamental aim 
behind the establishment of strategic hamlets was the isolation of the insurgents, both physically 
and politically, from the rural population. Within this fundamental aim, there were three 
objectives.24 
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Figure 18. Vietnamese children standing next to a 
defense of long, sharpened wood pikes. 
Figure 19. 768th Regional Forces Company 
 manning the perimeter. 
 The first of these objectives, a 
prerequisite for the other two, was the protection 
of the people. This was not simply a matter of 
regrouping some outlying huts in the center of 
the hamlet and then building a rampart around it 
of barbed wire, sharpened bamboo stakes, moats, 
and booby traps—the sort of defense measure 
which was prominent in many hamlets.25 It also required a good radio network between hamlets, 
villages, and the district capitals, as well as training and arming the men from the hamlets as a 
militia to provide a close-in defense. Until this kind of security arrangement was completed, the 
defense of the hamlets would be provided 
by the paramilitary forces (Self-Defense 
Corps and Civil Guard), while the regular 
army would hold the perimeter to prevent 
attacks by major enemy units. Both the 
paramilitary forces and the regular military 
were to be deployed to rescue hamlets 
attacked by more than local guerrilla 
squads. Another vital aspect of population 
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protection was the elimination of the insurgent infrastructure within the hamlets. No hamlet 
would be secure against penetration and treachery, nor could the people be expected to take 
positive action on behalf of the government until the insurgent infrastructure had been 
eliminated. To ensure a loyal hamlet population, each person would be documented, 
photographed, and records checked.26  
The second objective of the Strategic Hamlet Program was to unite the people and 
involve them in positive action on the side of the government. As a rule, most of the Vietnamese 
peasants would have been content to live quietly in their hamlets pursuing their traditional 
occupations as farmers and ignoring the rest of the world. Indeed, they were left largely to 
themselves in the first few years of the Diem regime, thus leaving a vacuum for the insurgents to 
move and take over. The aim of the government was to substitute its own controlling influence in 
the hamlets by promoting not only local community spirit but also a sense of national solidarity. 
The key to this part of the program involved a restructuring of the political and social 
organization of the hamlet.27  
The third objective of the program was to boost development in the economic and social 
fields. The government realized that any improvement in the welfare of the rural population 
would seriously handicap the insurgency and its appeal in the countryside. To a large extent, this 
part of the program was to provide the tangible benefits and rewards of cooperating with the 
government. It involved building schools, clinics, and markets; improved agricultural methods, 
water supplies, and electricity; radio programs, newspapers, and so on. It was at this point of the 
program that the forced regrouping of houses and other hardships associated with the strategic 
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hamlets would be offset by compensating advantages.28 Although the peasants may have farther 
to go to work in their fields, they would have greater access to many amenities of life:  schools 
for the children and markets for the wife. 
Because of this laissez-faire attitude, the hamlet’s social and economic welfare 
requirements were given a low priority in the government's order of business. It is interesting to 
note, for instance, that the official six criteria for a completed strategic hamlet, listed on July 19, 
1962, made no reference to economic betterment. A hamlet was completed when the people had: 
(1) cleared Communists from the area and coordinated population-control measures with the 
police and hamlet chief; (2) coordinated control of people and resources with the Vietnamese 
Information Service, indoctrinated the population, and successfully organized all the people; (3) 
instructed and divided work of all the people as to their obligations when disaster strikes; (4) 
completed defenses—such as fences, spikes, communication trenches, hidden trenches in all 
houses; (5) organized two special forces cells in each strategic hamlet; and (6) held the election 
of an advisory council.29  
Organizational Concept 
In its early stages, the Strategic Hamlet Program was administered through the 
preexisting channels of government. There was no single executive body responsible for the 
overall direction and coordination of the program unless one viewed Nhu's active promotion of 
the strategic hamlets in such a light.30 Disregarding bureaucratic niceties, Nhu chose to 
communicate directly with the province chiefs, upon whose shoulders rested the main 
responsibility for implementing the program. Many of the province chiefs were army officers, 
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and they were expected to act in both a civilian and military capacity.31 They were thus in an 
ideal position to coordinate the different aspects of the Strategic Hamlet Program. A problem 
was created, however, by the fact that the province chief in his civilian capacity was subordinate 
to the Ministry of Interior, while as a military officer he looked to the South Vietnamese army 
high command for support, if not instructions.32 Due to the byzantine nature of interlocking 
family connections, military cliques, and political attention coming from the presidential palace, 
it was not always possible to reconcile this division of loyalty and responsibility, and the result 
often was confusion and internal conflict. An additional handicap for the province chief was his 
lack of administrative control over the local representatives of other ministries, such as 
education, civic action, and rural development. 
By the end of 1961, it was clear that the Strategic Hamlet Program required 
administrative revamping, especially as it was then assuming the proportions of a major crusade. 
A great deal of the discussion in Diem’s Internal Security Council meetings was directed at this 
problem. The result was the presidential decree on February 3, 1962, which established the 
Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets.33 The committee was composed of the heads 
of the Ministries of Interior, Defense, Education, Civic Action, and Rural Affairs, and the Chief 
of the General Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. The Minister of Interior became the 
secretary-general, but no chairman was named since Ngo Dinh Nhu exercised this authority in 
practice and did not want his position formalized. The new committee was instructed to prepare 
an overall plan for establishing strategic hamlets throughout the country, i.e., to determine, in 
order of priority, the various areas where strategic hamlets were to be constructed and the 
techniques and time period of construction; to estimate the requirements for, and distribute, 
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material and human resources among the provinces; to specify responsibilities and coordinate the 
activities of regional and provincial organizations; and to supervise and control the general 
strategic hamlet construction program.34  
The line of responsibility for the Strategic Hamlet Program passed from the 
Interministerial Committee to the regions, province, and finally to the districts. At the regional 
level, there were regional committees for strategic hamlets, headed by the regional tactical 
commanders. The responsibility of the regional committees was predominantly military, simply 
because the region functioned as a step in the military chain of command, but not so in the 
hierarchy of the civilian administration. The Strategic Hamlet Program, nevertheless, utilized the 
regions for one important civilian operation: It established regional inspection teams whose 
function was to determine what progress was being made on the strategic hamlets in their areas 
and to report their findings to the Interministerial Committee in Saigon.35 
There were provincial committees for strategic hamlets, headed by the province chiefs 
and composed of other provincial and district officials. The provincial committee was primarily 
responsible for carrying out the directives of the Interministerial Committee and for developing 
plans for the individual provinces. The planning and execution of the Strategic Hamlet Program 
were most important, however, at the district level. It was the chief of the district who was 
directly responsible for the realization of the program in his small area. He and the military 
officers of the local command would meet with the province chief and the provincial committee 
for strategic hamlets to discuss plans for the construction of strategic hamlets in the district. After 
final plans were approved, the resources of the Civil Guard, Self-Defense Corps, the police and 
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security services, and the relevant ministries were mobilized, at least in theory, for the 
accomplishment of the goals associated with the program.36  
The civilian and military participants in the program were usually organized into groups 
called strategic hamlet construction teams.37 Each team was assigned a hamlet by the district 
chief (he himself would generally serve as the leader of a team), and orientation sessions were 
held to establish a clear understanding of the problems and to review measures and methods to 
be employed. 
Nhu eventually overcame his reluctance to be associated formally with the 
Interministerial Committee, and he assumed chairmanship in the spring of 1962.38 Despite the 
elaborate structure outlined above, Nhu tended to ignore the Interministerial Committee and the 
regional committees and issued orders directly to the province chiefs. To the extent that he did 
consult the Interministerial Committee, he completely dominated the meetings. American 
observers in the field reported that while Diem ordered that construction of Strategic Hamlets, 
the results were far from ideal. “Although the Vietnamese Government is giving the strategic 
village-hamlet program high priority, there is reliable evidence that the program suffers seriously 
from inadequate direction, coordination, and material assistance by the central government and 
from misunderstanding among officials at the provincial and local levels. Province chiefs have 
tended to draw up unrealistically high quotas (generally to please the authorities in Saigon), and 
the lack of enough resources provided by the government at the local level has in certain 
instances resulted in poorly constructed and poorly defended settlements and in financial levies 
on the peasant. Moreover, the construction of these settlements has not followed any pattern or 
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Figure 20. Kontum district advisory staff. 
plan based on priorities. In his reported recent merger of the ‘Delta’ plan and the strategic 
village-hamlet program, however, 39 
The American Interagency Committee for Province Rehabilitation  
Realizing that Diem’s government 
was making a major push to secure the 
countryside, the Interagency Committee for 
Province Rehabilitation (COPROR), was 
formed with the US mission in late March 
1962 as a counterpart to the Interministerial 
Committee for Strategic Hamlets. COPROR 
was chaired by the deputy chief of mission.40 Representatives of all US agencies—MACV, 
USOM, the United States Information Service, and the CIA were involved and, theoretically, 
problems of coordination, as well as liaison with the Vietnamese government, were dealt with in 
this group. The COPROR had no secretariat, and coordination often was achieved through 
informal interagency contacts.41  
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Figure 21. American advisor and Vietnam navy personnel. 
In May 1962, a two-man USAID team (Rufus Phillips and Albert Fraleigh) was sent to 
Saigon42 to survey the situation and prepare recommendations for increased USAID support. 
Phillips and Fraleigh recommended that a special office for rural affairs, or counterinsurgency, 
be established within the USAID mission as the action unit to administer a decentralized 
program to support the Government of Vietnam Strategic Hamlet Program. According to the 
plan, a USOM representative would be assigned to each of the provinces to administer a greatly 
increased military assistance program. Thus, it was through the Strategic Hamlet Program that 
the United States became involved in an advisory capacity at the provincial level.43  
Phillips and Fraleigh estimated 
approximately $10 million in local 
currency would be required to get the 
Strategic Hamlet Program moving. The 
money would be used to defray costs 
incurred by rural families in moving 
from insecure areas into the fortified 
hamlets; to support the recruiting, 
training, and deployment of government personnel who would work in the countryside; to 
support the training of local militia and hamlet officials; to subsidize self-help projects; and to 
support psychological warfare and information activities.44 The team also recommended that 
“Food for Peace” (Public Law 430, Title II) commodities and US excess property items be 
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imported for use in the pacification effort. These recommendations were accepted in 
Washington, and Phillips was selected to head the Office of Rural Affairs, with Fraleigh as his 
deputy. The recruitment of provincial representatives was initiated by USAID in Washington.45 
In Saigon, the newly created Office of Rural Affairs started working with the Government of 
Vietnam to develop a set of specific administrative procedures to implement the Strategic 
Hamlet Program. As a first step, Saigon instructed the province chiefs to prepare comprehensive 
provincial rehabilitation plans and detailed estimates of the funds, materials, and personnel 
required to carry out the plans. When correlated, these plans were reviewed briefly by the 
Interministerial Committee, the Office of Rural Affairs, and the MAAG’s Strategic Hamlets 
Division. A joint US-Government of Vietnam team composed of the directors of these three 
organizations made a field trip to the provinces to work out problems, prepare a budget for 
USOM financial and material support, and calculate Military Assistance Program (MAP) 
materials required, which would be supplied through the MAAG. The plans and budgets were 
then submitted to the US Interagency Committee and the Government of Vietnam 
Interministerial Committee for official approval.46  
To facilitate additional coordination and to increase accountability, a Provincial 
Rehabilitation Committee was created, with the province chief as chairman and the US 
provincial representative and US military sector adviser as members. This committee approved 
specific projects, established priorities in connection with the provincial rehabilitation plan, and 
was responsible for the successful implementation of the plan. Though the province chief was 
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the executive and made the decisions in the final analysis, the US provincial representative had 
to countersign all expenditures involving US funds. In this manner, a substantial degree of US 
supervision was maintained over the pacification effort in the countryside.47  
Supervision of the Strategic Hamlets in the Countryside 
Although the hamlet was the basic unit of Vietnamese society, it had not acquired an 
important role in the country’s administrative structure. The lowest rung on the government’s 
administrative ladder was the village. Thus, an important part of the Strategic Hamlet Program 
was the extension of the government network down to the hamlets. Three categories of elected 
officials were to make up the hamlet administrative organization. At the top of the pyramid was 
the hamlet chief. Instead of being solely in charge of hamlet administration, as was formerly the 
case, the hamlet chief was to have three assistants, forming a four-man Hamlet Administrative 
Committee. Their responsibilities were divided generally along the following three lines: first, 
security and youth affairs (including fortifications, defense, and youth organizations); second, 
political matters (including information and civic action); third, economic and social problems 
(land, agricultural and technical advice).48 A Hamlet Council, consisting of five to fifteen 
advisory members represented the different age groups and various local organizations.49  
Finally, were “interfamily” group leaders. Each small cluster of households was to elect a 
leader whose function was to assure an effective link between the Administrative Committee and 
the individual members of the hamlet. One of the duties of the group leader, for example, was to 
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transmit work assignments from the Administrative Committee to the populace.50 To help 
establish strategic hamlets, each province organized and trained strategic hamlet construction 
teams—called civic action teams or rural rehabilitation teams. These teams, comprised from ten 
to twenty cadres drawn from civilian and military services in the provinces. The teams worked 
directly under the supervision of the district chief and the district committee for strategic 
hamlets, which included the Civil Guard company commander and district representatives of the 
Government of Vietnam ministries and departments.51 The construction teams had two major 
functions: to assist the hamlet in organizing itself administratively and socially and to set up 
hamlet defenses. It was the intention of the Government of Vietnam to utilize the existing hamlet 
structure as much as possible rather than rely on relocating the population to new hamlets.52  
Village Organization and Security 
After a census was taken, the inhabitants were divided into interfamily groups, sometimes 
referred to as the combined-family mutual assistance system. Each of these groups contained 
approximately five families, the members of which elected a group leader. These groups were 
assigned the construction of a portion of the hamlet’s defense, generally in front of their own 
homes. The work to be done was divided among the various families at the discretion of their 
elected leader. Once this effort was underway, the people were organized into age and sex 
groups. There was, for example, a male elders’ group, a female elders’ group, a senior group 
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(men 18 to 35 years old), a woman's group (18 to 25 years old), a male junior team, and a female 
junior team. Each of these groups also had an elected leader and each group was assigned 
various tasks in defense of the hamlet (e.g., the women looked after the children in case of 
attack); the young men were assigned the most important job—serving as the hamlet militia. The 
members of the hamlet were also encouraged to join local political organizations such as the 
National Revolutionary Movement, the Women's Solidarity Movement, and the Republican 
Youth Movement. The purpose of these social and political organizations, naturally, was to 
provide the government with a means of organizing and influencing the members of the hamlet 
and, thereby, turning them into a weapon to be used against the insurgency.53  
The core of the hamlet militia was formed by the Republican Youth Movement, the 
hamlet unit was among the first groups to be organized by the visiting cadres. Although, 
theoretically, the age range in the Republican Youth was 18 to 35, in practice the upper age limit 
was often as high as 45 or 50 years.54 In many cases, local self-governing councils were created 
or reactivated. The most important was the Council of Elders, generally found only at the village 
level, which might have from 20 to 200 members, including women.55 Other such councils were 
found in both the villages and the hamlets, usually comprised the wealthy and influential men 
and women living there, including some influential younger men who had authority to consult 
with and influence the village and hamlet councils. Thus, it provided an added measure of 
response to local needs and maintained a link with Vietnamese traditional institutions.56 Once the 
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elections were held (or appointments made) and the strategic hamlets established to 
specifications, most provinces and districts attempted to carry out economic and social 
development activities within the hamlets. A few schools were built and dispensaries with 
medical kits established, but there were limited resources and the general attitude of the Diem 
government, and notably, Ngo Dinh Nhu, was opposed to dispensing such assistance to the 
people.57  
If a major flaw existed in the Strategic Hamlet Program, it was the excessive weight 
placed upon self-sufficiency and self-reliance. This is not to imply that these qualities were alien 
to the rural Vietnamese. Indeed, the people of the villages and hamlets had exercised a great deal 
of local initiative and independence for a long time. This tradition, however, had always been 
influenced by the conditions of autonomy and self-interest. It was either overlooked or ignored 
by Ngo Dinh Nhu in his effort to impose a new arrangement and new responsibilities on the 
people. There was in his approach and outlook an insistence that it was the duty of the peasants 
to shoulder the burden of implementing the Strategic Hamlet Program. But there were many 
disharmonies between the program’s goals and the needs and requirements of the rural 
population. Also, there was far too little emphasis and follow through on the responsibilities of 
the Vietnamese government itself in this same regard.58  
It is possible that Nhu emphasized the role of the hamlet and its inhabitants because he 
recognized the serious shortcomings of his own government. If this were the case, his concern 
about the performance of the Government of Vietnam was borne out in 1962 and 1963. One of 
the outstanding flaws in the implementation of the Strategic Hamlet Program was the persistent 
lack of sensitivity toward the rural people, their feelings, and real needs. In addition, there was 
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considerable disagreement with the US military who objected to the proposed focus of the 
program on the most populated areas of South Vietnam; the US wished to focus on areas where 
Communist influence was greatest. 59 
Flawed Implementation  
Securing the village population from Viet Cong coercion was both worthwhile and 
necessary, if Saigon was to have any chance to win the cooperation of their own citizens. 
Whatever good intentions motivated the endeavor were destroyed through often brutal 
implementation. Roger Hilsman, in his capacity as Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research [INR] at the Department of State, claimed that the Government of Vietnam's execution 
of program constituted a “total misunderstanding of what the [Strategic Hamlet] program should 
try to do.”60  
Diem and Nhu were impatient to expand the program, but it was their treatment of the 
people that caused its eventual failure. A review of the Pentagon Papers shows that in 
September 1962, 4.3 million people were housed in 3,225 completed hamlets with more than two 
thousand still under construction.61 Those numbers doubled by July 1963, to over eight and a 
half million people had been settled in 7,205 hamlets.62 At this breakneck rate of construction, 
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the Government of Vietnam was unable to fully support or protect the hamlets or its residents, 
despite funding by the United States government. Viet Cong insurgents easily sabotaged and 
overran the poorly defended communities, gaining access to the South Vietnamese peasants. By 
the end of 1963, only twenty percent of the hamlets in the Mekong Delta area were controlled by 
the Government of Vietnam.63 A resident of a hamlet in Vinh-Long described the situation: “It is 
dangerous in my village because the civil guard from the district headquarters crosses the river to 
the village only in the daytime . . . leaving the village unprotected at night. The village people 
have no protection from the Viet Cong, so they will not inform on them to the authorities.”64  
Another problem facing the Government of Vietnam was trying to do too much with too 
little. It is an axiomatic truism that only successful farmers eat. To be a successful farmer means 
that you know what you are doing when it comes to making decisions that will provide for your 
family—life punishes the foolish. One of the little-discussed features of the failure of the 
Strategic Hamlet Program was that where the hamlets were constructed had a great deal more to 
do with politics than where farmers could sustain themselves. To an overwhelming degree, the 
villagers suffered from an inability to choose safe and agriculturally sound locations for the 
hamlets.65 It must be said that the single most important factor in the failure of the Strategic 
Hamlet Program was the inflexible nature of the ruling Ngo family.66  
There is one additional factor that came to light only after the fall of the South 
Vietnamese government in 1975. Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao was placed in charge of the planning 
and the supervision of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Thao told Nhu it was imperative to build as 
many hamlets as fast as possible, when told the peasants resented being forcibly removed from 
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their ancestral lands and put into forts they themselves had to build.67 The Ngos were unaware 
Thao, ostensibly a Catholic, was, in fact, a Communist double agent on a mission to turn the 
rural populace against Saigon.68 Thao turned strategic hamlets into Communist strongholds. 
Thus, increasing the number of Communist sympathizers that moved into the hamlets and were 
given identification cards. As a result, the Viet Cong were more effectively able to penetrate the 
villages to access supplies and personnel.69 Nor were his activities limited to the South 
Vietnamese. Utilizing the extraordinary placement of their agent, the Communist attempted to 
assassinate Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. In 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara visited South Vietnam for an inspection tour of the country with President Diem and 
Thao. No doubt Thao divulged tour details to Viet Cong guerrillas, because each of McNamara's 
stopovers was punctuated by bloody attacks on nearby ARVN installations. When McNamara 
was in Bình Duong Province, five government soldiers were killed. As he flew from Da Lat 
north to Da Nang near the Demilitarized Zone, the Viet Cong bombed a southbound troop train, 
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Operations Sunrise and Sea Swallow 
Bernard Fall’s book, The Two Viet-nams: A Political and Military Analysis, describes 
many details of “Operation Sunrise.” Fall points out that Binh Duong Province, north of Saigon, 
was chosen as the test site because of the insurgents’ use of Ben Cat district, with its rubber 
plantations and wild forests, as a redoubt for the 55th and 300th battalions.71 Saigon authorities 
viewed Ben Cat, bordering Saigon on the northeast and southwest, as the keystone to the “arc of 
insurgency.” It not only qualified as a worthwhile first target for this reason, but also had the 
advantage of containing only a relatively small amount of 38,000 people.72  
Operation Sunrise began with a military maneuver aimed at sweeping the guerrilla forces 
out of Ben Cat’s populated area.73 People who remained in the hamlets were rounded up by the 
security forces. Seventy families agreed to move voluntarily; 140 others, according to Time 
magazine, “had to be convinced at gunpoint.”74 Foreign observers also noted that most of the 
able-bodied men had abandoned the area before the security forces arrived.75 The Ben Tuong 
hamlet area, to which the peasants were moved, consisted mainly of cleared ground, except for a 
concrete infirmary and administrative building. The people had to construct their own thatched 
huts and moats and walls for defense. In the following weeks, a school was built; the land was 
cleared for cultivation; and fertilizer, tools, and seed were distributed to begin farming. 
Government of Vietnam forces then conducted indoctrination and psychological activities using 
leaflets, radio broadcasts, and occasional movies and plays. Local security was provided by one 
Civil Guard company, and a Republican Youth group was trained as a hamlet militia. To 
complete the security system for the hamlet, a US-supplied radio for hamlet-to-district 
                                                 
71. Bernard Fall, The Two Viet-nams, 37. 
72. Fall, The Two Viet-nams, 378. 
73. Fall, The Two Viet-nams, 378. 
74. Fall, The Two Viet-nams, 378.  
75. Fall, The Two Viet-nams, 378. 
190 
communication was installed. Other American assistance for the overall operation included 
military aid and coordination provided by MAAG and an initial sum of $300,000 from USOM to 
help compensate resettled families for property lost and damaged while moving. To ensure that 
the peasants did not attempt to leave the hamlet and return to their old villages, their old 
dwellings were burned and leveled.76  
Operation Sunshine in many ways was a template for future resettlement programs. 
Methods used reflected the desire on the part of those in Saigon to not only deny Viet 
Cong support, but to control the population to gain acceptance for the Government of 
Vietnam. As outlined, the United States Agency for International Development provided 
$21 per family to compensate farmers for their loss of property when forced to move into 
a strategic hamlet. Of the first 210 families relocated, 140 were reported to have been 
moved at gunpoint. Once the villagers were moved, the South Vietnamese soldiers 
burned their former villages to keep them from returning. By May, South Vietnam's 
government-owned newspaper reported that only seven percent of 38,000 rural dwellers 
in the target area had been relocated either voluntarily or by force. 77 
The establishment of Ben Tuong was hailed as an enormous success and the Government 
of Vietnam proceeded to extend the program into other areas of Bing Duong Province. The Ben 
Tuong operation was followed by Ben Dong Soon on July 17, 1962. In the remaining southeast 
provinces covered by Operation Sunrise, strategic hamlets were constructed in Binh Duong 
Province without the elaborate military clear-and-hold operations necessitated by the high degree 
of insecurity. 
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By mid-1962, there was considerable controversy among Vietnamese, American, and 
British planners in Saigon over the progress of Operation Sunrise. Many observers, including 
some Vietnamese, believed that both the small sum of money given to the people to convince 
them to move coupled with the measures employed to move them to the new hamlets were 
bitterly resented. The regulations controlling the movement of the people gave the strategic 
hamlets the appearance of a detention area rather than that of a community. Bernard Fall’s stated 
in The Two Viet-nams that:  
Certain journalists—particularly American journalists—have made it appear, 
either through wickedness or naiveté that “Operation Sunrise” consists in 
applying totalitarian methods in order to compel people to leave their villages. . . . 
It is easily conceivable that the uprooting of peasant families, and particularly the 
destruction of abandoned villages, is not always accepted with joy, in spite of the 
explanations given by the government. Nevertheless, “Operation Sunrise” is not a 
pacification plan similar to that which has been applied in Algeria. The war which 
we fight against Communism is the opposite of a colonial war . . . [it] is a 
salvaging operation, not affecting the principles of democracy, and a humanitarian 
action which the government of a free country undertakes because it is afflicted 
by Communism.78  
In terms of statistical accomplishment, Tu Do, a Saigon newspaper controlled by the 
Government of Vietnam, reported on May 13, 1962 that of the 38,000 inhabitants of Ben Cat 
district, sixty percent must be reckoned as “communist intoxicated,” and that after six weeks of 
operations, only 2,769 inhabitants (seven percent) had moved voluntarily or by force into Ben 
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Figure 21. Wounded advisor receiving medical treatment. 
Tuong and the smaller hamlets of Ben Dong So and Bau Bang.79 Obviously, the operation had 
not yet succeeded in depriving the insurgents of civilian support in the area. This fact was borne 
out when a guerrilla force ambushed an ARVN convoy in broad daylight in June 1962 near Ben 
Cat, killing 26 South Vietnamese soldiers, several civilian public works technicians, and two 
American military officers. The success of the ambush was in large part because the civilian 
population failed to notify the local ARVN posts of the impending attack.80 One year later, the 
situation had not changed. Some strategic hamlets withstood guerrilla attacks while others were 
overwhelmed, or even betrayed. Among the casualties was Ben Tuong, the pilot strategic hamlet, 
which was overrun and destroyed by the enemy on August 20, 1963.81  
Operation Sea Swallow 
The enemy's interference with 
communications up and down the coast and 
the ever-present threat that a concentrated 
insurgent drive might cut the country in two 
led to the launch of a second major operation 
under the Strategic Hamlet Program in Phu 
Yen. With Operation Sunrise well underway, 
Operation Sea Swallow was launched on May 
6, 1962 in Phu Yen Province in central Vietnam. Phu Yen extends from the Annamite Chain 
watershed to the coast; its population of 356,000 was under the almost undisputed control of the 
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Viet Cong. One of the few areas where the government retained control was in and around Tuy 
Hoa, the provincial capital.  
Although basically similar in broad conception to Operation Sunrise, the campaign in 
Phu Yen was different in several respects. It embraced the idea of strategic hamlets, but it also 
set out consciously to give the inhabitants an interest and stake in their own well-being and in the 
conduct of their own affairs. The United States was largely responsible for this emphasis on 
winning the support of the people in rural areas: large sums of US aid were made available for 
resettlement, medical aid, and security operations. Whereas Operation Sunrise had begun with 
considerable harshness, the officers responsible for field control in Operation Sea Swallow 
insisted that the people not be moved until houses were ready for them, and, moreover, that they 
are compensated for their destroyed homes.82 Operation Sea Swallow was to be the pilot scheme 
for a series of clear-and-hold operations in the central coastal region of the country. The idea was 
to move from the narrow coastal plain by a series of three bounds along the valleys and high into 
the foothills of the Annamite Chain.83  
In the first phase (90 days), strategic hamlets were to be built in the relatively secure 
areas around Tuy Hoa. The next step was to push out into the more heavily dominated-enemy 
areas and establish strategic hamlets in which the population would be given direct military 
protection by the ARVN and Civil Guard.84 This phase was to take sixty days. In the final phase 
(150 days) the security forces would take on the insurgents in their own areas, pushing deeper 
and deeper into the mountains and perhaps threatening even the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 
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Additional Pacification Programs 
Chieu Hoi Program. In April 1963, the Diem regime launched the Chieu Hoi (Open 
Arms) campaign to encourage enemy defections to the government side. The campaign, 
patterned after successful experiments conducted in Malaya and the Philippines, was designed to 
attract and rehabilitate disillusioned Viet Cong willing to defect. Each strategic hamlet 
established its own Chieu Hoi committee to welcome those Viet Cong who wanted to return and 
serve the national cause. At the central level, the defectors’ program was supervised and run by a 
subcommittee attached to the Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets. A presidential 
proclamation and various instructions for Chieu Hoi cadres were printed on small leaflets that 
were distributed throughout the country. The leaflets also served as safe-conduct passes for 
defecting Viet Cong.85 
Land Reform. In its early years, the Diem government considered agrarian reform one of 
its great successes. By the beginning of the 1960s, however, it was apparent that the program had 
fallen far short. Six years after the land reform ordinance was promulgated on October 22, 1956, 
less than one-third of the eligible peasants had benefited from it and the Government of Vietnam 
still had 150,000 hectares of land to distribute. To begin with, the reform was altogether too 
conservative; landowners were permitted to retain as much as 100 hectares of rice land and 
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another 15 hectares for burial grounds and ancestor worship.86 In addition, the program lacked 
regulatory machinery to adjudicate tenant and landlord conflicts, and all sorts of arrangements 
were devised by landlords to defeat the intent of the program. In areas where lack of security had 
prevented the landlords from collecting rents on their properties for many years, the peasants 
regarded Diem's land reform as a step backward. Pressure was placed upon them to pay rents 
retroactively. In addition, they faced the payment of high prices for the land they had once all but 
regarded as their own. In effect, the Land Reform Program, to the extent that it even operated in 
the early 1960s, generated more antagonism than support for the Government of Vietnam.87  
The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups.  CIDGs were an outgrowth of the US military’s 
pacification effort in the central Vietnam mountainous regions. Beginning with the Rhade tribe 
around Ban Me Thuot in Darlac Province in early 1961, US Army Special Forces teams assigned 
to the CIA joined Vietnamese Special Forces counterparts in training and equipping young men 
from Rhade villages. The American and Vietnamese team members lived and ate with the 
tribesmen during the training period. While many of the Americans developed close relations 
with the tribesmen, the Vietnamese tended to remain more aloof and distant. The Vietnamese 
traditionally have held the highlanders in low regard and were reluctant to see them armed. After 
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six weeks of instruction, the well-armed young men were returned to their homes to defend their 
hamlets and report movements of the enemy.88  
By 1963, an extensive number of US teams were at work creating 200-man strike forces 
for operations in insecure areas. More than 25,000 tribesmen were armed under the CIDG 
program. In addition to providing security in their areas of operation, the CIDGs undertook 
comprehensive civic action projects, including medical care, construction projects, and 
education.89  
The Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps. A basic ingredient of the Strategic Hamlet 
Program was the provision of security through a combination of the forces of the ARVN, the 
Civil Guard, and the Self-Defense Corps. Unfortunately, the ARVN proved themselves incapable 
of acting as a screen against the enemy, and the brunt of the Communist attacks fell on the 
territorial forces.90  
As a result, the Civil Guard and the Self-Defense Corps (later renamed Popular Force and 
Regional Force) suffered serious casualties, with a consequent reduction in morale and an 
increase in desertion. For example, during the first six months of 1962, the Self-Defense Corps 
and Civil Guard suffered eighty percent of the armed forces casualties. Morale not only suffered 
from the heavy losses, but inadequate pay and benefits played a big part, which were 
                                                 
88. John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 128. For a concise history of the CIDGs history, see Major Darrell 
W. Carr, “Civil Defense Forces in Counterinsurgency: An Analysis of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group in 
Vietnam,” Master’s Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College 2012, Texas Tech University, Vietnam 
Center and Archive, Darrell Carr Collection, Box 01, Folder 01, Item Number: 25100101001, 2012. 
https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/reports/images.php?img=/images/2510/25100101001.pdf.  
89. Colonel Francis J. Kelly “US Army Special Forces 1961-1971,” (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Army. 1985). https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/reports/images.php?img=/images/286/2861405001a.pdf . 
90. For a look at where the Civil Guard and the Self Defense Corps started, see “Review of Self-Defense 
Corps,” 31 October 1957, Texas Tech University, Vietnam Center and Archive, Michigan State University Archives 
& Historical Collections: Ralph F. Turner Papers, Box 1695, Folder 16, Item Number: 6-20-1607-116-UA17-
149_000099, 31 October 1957. https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/reports/images.php?img=/images/msu/6-20-1607-116-
UA17-149_000099.pdf. See also “Staff Study,” Texas Tech University, Vietnam Center and Archive, Sam Johnson 
Vietnam Archive Collection, Box 0007, Folder 0654, Item Number: F030600070654, n.d. 
https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/reports/images.php?img=/images/F0306/F030600070654.pdf.  
197 
considerably less than those for the ARVN. Disability pay and death benefits, if paid at all, were 
often long delayed, and benefits for family dependents were virtually nonexistent. Terms of 
service were four years compared with a two-year term for ARVN conscripts. And finally, a 
most serious constraint was the inexperienced and for the most part incompetent leadership of 
these forces that existed at all levels.91  
Viet Cong Reaction 
The reaction of the Viet Cong to both the Strategic Hamlet and the associated 
counterinsurgency programs during its first year was muted and low key. This does not mean 
that they were unconcerned; in fact, documents captured at the time of Operation Sunrise 
revealed considerable enemy apprehension about the effects of the campaign. Young men were 
returning to their native villages, intelligence agents were being arrested, tax collections were 
falling off, and travel from one base area to another base area was becoming more difficult and 
dangerous.92  
It is fairly clear that the insurgents were confronted by something of a dilemma, for any 
overt assault on the hamlets and their newly formed institutions ran the risk of alienating the 
people and diminishing their support for the insurgency. The Viet Cong, therefore, confined 
themselves to four lines of action during the first year: continual propaganda against the strategic 
hamlets as concentration camps; penetration of the hamlets by Viet Cong agents and supporters; 
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the maintenance of pockets of contested territory under Viet Cong control; and the preservation 
of regular units, which were rarely committed to a major action during this period.93  
Beginning in July 1963, however, the Viet Cong started to attack the strategic hamlets in 
force. This offensive coincided with the Diem regime’s clash with the Buddhists and the 
deterioration of US-Government of Vietnam relations. The attacks on the strategic hamlets 
followed a general pattern. As a primary objective, the Viet Cong struck at the radio transmitters 
in the hamlets to isolate the villagers from Government of Vietnam protection. Hamlet militia 
posts were repeatedly attacked, and walls and fortifications around the hamlets were destroyed, 
an action which underscored the failure of the South Vietnamese government to provide the 
protection that it promised. In some cases, the attacks escalated to the point that hamlet residents 
were forced to return to their previous villages and rebuild the homes that the Government of 
Vietnam had destroyed.94 Adding to the misery, the various social and economic benefits which 
were supposed to accompany the Strategic Hamlet Program often did not materialize in the face 
of the Communist harassment of government representatives. School teachers were killed, and 
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anti-malaria teams were attacked and their medical supplies were stolen. In addition, the general 
overextension of the Strategic Hamlet Program played right into the Viet Cong’s hands. In some 
areas, government control was so weak that, while the Viet Cong permitted the establishment of 
strategic hamlets, the inhabitants allowed the insurgents to pass through the fortifications 
freely.95  
The House of Ngo Falls 
 Contrary to popular belief, the assassination of President Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu did 
not bring about the sudden end of the Strategic Hamlet Program. The end of the program had 
been coming for some time. By mid-1963, attacks had been increasing against the hamlets, 
especially in the populous Mekong Delta area, and many previously secure hamlets had been lost 
to the Viet Cong. With the death of the president and his brother, many generals in an attempt to 
maintain their long-held power, quickly disassociated themselves from anything to do with 
Diem's regime. Consequently, the Strategic Hamlet Program simply fell apart. Why? There are 
several reasons that had a major impact on both Nhu and Diem’s efforts, many that observers on 
the ground had reported for years. It was only with the demise of the Ngo brothers that the 
outcome became obvious.96  
In the chaos and confusion that followed the coup in November 1963, there was little 
time for the Strategic Hamlet Program. Officials at all government levels were unsure how to 
proceed. They had no prepared policy and took too long to make decisions on the future of the 
strategic hamlets. Most provincial and local officials were replaced and over the next few 
months, there were frequent and repeated changes to these appointments.97 A paralysis of policy 
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and action continued as governments changed throughout 1964. In this environment, both 
government officials and the peasants were reluctant to commit themselves to a program 
associated with the Diem regime and clearly falling apart. The Viet Cong efficiently filled the 
void left by the strategic hamlets. They filled it so efficiently, that by the end of 1964, Thompson 
assessed that the government was losing control in the countryside, and “the villages were 
beginning to encircle the towns.”98  
The Strategic Hamlet Program failed for a great many reasons. Primary among these 
were inadequate planning and coordination, inadequate resources, a totally unrealistic timetable, 
problems with location and construction, and inadequate and false evaluation of what was being 
accomplished. Other reasons for the failure of the program were the narrow and selfish view of 
Diem and Nhu of what they wanted to achieve, highlighted by a lack of commitment to the 
program, an inappropriate and complicated administrative structure that had little coordinative 
power. 
Above all these reasons, the South Vietnamese peasants who had been identified as the 
focus of the Strategic Hamlet Program, resented and largely rejected the program because they 
perceived that there was little in it for them. This feeling was accentuated by corrupt and 
uncaring government officials more interested in themselves than the people in the countryside.  
One outstanding question remains and it’s just as relevant today as it was forty years ago, 
relates to the ability of the United States to act as a constructive and reliable partner in assisting a 
country faced with an insurgency. A country seeking support should be concerned that it receives 
consistent and reliable support, generally free of demands for social and administrative reform. 
In South Vietnam, the United States was unable to meet these requirements. Support was neither 
consistent nor was it properly related to the true nature of the problem. Instead of being aimed at 
                                                 
98. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 140 
201 
the root causes of the insurgency, the aid effort was seriously diluted by a focus on the threat of a 
conventional invasion from the north. In 1963, the threats to withdraw support indicated the 
unreliable nature of the United States in providing support. The United States was unable to 
commit itself to a long-term view of the problem even though it was recognized that, as in 
Malaya, the problems of insurgency could not be solved overnight. 
The demands for social and political reform placed on President Diem demonstrated the 
intolerance of the United States for a political system other than one modeled after its own. Had 
the United States been able to accept Diem's rule as a less than “perfect” government and had it 
committed itself to the long-term support of his government and his policies, especially 
pacification, events may have proceeded differently. Certainly the “Americanization” of the war 






Awareness of our limitations should make us wary 
of condemning those who make mistakes, but we 
condemn ourselves if we fail to recognize mistakes.1 
. 
B. H. Liddell Hart 
What sort of lessons should we look for from the Vietnamese War? It is fashionable to 
quote Santayana’s warning that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat 
it?2 This would seem to be a prudent caution for a serious student of war and diplomacy. But it is 
equally possible that our bitterly won knowledge of conducting a counterinsurgency may be 
irrelevant, as the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have debunked the lie that the United 
States would never again be involved in a situation that even remotely approximates the 
conditions of Vietnam.3  No more proof need be given that we continue to become involved in 
“wars of choice,” than the disregard of recent American administrations to the “Nixon Doctrine,” 
which supposedly codified the post-Vietnam US foreign policy posture by limiting the character 
of US assistance: “We shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in 
accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to 
assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.”4  
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Professor Samuel P. Huntington went a step further; he warned that with Vietnam:  
if we remember the past we are condemned to misread it. . . . The right lesson, in 
short, may be the un-lesson. . . . the Vietnam problem was a legacy of Western 
colonial rule. . . . Vietnam was, in addition, the one European colony [in which] . . 
. Communist groups established an early ascendancy in the nationalist movement. 
The struggle for independence led to a divided country, a sequence of events 
which seems unlikely to be duplicated again in the future. Finally, the American 
involvement in Vietnam came at the end of a cycle of active American concern 
with foreign affairs which seems unlikely to be repeated for some time in the 
future. Every historical event or confluence of events obviously is unique.5  
If it were true that the Vietnam War was unique, it does not make its lessons irrelevant. 
All events are in a superficial sense unique; it is their components that we separate out for 
comparison that give meaning and that we can take as a warning.  
A Failed Effort 
The escalation period of the Vietnam War, from 1955 to 1965, mirrored the Cold War in 
that the United States and USSR avoided direct conflict—and thereby the possibility of nuclear 
war—by operating through proxy governments and forces. Unfortunately for the United States, 
from its very inception, the South Vietnamese government was weak and corrupt with little 
administrative expertise.  The North Vietnamese government under Ho Chi Minh was a fiercely 
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proud and independent group of nationalists willing to fight endlessly against foreign dominance 
and for Vietnamese unification. 
Due to the spirit of the times, the United States rejected Franklin Roosevelt's anti-
imperialist policies and procedures and adopted a strident anti-Communist stance and 
antagonized the North Vietnamese by inserting themselves into what was in reality a Vietnamese 
civil war.  In its zeal to battle Communism, the United States essentially ended up assuming the 
hated role of imperial master in Vietnam. As a result, when the United States sent troops into the 
territory in 1965, they found a far different situation than any other they had faced up to that 
point in the Cold War. 
After years of bureaucratic infighting, the US-Government of Vietnam war effort in 
Vietnam to combat the Vietnamese Communists underground in South Vietnam remained 
unfocused and under the control of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother 
Nhu. Up to this time, North Vietnam and its surrogate infrastructure in the south, the Viet Cong, 
had been successful in evading or countering US-South Vietnamese efforts to protect the 
population in both the Agroville and Strategic Hamlet Programs. It was only after much internal 
bureaucratic sparring between the Government of Vietnam and the US that intelligence efforts 
were more fully coordinated and were, in turn, integrated more fully with the efforts of the 
Saigon government. 
At the insistence of the Americans, Diem’s government became focused on a key long-
term goal of tracking down and removing—either by killing, capture, interrogation, or 
imprisonment—Communist agents involved in the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam. 
The National Liberation Front was the core coordination mechanism of the Communist enemy 
infiltrating South Vietnam from the North. The government in Hanoi, under Ho Chi Minh, spent 
206 
 
decades developing an organization of highly centralized policy and logistical control, coupled 
with a decentralized network of thoroughly trained agents in the south. The Communist 
subversive organization—or Viet Cong infrastructure—organized and controlled the countryside 
by means of organization, intimidation, political assassination, and propaganda. This was what 
the combined efforts of the United States and the Government of South Vietnam had to combat. 
The preceding chapters of this dissertation explained the nature of Communist successes in 
controlling the Vietnam countryside. Operational control was delegated to the hardcore agents at 
both district and village levels, where the great majority of the population—eighty percent—
lived. Communist efforts concentrated on organizing the farmers into “fronts,” which by 1960, 
had supplied the rationale for the creation of the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam. 
Communist agents also sought to penetrate and weaken the Government of Vietnam 
urban areas as well. Throughout the country, assassination teams selectively targeted effective 
administrators, while employing terror tactics to intimidate the population. Led by dedicated 
Communist agents, all civic organizations were incorporated into fronts, creating a shadow 
government in opposition to the Government of South Vietnam. An important distinction was 
that the Viet Cong was not essentially concerned with popular or voluntary support; it sought 
control. The Viet Cong offered the people only one choice: either incur the active enmity of the 
Viet Cong, or refuse to cooperate with the Government of South Vietnam. As the Viet Cong 
organization expanded in the years prior to 1963, Viet Cong violence was designed to achieve 
the desired results by punishing anti-Viet Cong or pro-Government activities.  
This forces us to ask a question: why did neither the United States nor the Government of 
South Vietnam respond in kind to Viet Cong tactics during the mid-1950s to 1963? In 1962, a 
recommendation by Roger Hilsman and Michael Forrestal was made to then President Kennedy, 
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to develop a pacification program in Vietnam. As envisioned, the program was to be under 
civilian control at the village level, with lines of command extending upward to the central 
government of President Diem. This program would counter the successful subversion of the 
countryside by the Communists. Despite failure, a properly resourced and coordinated 
pacification campaign remains a viable response to an insurgency situation. A program such as 
the Strategic Hamlet Program, designed to achieve security, as well as economic, social, and 
political reform remains a viable component of a pacification program. The Strategic Hamlet 
Program in South Vietnam was an attempt at such a program. However, because of problems in 
implementation and design, the program was not able to realize its full potential and 
subsequently failed. 
The Diem government, however, persisted in its emphasis on central control and policy 
direction from Saigon in both the Agrovilles and the Strategic Hamlet Programs. As has been 
discussed previously, the villages were given little if anything for their own defense. The South 
Vietnamese regular army, designed and equipped by the US military, was organized and trained 
to repel an invasion from the north, or to fight conventional battles. The assassination of 
President Diem in 1963, and the later introduction of US troops in 1965, did not change matters. 
To gain control of a rapidly deteriorating situation, American and South Vietnamese forces 
placed greater emphasis on stabilizing the government, and containing Viet Cong activities in the 
countryside received a lower priority.  
Why did such a cumulatively enormous effort which had been taking place since 1954 
have such limited impact for so long? Why did it involve such disproportionate costs and 




Several reasons were given throughout this dissertation. Among them, of course, was the 
unique and highly unfamiliar conflict environment in which America found itself.  Another was 
the sharp contrast between the enemy they faced—an ideologically determined, centrally 
directed, tough-minded regime in the north, with a highly disciplined, revolutionary apparatus 
established in the south.  The south was only a half-formed nation, with a weak, corrupt, 
traditionalist regime. As the American observers in Vietnam pointed out, both the American 
leadership and the South Vietnamese themselves frequently misjudged the enemy. The decision-
makers underestimated the enemy’s ability to frustrate our tactics by evading contact and to 
counter-escalate against us at every stage up to the President Diem’s assassination in 1963 and 
beyond. Lastly of course, the incremental nature of the US response of Presidents Eisenhower, 
Kennedy, and Johnson.  At each point, they chose to do only what was minimally necessary at 
each stage of the insurgency in the hope that the South Vietnamese would establish themselves if 
given enough training, aid, and time.6 
 As a result, the civilian agencies with the responsibility for pacification were left to fend 
for themselves, and these agencies—USAID, CIA, the US Information Agency (USIA), the US 
Embassy, and the US State Department—failed completely. USAID was responsible for advising 
the national police and the Chieu Hoi Program for Viet Cong defectors. The USIA was 
responsible for propaganda. The CIA was in charge of developing, testing, and persuading 
Saigon to implement pacification and intelligence programs. It became glaringly clear that the 
                                                 
6. For a review of the steps President Kennedy enacted leading to an escalation of the war, see David 
Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 2000); Howard Jones, Death of a Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the 
Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: 





American civilian agencies in Saigon—USAID, CIA, USIA, and the US Embassy—could not or 
would not coordinate and pool their resources to create a viable pacification program.  They were 
unable to work effectively with their South Vietnamese counterparts, who were themselves 
inefficiently organized, contradictory in their goals, and corrupt in their practices.  Bureaucratic 
interests continued to dominate the American and South Vietnamese civilian agencies even in 
the face of disaster. 
Nor was the American military exempt from criticism. The US military was responsible 
for advising and upgrading the Vietnamese Territorial Forces (popular forces and regional 
forces) which were based at province and district levels. However, the greatest emphasis for 
support remained with the country’s conventional military forces. These loosely organized units 
represented 400,000 local troops but were poorly paid, equipped, or trained, and when called 
upon to defend their homes were inadequate to counter the Communist insurgents. 
There were critical structural problems within the pacification effort that plagued 
successful implementation. Due to President Diem’s insistence on retaining control and his 
refusal to delegate authority, each South Vietnamese organization—regional forces, popular 
forces, or police field forces—were vertically structured and controlled and had to refer all plans 
and recommendations to Saigon prior to implementation. The result was a delay and bureaucratic 
competition for resources. And after years of neglect by the South Vietnamese’s stubborn 
determination to retain control in Saigon, when the crisis came, there was no mechanism in place 
to provide centralized coordination to keep the country unified and stable.  
Reaction to Communist paramilitary, organizational, and terrorist activities could 
consistently be categorized as too little and too late. A structured organization dedicated to 
coordinate efforts between the South Vietnamese and the US did not become into being until the 
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Military Assistance Command, Vietnam in 1962, much too late to stave off a disaster. The Viet 
Cong Infrastructure, which, despite Communist main force losses, continued to be able not only 
to survive but also to replace its battlefield losses, select its targets, carry out political strategy, 
and even create a shadow government which collected taxes. It also developed external 
diplomatic ties with the Communist Bloc nations, India, and Indonesia.  
Johnson did not need that retrospective appraisal to launch a more vigorous campaign 
against the Communists, for his first impulse as the new president was to shift the war into 
higher gear. Meeting with his top civilian advisers on Vietnam, Johnson told them to forget 
about the social, economic, and political reforms that Kennedy had stressed. Victory in the 
military conflict became the new administration’s top priority. Hoping to apply more pressure on 
the Communists, the administration began to implement a series of tactics it had adopted in 
principle within the first week of Johnson’s presidency. These included a more aggressive 
propaganda offensive as well as sabotage directed against North Vietnam.7 
One Final Thought 
A review of the literature contained within this dissertation has suggested that we could 
not win the Vietnam War—at least not in any meaningful sense and at an acceptable cost, 
because of the way we fought it. But this still begs the question of why we fought the way we 
did. I think the answer lies in an as yet neglected dimension of the Vietnam War, the impact of 
institutional factors—bureaucratic constraints.8 In effect, both governments attempted to cope 
with a highly atypical conflict situation through institutions designed for quite different purposes. 
                                                 
7. For more on this, see Edward C. Keepfer, ed. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961–1963: 
Vietnam, August-December 1963 NSAM 273 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), 4:637. All 
quotes found in David Coleman and Marc Selverstone, “Lyndon B. Johnson and the Vietnam War,” 
Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia. https://prde.upress. virginia.edu/content/Vietnam#fn8. 
8. For more on bureaucratic constraints. See Robert Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional  
Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1972).  
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The typical behavior patterns of these organizations influenced not only the decisions made but 
what was actually done in the field: the performance of the units trained and advised by the 
Americans and the political and policy decisions made in Saigon. They also influenced the very 
way in which the South Vietnamese and their Americans allies responded to the Viet Cong 
threat. In the case of the Agroville and the Strategic Hamlet Programs, sheer bureaucratic inertia, 
another institutional factor, made American and Vietnamese governmental organizations very 
slow to change their ingrained institutional behavior patterns.9  
In other words, there was a whole set of real-life constraints inherent in the way both the 
South Vietnamese and American organizations operated, which made them unable to adapt 
sufficiently to the unique and unfamiliar conflict environment of Vietnam. Though by no means 
the whole story, these factors did much to help render the American and Government of Vietnam 
response unduly conventional, wasteful, and slow to adapt compared to the Viet Cong.10  
I believe that Maxwell Taylor said it best when he stated: “First, we didn’t know 
ourselves. We thought we were going into another Korean war, but this was a different country. 
Secondly, we didn’t know our South Vietnamese allies. We never understood them, and that was 
another surprise. And we knew even less about North Vietnam. Who was Ho Chi Minh? Nobody 
really knew. So, until we know the enemy and know our allies and know ourselves, we’d better 
keep out of this dirty kind of business. It’s very dangerous.”11  
 
                                                 
9. For a thorough review of the perceptual logic which guided the US’s approach to the problem of the war in 
South Vietnam, see Charlie Cook, “Perception.” Texas Tech University, Vietnam Center and Archive, Rufus 
Phillips Collection, Box 03, Folder 14, Item Number: 23970314021, n.d. https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/reports/ 
images.php?img=/images/2397/23970314021.pdf.. 
10. Charlie Cook, “Perception.” 
11. Douglas Kinnard, The Certain Trumpet: Maxwell Taylor and the American Experience in Vietnam (Sterling, 





Up until the recent wars in Iraq, and especially Afghanistan, the Vietnam War is likely 
the most problematic of all the wars in American history. From an American point of view 
Vietnam was a morally ambiguous conflict from the start, ostensibly a war against Communism 
yet also a war to thwart national sovereignty. Reading American exit interviews of those tasked 
to advise and support the South Vietnamese reveals a conflict rife with paradoxes: Tasked to 
support and protect the South Vietnamese, the United States propped up a dictatorial regime in 
headquartered in Saigon; later in the war the US military destroyed villages to save them. US 
objectives were often poorly defined during the Vietnam war.  The United States would 
“Americanize” the war, only to “Vietnamize” it five years later. The American media sometimes 
represented tactical victories as terrible defeats, while the US military kept meticulous enemy 
body counts without any clear method of distinguishing the bodies of the hostile Viet Cong from 
those of the friendly South Vietnamese. If there is any consensus to be found perhaps it would be 
that whatever the reasons we intervened in Vietnam, even if the ultimate outcome had not been a 
disaster, the results achieved would hardly have been proportionate to the immense human and 
material costs incurred.12  
In summary, pacification was everyone’s business but no one’s responsibility from 1956‒
63. Pacification did not so much fail as a program; rather, it simply was not attempted on a major 
scale. Instead of adapting to the local circumstances in Vietnam, we fought the enemy our way at 
horrendous costs and with some tragic side effects, because we lacked the capability to do 
                                                 
12. “Statistics on U.S. Participation in The Vietnam Conflict, With Addendum,” Texas Tech University, 
Vietnam Center and Archive,. Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03—Statistical Data, Box 43, Folder 02, Item 




otherwise. In effect, we imported the American style of war to Vietnam. It was our style, we 
understood its strengths and weaknesses, it worked in two world wars and Korea. 
Recommendations 
After reading forty years’ worth of retrospective analysis of what went wrong in 
America’s attempt to support and advise the South Vietnamese, along with a careful reading of 
the Pentagon Papers, several general military lessons from the Vietnam War present themselves. 
They are:  
1. The effective conduct of military operations rests vitally upon a political 
infrastructure which is capable of attracting sustained popular support and 
minimizing the need for heavy reliance upon outside forces such as those 
provided by the United States. The United States must not be more willing to 
defend an ally than the ally is willing to defend itself. 
2. The need to fully understand the close relationship between domestic politics and 
foreign policy, especially in a country such as the United States. The implication 
is that the United States cannot support, over a long period, a large-scale US 
military intervention unless direct American national interests appear to be vitally 
affected and can be demonstrated as being vitally affected. The American 
military’s unfortunate experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have only reinforced 
this point. Unlike in Vietnam, there was no conscription and in those wars, the 
military relied on involuntarily extending service members within the ranks to 
offset military manpower shortages.  
3. The existence of gaps in historical experience, culture, and the nature of 
respective goals makes it essential to have a more broadly based understanding of 
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the country in which military operations are being conducted. This was not the 
case in Vietnam, at least in the early stages of the conflict. The lack of such 
understanding leads to the development of policies, strategies, and capabilities 
based largely upon a US experience rather than that of an adversary whom we 
confront or an ally whom we seek to assist. It also leads potentially to a 
miscalculation as to the other side’s willingness to absorb losses, a problem which 
is inherent in the calculation of the costs to the opponent of a war of attrition. 
4. The need to more precisely define the nature of US goals. US goals appear never 
to have been adequately defined in such a way as to be understood and accepted 
by a substantial segment of the US population. The criteria for judging US 
success or failure in Vietnam were not fully developed, enunciated, or understood 















Kingsley Amis once declared that if someone is not annoyed by what you write, you have 
not done your job. I’d also add that at the age of fifty-eight, I’ve come to believe that all works of 
nonfiction are to some degree autobiographical and this one more than most. Given the bitterness 
or unbending opinions that inevitably come to the surface with any discussion of the Vietnam 
War, and given the subject of this dissertation, I believe that some personal perspective might be 
in order. Think of it if you will as full disclosure. 
And no, I did not participate in the Vietnam War, but I was in support during Desert 
Storm/Desert Shield and directly participated in the Second Iraq War and Afghanistan in 
somewhat the same guise as the soldiers whose Vietnam experiences I used in this dissertation.  
I wrote this dissertation as a form of therapy in an attempt to come to terms with what I 
had both observed and undergone in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those experiences can only truly be 
understood by someone who has “seen the elephant.” Although I was much too young to 
experience the Vietnam War first hand, my father religiously watched the evening news 
programs, primarily CBS’s Walter Cronkite, on television each evening. It was, in critic Michael 
Aden's phrase, “the living-room war” and it was the backdrop of my formative years.1 For my 
father, the war was deeply personal with eight members of our extended family serving in that 
conflict. Seven of these men returned from their tours in Vietnam to go on to work in the coal 
fields and steel mills around my hometown. They found work, started families, and got on with 
their lives. During family gatherings, their experiences were never talked about when children 
                                                 
1. David  Bianculli, Teleliteracy: Taking Television Seriously (Chapel Hill, NC: Syracuse University Press, 
2000), 86. Michael Aden's phrase, “the living-room war” was used to illustrate the effect of television coverage of 
the Vietnam War on the American people. Bianculli emphasized that the “narration” of any war—how it is 
presented to the people by its government—is becoming increasing critical in sustaining popular support in the age 




were present. Other than occasionally wearing an old field jacket or “boonie hat,” no items were 
ever displayed in their homes indicating their military service. Over the years, my efforts to get 
them to tell me stories of the war were repeatedly met with vague, cryptic remarks that in effect 
said nothing and after a while, I just stopped asking.2   
It was thirty-five years later, and only after I had returned from the second of my four 
tours in a war zone, that these same men finally started talking about their experiences in 
Vietnam. My own wartime service established a shared bond and it is only now that the 
surviving members of my family will talk, if not always easily or freely, at least candidly with 
me about what they saw and did during their war and how they were treated when they came 
home. Reflecting on their experiences provided me with a much-needed insight into the 
difficulties I have come to believe all returning soldiers undergo when trying to reintegrate into a 
society that does not fully understand them. This simple realization had a profound effect on me 
and started a chain of events leading to this work. 
It wasn’t until the spring of 2008 when I was stationed at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, that I 
had a personal breakthrough when, in researching my dissertation topic, I had a series of 
extraordinary, offhand conversations with a few retired officers at Fort Leavenworth who had 
served in Vietnam as advisors. It was through these discussions that a germ of an idea formed. 
Through them, I discovered that there existed copies of the exit interviews conducted on 
                                                 
2. In talks among my family, the impact of Walter Cronkite in shaping the debate on the war came up several 
times. At the time of the Tet Offensive, his popularity and status within the Washington elite and among the wider 
American population was unrivaled. In talking with my family, the one member that remained convinced that 
victory was possible in Vietnam remarked that “after Uncle Walter said we should get out—we got out.” Possibly 
the most heartbreaking interview conducted prior to the Americanization of the war was between Cronkite and 
President John F. Kennedy at the presidential residential compound in Hyannis Port, MA., and it pointed to the 
problem that the US would face in the years ahead, “I don’t think that unless a greater effort is made by the 
government to win popular support that the war can be won out there. In the final analysis, it is their war. They are 
the ones who have to win or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there 
as advisers, but they have to win it.” See John F. Kennedy Interview by Walter Cronkite, CBS, September 2, 1963. 
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum, Boston, MA., doi: JFKWHA-212-002. 
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Vietnam advisors returning from the war and that copies of these interviews were stored locally 
at the Combined Arms Research Library at Fort Leavenworth. These now rarely opened, even 
semi-forgotten, reports were a revelation to me. By studying what had taken place in South 
Vietnam, I could better make sense of how a technologically advanced military superpower 
could be frustrated by a defeated Third World nation (Iraq) and illiterate tribesmen from a 
medieval non-state (Afghanistan). How could we win every battle and yet fail to pacify people 
who refused to recognize their own defeat?  
For the next eight weeks, I conducted an extensive review of many of those interviews 
and mentally placed them in three distinct categories. The first are those done by soldiers or 
Marines clearly impatient to separate from the service. The second group can best be described 
as those on a “careerist” path hoping to remain within the military. The final third of these 
interviews were the ones that kept me up late at night reading. It was these reports that placed my 
own difficulties in advising in a broader context and gave a poignant verification that my own 
wartime experiences were not abnormal.  
Many of the men interviewed were inarticulate, some were frighteningly blunt, and a few 
were movingly eloquent. But what caused me to keep reading late into the night, what lifted my 
spirits even when what was being said was ghastly, was that they cared; their commitment in 
telling their stories in the hope of helping others about to deploy to Vietnam jumped off the page. 
Many times, I caught myself nodding my head at what I was reading, substituting the words 
Afghanistan or Iraq for Vietnam. I was both intrigued and depressed at what I was reading. I was 
also hooked. 
When I was later asked by friends and family what helped me most in regaining a sense 
of normalcy after serving in two wars within the space of ten years, I point to the discovery of 
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those exit interviews as a turning point in my life. Through them, I developed a greater 
understanding of the frustrations endemic to serving with soldiers outside of my own culture and 
I have a greater appreciation for those precious few who do it repeatedly and who do it well.  
The selection of this research topic stems from a personal interest in the current debate on 
the use of advisors within the Army to confront the insurgencies in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Conversations with fellow military officers at Fort Leavenworth disclosed many were convinced 
the nation effectively utilized traditional elements of national power—diplomatic, informational, 
military, and economic—to wage and win the war. Others, especially those with recent 
experience advising Iraqi and Afghanistan forces, stayed adamant in their belief the US was not 
winning the war or, at least, that the US failed to use some or all elements of national power 
effectively. Divisive debate continues within the Army community concerning the effective use 
of advisors in a counterinsurgency struggle.  
It is the author’s hope that this dissertation will contribute to the understanding of the use 
and evolution of advisors programs during the Vietnam War and provide insights that have 
application to present-day operations.  





Note on Military Acronyms and Jargon 
It is the author’s intention to use only generally understood acronyms and jargon of the 
Vietnam era within this dissertation, but to aid the reader, a Glossary is provided. The author 
believes that the use of acronyms within both the US military and its government has reached a 
level bordering on the absurd and has therefore sought to limit their use within this dissertation. 
On those occasions within the dissertation where the use of military acronyms and jargon is 
necessary to provide context, they will be kept to a minimum so as not to impede those reading 
the dissertation and understanding the narrative. 
ARVN  Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South) 
BRIAM British Advisory Mission 
CG  Civil Guard (South Vietnam) 
CGLD Commissariat General for Land Development 
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency 
CIDG  Civilian Irregular Defense Group (South Vietnam) 
CMH Center of Military History 
CORDS  Civil Operations and Revolutionary (later “Rural”) Development Support 
COPROR Interagency Committee for Province Rehabilitation 
COSVN  Central Office for South Vietnam 
DARPA Defense Advanced Project Agency 
DEPCORDS Deputy for CORDS 
DMZ Demilitarized Zone 
DRV  Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
DTIC Defense Technical Information Center 
FOIA Freedom of Information Act 
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FRUS Foreign Relations of United States 
GVN  Government of Vietnam (South) 
ICP  IndoChinese Communist Party 
INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
KGB Committee for State Security (former USSR) 
KMT Nationalist Party of China 
MAAG  Military Assistance Advisory Group (US) 
MACV  Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (US) 
MACCORDS Military Assistance Command, Civilian Operations for Revolutionary 
Development Support 
 
MAP  Military Assistance Program 
 
MSU  Michigan State University 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NLF National Liberation Front  
NRM National Revolutionary Movement 
NSC  National Security Council (US) 
NVA  North Vietnamese Army 
PRG  Provisional Revolutionary Government 
PSYOP Psychological Operations 
RVN  Republic of Vietnam (South) 
RVNAF  Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces 
SDC  Self Defense Corps (South Vietnam) 
SEATO  Southeast Asia Treaty Organization  
SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimates 
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SWNCC State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (Japan) 
TIRS Terrorist Incident Reporting System 
US  United States 
USAID Agency for International Development 
USIA US Information Agency 
 
USOM  United States Operations Mission 
VC  Viet Cong 












The following Official Records used in the preparation of this work fall into two broad 
categories: those that have been accessioned by the National Archives and are identifiable by 
record group (RG) number, and those still in the custody of various government agencies that 
have not been evaluated or processed by an archivist. The latter only occasionally have 
identifying numbers; since these numbers will lose their identifying function once the records 
have been processed by National Archives, they have not been included in citations. Copies of 
many of the documents cited in the endnotes have been collected and are on file in the National 
Archives and the US Army Center of Military History (CMH) in Washington, DC, for permanent 
retention. Of particular value are the so-called Army G-2 10 files (RG 319)—a reference 
collection incorporating not only intelligence documents originated by the US Army but 
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